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REAL RESPECT: A REJECTION OF RICHARD MILLER’S
PATRIOTIC BIAS IN TAX-FINANCED AID
Gerbrand Hoogvliet
Abstract This paper analyzes Richard W. Miller's argument for
favoring compatriots in the allocation of tax-financed aid. It argues
that Miller‘s patriotic bias is derived via an incorrect framing of
the problem. It furthermore contends that Miller‘s notion of equal
respect is too uninformative to ground such a patriotic bias. A
better definition of respect in terms of human rights is offered. This
definition is more informative but fails to uphold the stringent bias
Miller argues for.
National borders occupy a curious position in political
philosophy and ethics. Their existence and location is often the
result of mere historical accident. Yet, despite this arbitrary nature,
the nation states defined by these borders are often chosen as the
primary actors in theories of international relations. Similarly in
ethics, there is a tension between the fact that citizenship seems
morally arbitrary, insofar as it is usually bestowed upon persons at
birth, and on the other hand the moral obligations that participation
in a particular society seem to give rise to. In the context of global
poverty national borders take on another moral dimension since
they often, as Michael Blake puts it, ―divide not simply one
jurisdiction from another, but the rich from the poor as well‖1.
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Given the grim facts of poverty in many parts of the world, the
question of whether wealthier nations are morally allowed to favor
their own citizens over foreigners in dire need becomes an
important one.
Richard Miller, in his contribution to the anthology The
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, entitled ―Cosmopolitan
Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, provides a universalist defense of
such a favoritism. He argues that on the basis of the principle of
equal respect for all persons we are in fact obligated to prioritize
our compatriots when it comes to tax-financed aid. He argues that
a violation of such a patriotic bias would entail disrespectful
treatment of our fellow citizens and would lead to an excessive
loss of social trust. Given that breaking the principle of equal
respect is wrong, violation of the patriotic bias is also wrong. We
are thus morally obligated to prioritize compatriots in the
administration of such aid.
In this paper I will argue against the position put forward
by Richard Miller. I will begin with an exposition of his argument.
For the benefit of the reader I will also provide a brief explanation
of concepts found in John Rawls‘s Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, that are important to a proper understanding of
Miller‘s position. I will then provide my own critique, focusing
firstly on what I hold to be an improper framing of the issue,
followed by a more fundamental criticism of the notion of equal
respect used by Miller. I will show his definition of equal respect
to be uninformative and anemic and will proceed to redefine this
concept in a more substantial way by appealing to the
philosophical literature on human rights.

2

Miller
In his paper, Miller aims to provide ―a universalist
justification of the patriotic bias in aid.‖2 Universalism here refers
to a position similar to cosmopolitanism, which takes human
beings as ‗the relevant unit of moral concern‘. It is mainly defined
in contrast to what Miller calls particularism, which is a view
maintained by philosophers such as David Miller and Michael
Sandel, who ascribe intrinsic value to communities of persons such
as nations. For particularists, the defense of patriotism is usually
based on some notion that it benefits the community or the nation
state. Since Richard Miller rejects a view of nations as intrinsically
valuable he cannot make a similar claim. In fact, because he adopts
the universalist view of all persons as having equal moral value, he
commits himself to the use of universal principle that applies to all
persons. This principle is that of equal respect.
In order to establish a patriotic bias, however, he first has to
identify what such a bias consists of. He points out that the
patriotic bias is really a combination of two biases: an attention
bias and a budgetary bias. To establish the attention bias he has to
prove that we are justified and indeed obligated to pay more
attention to the needs of our compatriots than to the needs of
foreigners. The budgetary bias is then the working out of this
attention bias in terms of assigning aid and simply means that the
majority of our tax-financed aid is indeed spent on compatriots. He
recognizes that he has to establish the attention bias before he can
claim the budgetary bias.
2
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Equal Respect
In establishing the principle of equal respect, Miller makes
an appropriate distinction between respect and concern. Whereas
most of the literature conflates these two terms, he defines them
separately. Concern, for Miller, applies to personal relationships
such as between family members, friends etc and signifies a deep
level of caring for the well being of others. I think Miller rightly
restricts this type of sympathy to those who we are personally
acquainted with. As an example, he states that although he owes
equal respect to his daughter and the girl across the street, he is not
required to have the same level of concern for the latter. I think this
is a sensible distinction and it clarifies the task at hand: since
concern covers all persons that we stand in a personal relationship
to, the principle of respect is the one that will regulate our behavior
to strangers domestically and abroad.
The equal respect that we owe to strangers has two main
parameters:
1) One avoids moral wrongness just in case one
conforms to some set of rules for living by
which one could express equal respect for all.3
2) A choice is wrong just in case it violates every
set of shared rules of conduct to which
everyone could be freely and rationally
committed without anyone‘s violating his or
her own self-respect.4

3
4
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The phrasing of these parameters is somewhat confusing, but in a
nutshell they provide two conditions under which equal respect is
violated. Under the first rule, it is morally wrong to choose a
method of administering tax-financed aid that does not show equal
respect for all. The second parameter claims that it is wrong to
choose a way of distributing aid in a way that some persons could
not self-respectfully accept. To use an example, if you and I were
to start a lawn mowing business and I suggested that, even though
we put in the same amount of work, I should get all the money,
then that would not be an arrangement that you could selfrespectfully accept.
Miller thus separates respect out into a respect outward and
respect inward; respect for others and self-respect. Any
administration of tax financed aid thus has to express and satisfy
both forms of respect.
Rawlsian Intermezzo
At this point I think it will be beneficial to elucidate some
concepts from John Rawls that are implicit in much of Miller‘s
further discussion. Although Miller is not defending anything like
a Rawlsian position, much of political philosophy is steeped in the
tradition started by Rawls and it is therefore useful to have a basic
understanding of some of the background concepts informing this
discussion.
Rawls conceives of society as ―a fair system of
cooperation‖5 among free and equal citizens. Fairness is necessary

5
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for Rawls because one does not choose what society one is born
into, and exiting a society is extremely difficult if not impossible.
Society is thus unlike other forms of association such as local
communities, schools, clubs, church congregations etc. where
membership can be given up if one is asked to uphold rules and
practices that one is unwilling to support. Since no such an exit
option exists for the nation state there is a more urgent demand for
fairness.
Not only is societal membership largely involuntary, it also
exposes persons to the coercive nature of the state. For Rawls
―political power is always coercive power applied by the state and
its apparatus of enforcement.‖ 6 As citizens we participate in the
creation of laws, which the state then enforces in our name.
Justification is thus demanded both on the grounds that laws are
enacted in our name as well as that laws are enforced upon us.
Given this nature of society and the demands for
justification that it gives rise to, Rawls is particularly concerned
with the well being of what he calls ―the least-advantaged
members of society.‖7 It is easy to see why this is: given the
coercive nature of the state and the near impossibility of exiting
society, it is the worst off group that is most likely to feel trapped
in a system that they would not voluntarily uphold. This group
could certainly be coerced into cooperation, but the ideal of a just
society would then have been forfeited. I take Miller‘s concerns
about respect to also be focusing largely on this group, and for
similar reasons.

6
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Loss of Social Trust
Returning to Miller‘s argument, he claims that a failure to
prioritize compatriots would entail a violation of the principle of
equal respect. This violation comes about in two ways. First,
without a patriotic bias, tax-financed aid is distributed in a way that
does not express respect to all. Specifically, the least-advantaged
members of society are not treated respectfully by their fellow
citizens. This goes against the first parameter of equal respect that I
stated above. The idea here seems to be that by not paying extra
attention to the needs of disadvantaged compatriots we are treating
them disrespectfully, which the first parameter holds to be wrong.
The second way in which a breach of equal respect comes
about is through the inability of the least-advantaged group in
society to self-respectfully accept such an allocation of taxfinanced aid. Put differently, the least well off members of society
could not choose a use of tax-financed aid that did not prioritize
them and at the same time maintain their self-respect. The sacrifice
required of them would be too large, the inequalities faced too
stark. Since an allocation is imposed on them that they could not
self-respectfully accept, parameter 2 of equal respect is violated
and the allocation is thus wrong.
It is important to note here that the priority that Miller
requires is a very strong one:
[P]riority does not totally exclude support for
foreign aid in the presence of relevant domestic
burdens. Still, until domestic political
arrangements have done as much as they can [...]
to eliminate serious burdens of domestic
inequality of life-prospects, there should be no
7

significant sacrifice of this goal in order to help
disadvantaged foreigners.8
To put the consequences of this patriotic bias in context, Miller
presents us with three persons who present the three main
stakeholders in the outcome of this discussion. Kevin is a corporate
lawyer living in a rich suburb of New York. Carla lives in the
South Bronx and earns a meager living cleaning other people‘s
apartments. Khalid, finally, collects scrap metal and lives in a slum
in Dacca, Bangladesh. Miller maintains that the patriotic bias and
its consequences can be self-respectfully accepted by all three. As
we stated above, Carla, as a member of the least-advantaged group
in society, can self-respectfully accept a situation in which she is
prioritized to the extent that Miller suggests in the statement above.
Kevin also upholds the principle of equal respect since he is
treating Carla in a respectful manner. Khalid, according to Miller,
can also self-respectfully accept the patriotic bias that Kevin and
Carla adhere to since he understands that both value the social trust
that would be lost without such a bias. Kevin and Carla are also
assumed to be treating Khalid respectfully, although Miller does
not go into detail as to why that would be the case.
Naturally such a bias is a very convenient view for rich
societies to hold since it reduces their obligations to foreign aid
significantly. As Thomas Nagel points out in ―The Problem of
Global Justice‖, however, the fact that a theory is convenient
doesn‘t make it false.9
8
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There is, however, another reason to be suspicious about
Miller‘s patriotic bias as based on the principle of equal respect.
Note that changes in Khalid‘s level of deprivation do not change
the bias. Miller chooses to think of him as a scrap metal collector
in Bangladesh, but we could just as easily imagine him as living in
a refugee camp in Chad, or working 70 hours a week in a coal
mine in Brazil, and Miller‘s bias would remain unaffected. Also
note that Khalid does not feature anywhere in Miller‘s argument
prior to the establishment of the patriotic bias. The fact that
Khalid‘s circumstances are not being taken into account at all
makes it at the very least unlikely that he is being shown equal
respect.
Deciding on the extent of a patriotic bias that is supposed to
show equal respect to all can hardly be done without looking at the
needs of foreigners, especially given the severity of global poverty.
Although the facts of global poverty cannot, in and of themselves,
decide the debate about patriotic bias, they can help pull it into
focus. Thomas Pogge estimates that in the 15 years following the
Cold War, 270 million people died from poverty related causes, an
average of 18 million a year.10 Against the backdrop of these grim
facts, a theory that does not take into account the needs of the
global poor can hardly claim to express equal respect for all.
In the next section I will present two criticisms of Miller‘s
argument. The first focuses on a framing issue that I think skews
the debate and misrepresents the trade-offs involved in reallocation
10
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of tax-financed aid. The second criticism is far more fundamental
and proves that the principle of equal respect used by Miller is
uninformative and stands in need of a better definition. I will
consequently suggest a more informative definition grounded in
contemporary political philosophy of human rights.
Framing
My claim here is that Miller gets the strong bias that he
wants by the way he frames the reallocation of tax-financed aid. In
short, my contention is that Miller implicit assumes the amount of
tax-financed aid to be fixed, or determined at a point prior to the
patriotic bias discussion. By doing this, any imagined change to the
allocation of this aid becomes a zero-sum game between Carla and
Khalid. The amount of aid is set, so any aid to Khalid will have to
come out of tax money reserved for Carla. This places undue
tension on the allocation decision as we are forced to choose
between two persons clearly in need. Certainly, in absolute terms
Khalid is worse off than Carla, but on the other hand Carla is
forced to participate in a society with people like Kevin, which
raises concerns of fairness domestically. The radically unequal
income distribution in the United States only further aids Miller‘s
argument.
My point is that this is an incorrect framing of the question.
If we are really concerned with equal respect for all, we should not
take tax aid as given, but rather as a function of the needs of Carla
and Khalid and what is owed to them on account of this respect. If,
for the sake of argument, we take Kevin as the sole tax payer, then
the tax rate imposed on him should be set at a level at which both
Carla and Khalid can self-respectfully accept the amount of aid
10

they receive. Framing the question in this way, I think Miller may
still be justified in claiming that more is owed to compatriots on
account of the coercive nature of the state. However, the amount
owed to Khalid is likely to be much higher than what he has in
mind. Thinking about the reallocation of aid in this way also makes
more sense if we view it from Khalid‘s perspective. He is more
likely to think of himself as being owed some type of aid by Kevin
rather than by Carla, since Kevin is in a position to improve
Khalid‘s life significantly, at little cost to himself.
This then raises the question of how much domestic and
foreign aid would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the principle
of equal respect and whether Kevin could self-respectfully accept
such a tax burden. This is where the limitations of Miller‘s account
become clearly visible, because the definition of equal respect that
he uses is completely uninformative on this matter. It seems to me
that Khalid could not self-respectfully accept the bias proposed by
Miller, but how much would foreign aid have to increase for that to
change? And if we found this amount, how could we tell if the tax
burden required is one that Kevin could self-respectfully accept?
Equal Respect Revisited
The uninformative nature of the equal respect principle
stems from the fact that Miller defines it in terms of respect. If we
look again at the two parameters, we notice that they largely
constitute an elucidation of the concept of equal respect. Miller
effectively break it down into two components: respect-towards
and self-respect. Parameters one and two deal with those
respectively. However, the meaning and import of these

11

components remains unhappily vague as can be seen in the
discussion at the end of the previous section.
I think current thought in political philosophy can provide
us with more informative concepts of what equal respect entails.
The one I shall focus on here is the recent work in philosophy of
human rights, although Amarty Sen and Martha Nussbaum‘s work
on the human capabilities approach is also a strong candidate.
Human Rights as Equal Respect
International human rights practice is commonly seen as
motivated by the need to protect human dignity in some form or
other. Although this idea of dignity is rather vague, a clear
connection can be seen with the idea of respect. What we mean by
equal respect is that we treat other persons as having a certain
amount of equal intrinsic value. We regard them as worthy of
moral consideration.
Recent works in the philosophy of human rights have
expounded this idea of dignity and tried to give it more substance.
They have established strong philosophical frameworks for
thinking about the goal and content of human rights. The account
given by James Nickel in Making Sense of Human Rights focuses
on vital human interests that human rights are designed to protect.
As such, human rights can be seen as necessary conditions for
living a minimally good life. James Griffin‘s account in On Human
Rights envisions them as protecting a person‘s liberty, autonomy,
and basic standard of living.11 Again, human rights are used to
protect what we see as central to human life.
11
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I think that these accounts can help lend content to the
concept of equal respect. Since human rights are necessary
conditions for a minimally good life, violating them can rightly be
seen as disrespecting the holder of that right. Human rights thus set
a minimum standard for what equal respect for all persons requires:
namely a guarantee not to violate human rights and a strong duty to
help uphold and enforce them whenever one is in a position to do
so at relatively low cost to oneself.
Applying this human rights definition of equal respect to
Miller‘s account yields a very different outcome. For one, the
patriotic bias can no longer be established by only considering the
domestic case. Instead, equal respect demands an effort to
guarantee the observance of human right for all persons both
domestically and abroad.
Certainly I have only sketched an outline here of what such
an approach to the allocation of tax-financed aid would entail.
Further development of the idea of ‗human rights as a standard for
equal respect‘ is necessary in order to work out its exact practical
implications. The duties of different well-off societies to help the
global poor in having their human rights protected need to be
coordinated and a reasonable limit needs to be placed on the
burden that such duties can impose on these societies.
Nevertheless, it appears clear from the outset that any
patriotic bias that claims to show equal respect on my definition of
that term, would be quite different from the one argued for by
Miller. It almost certainly calls for a greater transfer of aid from
the per-capita rich countries to those in need. It does not preclude
the existence of a patriotic bias in tax-financed aid, and in fact
arguments for such a bias are probably justified. It does mean that
13

demands for equal respect will take precedence over any
considerations of patriotic priority, as I have argued they should.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that Richard Miller‘s argument
for a patriotic bias rests on an uninformative definition of the
principle of equal respect. Due to the indeterminate nature of this
principle, it is unclear what sort of patriotic bias can be justified.
Whether different allocations of tax-financed aid show equal
respect for all becomes a matter of speculation and personal
interpretations of human psychology.
I have argued that the philosophical human rights tradition
can provide us with a more substantial account of what respect for
persons entails. Recent influential works by James Nickel and
James Griffin suggest human rights as a protection of abilities and
interests necessary for living a minimally good life. Given the
important nature of human rights to individuals persons, I suggest
that equal respect entails the non-violation of these rights as well
as a duty to protect and uphold them when one can do so at little
cost to oneself. I note that this is merely the first step in the
creation of such an account and that more work is needed to
establish clearly the demands ‗human rights as a standard for equal
respect‘ can and ought to give rise to. I do contend that any
account based on this new definition of human rights will fail to
establish a patriotic bias as strong as the one argued for by Richard
Miller.
A last remark with regard to the question of tax-financed
aid is in order. As Charles Beitz has noted, discussions in the field
of global economic justice often make too much of the importance
14

of transfer payments from tax dollars.12 More effective, efficient
and lasting solutions to problems of economic inequality and
global poverty can likely be found through the structural
rearrangement of institutions such that they favor - or at the very
least cease to actively disadvantage - the global poor. For the
purpose of this paper, which was a response to Miller‘s patriotic
bias in tax-financed aid, such questions of institutional reform were
unfortunately not within our scope. Discussions in the field of
global justice and cosmopolitanism can perhaps shine a light on
fruitful solutions in that direction.

12
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A DEFENSE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
Simon Pickus
Abstract Public justification is a concept presented by John
Rawls as a way to legitimize political authority and to make
fundamental political arguments. In essence, the principle holds
that one should only present arguments that the opposition can
reasonably accept, as opposed to appealing to a religious or
political conception of the good. This paper seeks to present a
cogent conception of the principle of public justification. The
strengths of the principle will be explained, and the main critiques
of the position will be examined and defended against. By this
method, Rawls‘ conception of public justification can be shown to
be a compelling and robust position.
Among the more pressing issues that have persisted
throughout Western political and philosophical thought have been
how political power can be rightly exercised, and how can political
disputes between passionate parties be fairly resolved. Under what
circumstances can the coercive power of the state be implemented
in a way that is just and right? Bloodlines, military might, and
religious mandates have all been appealed to as justification for
political authority, but these are all answers monarchs and
emperors have given to their already cowed populaces.
Compelling answers to these questions presented by thinkers such
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau emerged in the form of
reasonable consent of the governed as a legitimizing factor for
18

political authorities. In the 20th century, the widely-read political
philosopher John Rawls best articulated the concept of public
justification, a principle in which political authority can be
considered legitimate only insofar as the reasons given for political
action could be reasonably accepted by those who are governed.
For this project, I will begin by giving a general overview of the
position as conceived and presented by Rawls in his more recent
works. I will follow this outline of public justification by
explaining why this view is appealing and what problems within
political thought it solves, or at least purports to solve. I will then
present brief explanations of some of the more pressing objections
to the theory, and will conclude with a refutation of these critiques.
The Idea of Public Justification
For Rawls, the principle of public justification is one that
exists within what Rawls refers to as a well-ordered society. This
means that, for him, any discussion of public justification
presupposes a democratic society with a political culture that is
pluralistic and has a commonly accepted conception of justice. In
addition, Rawls notes that, ―Accepting this conception does not
presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine.‖1 To
clarify, ―comprehensive doctrine‖ is a Rawlsian term for a
complete conception of the moral good and a thorough set of
values. Although these are not by necessity comprehensive, what
is important about them is that they comprise a set of values and a
conception of the moral good. Some examples of comprehensive
doctrines are religious beliefs and moral philosophical codes such
1
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as utilitarianism. Here Rawls is emphasizing that the principle of
public justification is distinct from any one conception of the good
or set of moral values. It does not presuppose a religion or ethical
code, and does not need to. As it is meant to function within a
society that has a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that its
citizens accept, public justification is compatible with all
reasonable conceptions of the good.
It is important here to note the particular meaning of
―reasonable‖ in this context, as it is a conceptually significant term.
For Rawls, ―…reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to
specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation.‖2 By
this Rawls means that to be reasonable is to act fairly and to seek
cooperation and the resolution of disputes. A reasonable person
will not enter into an agreement knowing that they will later
violate that agreement, not will they staunchly refuse any attempt
at resolving a disagreement. Additionally, reasonable people will
seek to end conflicts and live peaceably, even if doing so is not
always in complete accord with their rational self-interests. Acting
reasonably is, as Rawls sees it, distinct from acting rationally,
although in no way does reasonableness preclude rationality. It is
very possible, however, to act rationally and unreasonably at the
same time. An example of this would be a person who enters a
long-term agreement and immediately forsakes that agreement
when they see a way to derive some advantage from it. Another
way to conceptualize this distinction is in the context of rational
self-interest. To act in accord with rational self-interest is always
2
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rational but not always reasonable. The example of the tragedy of
commons demonstrates that rational self interest leads to what
Rawls would call unreasonable behavior, because it does not
indicate a desire for fair cooperation. Rawls‘ conception of the
reasonable, I find, agrees in large part with commonly held
intuitions of what it is to act reasonably.
The principle of public justification, once established in the
Rawlsian political context, is the vehicle for those with political
disagreements to discuss and resolve their disputes in ways that are
reasonable and acceptable to all involved. As Rawls explains, this
principle allows people and groups to ―…justify to one another
their political judgments: each cooperates, politically and socially,
with the rest on terms all can endorse as just. This is the meaning
of public justification.‖3 Here Rawls explains the very basic idea
of the public justification principle.
People within a well-ordered society, or any developed
democratic society as we would recognize today, will inevitably
disagree with each other and their leaders on their political and
social policy judgments. This alone is difficult to dispute. There
are many reasons, even within a well-ordered society with a shared
conception of justice, for these disagreements, such as what Rawls
refers to as the plurality of comprehensive doctrines. He claims
that, ―…a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable
comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist…This fact
about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.‖4
Once the aforementioned disputes arise, public justification acts as

3
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a mechanism for their resolution. People and groups justify their
political judgments by presenting arguments that their opponents
can reasonably endorse as a means of making their views plausible
within the worldviews of the other. Using public justification, they
appeal not to their conception of the good, such as, for example,
the principle of utility or the intrinsic value and dignity of a human
being, but rather they appeal to political values and reasons they
both share so as to cooperatively come to a conclusion. In this way
political disputes can, ideally, be solved in such that all can
reasonably accept the conclusion without having to violate their
closely held values and beliefs. Rawls goes on to note that,
―Public justification proceeds from some consensus: from premises
all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and equal and fully
capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to endorse.‖5
The general aim of this principle, then, is to provide a way
for political judgments to be justified without appeal to reasons
that the disagreeing party would never accept. A utilitarian could
never convince a Kantian that a political moral dilemma can be
solved using the principle of utility, no more than an Orthodox Jew
could appeal to his or her religious tenets to convince a political
opponent who is an adherent of Islam. No matter how dearly
someone holds their conception of the moral good, they will not be
able to offer compelling arguments to me if I do not agree with that
idea of the good. They would need to find a set of criteria we both
accept. By avoiding argument entrenched in the values of a
comprehensive doctrine, public justification aims to avoid some of
the persistent and pressing disagreements that have plagued
I
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political discourse. Additionally, it reinforces political cooperation
and reasonable discourse in a way that is consistent with a
functioning democracy.
One important distinction that Rawls emphasizes is that
public justification does not have a basis in simple agreement.
What sets public justification aside as unique is its appeal to a
common ground of reasonable arguments based, in part, on a
shared conception of justice that allows for important political
disputes to be fairly solved. Rawls himself states that, ―It is this
last condition of reasoned reflection that, among other things,
distinguishes public justification from mere agreement.‖6 Here
Rawls shows the true importance of justifying political positions
by presenting reasons anyone could reasonably accept. It is this
aspect of public justification that sets it apart and, as I will now
explain, it is this aspect that makes the principle of public
justification appealing.
Why Public Justification is Compelling
The theory of public justification has a variety of strengths
that make it a very compelling way to approach political discourse
and legitimacy. The first largely intuitive main strength of public
justification is that it serves as an alternative to tyranny and
oppression, and as construed here does not allow for tyranny or
oppression of any sort. The very nature of public justification does
not allow for any sort totalitarian coercive rule that is imposed on
the populace of a nation unwillingly. This aspect of public
justification, though simple and straightforward, is a significant
6
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point in its favor.
A second way in which the principle of public justification
is strongly compelling is that it provides a way to solve political
disputes that otherwise seem too divisive or too deeply entrenched
in moral values for either party to possibly accept the other‘s
position. This is particularly relevant to American politics, and
similar systems, in which there is a political culture of such
profoundly divided adversarial fervor that a resolution between the
adversaries, in this case the two political parties, seems completely
unfeasible. Joshua Cohen, a prominent contemporary political
philosopher, echoes this sentiment when he notes, ―The more
immediate concerns come from the pathologically polarized state
of political discourse in the United States.‖7 He goes on to state
that the intention of politics is to confront and overcome important
and pressing issues relating to people and what they value in their
lives, which is significant because ―…public reason arguably
provides a more promising basis than polarized disagreement for
doing the works of politics, and…decent and inclusive political life
is not only a profoundly important good, but a painfully fragile
one.‖8 In essence, the principle of public justification allows us to
do the important work of politics without being hobbled by the
vehement political culture that currently exists in the U.S. All that
is required for this to work is that those engaged in political
arguments accept that giving conceptions of the good as criteria for
political decisions is not only unreasonable but disrespectful, as it
is essentially a demand that political opponents defer to one‘s
7
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comprehensive doctrine. Were politicians and pundits to accept
this burden of respect and consider the practical advantages of
public justification, we would not be stuck in such a partisan rut.
In this case, public justification is compelling in that it avoids this
issue by leading the disputing parties to converse using reasons
that the other side might reasonably accept. At the very least, this
principle presents the possibility of progress beyond the partisan
impasse that some see the United States to be stuck in, and in this
way public justification is compelling to American political
thinkers.
A third reason that public justification is appealing lies in
the distinction between rational and reasonable. As a method for
justifying political positions and authority, public justification as
presented by Rawls prioritizes the reasonable over the rational. To
some, the appeal to discussion between reasonable people without
emphasizing acting in strictly rational ways lies in the avoidance of
prisoner‘s dilemma-type situations. By this I mean that for some,
political discourse is problematic because it can be said to be
populated by those who act strictly in their own interests and the
interests of their associates; people who act in ruthlessly
calculating ways. Public justification, on the other hand, ensures
political discourse in which nobody is trying to trick their
opponents, but rather encourages reasonable people to make
genuinely persuasive arguments so as arrive at resolutions of
political disputes. This emphasis on reasonableness is appealing to
some because it presents a less adversarial, more cooperative
method of dealing with political disagreements. As an
environment focused on the genuine resolution of the issues in
reasonable and productive ways, public justification is an
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appealing principle.
A fourth strength of public justification is the way in which
it provides a means for the maintenance of both legitimacy and
stability in contractarian societies, those societies with a basis in
some sort of founding agreement or governing document. A very
real issue for these societies is that in several generations that
society will be comprised of citizens who were not party to the
original contractarian agreement. In a Hobbesian society, for
example, once this point is reached, and there is no effective
institutional way to change the society, then it is only a matter of
time until circumstances change such that sufficient people reject
the original contractarian agreement and the foundations of the
society collapse. For this reason, there will come a point at which
the members of the society no longer see a compelling reason to
continue to submit to the coercive powers of the state granted by
their ancestors. Public justification becomes appealing in this
circumstance because it provides a plausible means for the
contractarian society to change according to the wills of its citizens
without a fundamental threat to its stability. Since the society‘s
basic institutions are now mutable according to the will of the
current populace, general discontent with the contractarian nature
of the state is no longer an issue. In this way public justification is
a compelling principle to those who adhere to contractarian
conceptions of statehood.
Objection 1: Begs the Question
In addition to its many compelling features, the principle of
public justification has significant objections to contend with. To
begin, it is necessary to clarify the concept of public reason and its
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interaction with public justification. As Rawls puts it, public
reasons are, ―…the political values covered by the political
conception of justice (or one of a suitable family of such).‖9 In
essence, public reasons are those we can give to justify our actions
and positions to others within our society who therefore share our
basic political conceptions. As Cohen puts it, ―…the ideal of
public reason says that in our political affairs…justification ought
to be conducted on common ground…common ground provided
by considerations that participants in the political relations can all
acknowledge as reasons.‖10 Simply put, public reason is the
vehicle of public justification; reasons that are publicly justifiable
are discussed using public reason. It is the form of reason we use
to justify our political judgments to others. In this sense a
discussion of public reason goes hand-in-hand with one of public
justification, and a rejection of public reason is a rejection of
public justification.
The first objection I will address comes from a writer
named Bruce Brower of Tulane University. In his article The
Limits of Public Reason, Brower analyzes several ways in which
Rawls can make public reason, and by extension public
justification, compelling to those who do not accept the priority of
the reasonable. If I can refute any one of these, it would show that
Rawls‘ project does not succumb to the limitations Brower
presents. I am choosing to address one of these lines of argument,
in which Brower claims that the demands of public reason violate
equal respect and can be shown to be compelling only to those that

9
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already accept the ideal of the reasonable. In other words, Brower
argues that the case for public reason begs the question. Brower
argues that the demands of public justification violate equal respect
because they require people to abandon values and beliefs that are
deeply important to them. As he writes, ―Treating others equally
and acting autonomously…requires us to ignore an important part
of our character…‖11 Here Brower is arguing that in requiring that
people not use their conception of the good to make fundamental
political decisions Rawls is asking them to forsake something too
important to simply discard. Brower goes on to argue that
proponents of public justification, ―…do ignore something
‗constitutive‘ of our persons: that we care deeply about our
conceptions of the good and associated justifications…The
problem is…Rawlsian arguments will be acceptable only to those
who have already approved the…ideal of the reasonable person.‖12
This is the meat of the objection that Brower presents. Rawls fails
to show equal respect because he devalues peoples‘ constitutive
values on the grounds that they are not publicly acceptable reasons
to give in a political sense. Because of this, Brower feels that
Rawls is saying that people should not give morally-grounded
justifications, and should rather give public justifications, which
are more reasonable. But, Brower claims, this requires that
someone has already accepted the priority of the reasonable.
Because of this, public justification is only compelling to those
who already accept it.
This objection is not as strong as it first appears, and it in
11

Bruce W. Brower, ―The Limits of Public Reason,‖ The Journal of Philosophy
91 (1994): 14.
12
Brower, ―The Limits of Public Reason,‖ 15.

28

fact undermines itself. There are two primary claims to deal with:
the demands of public justification violate equal respect, and
public justification is not compelling to those who have not already
accepted it. A fair way to analyze this objection is to consider a
political dialogue between two people and look to see if the issues
Brower presented indeed occur. Abe is someone who wants to
make political arguments based on his conception of the moral
good. Zeke is a proponent of public justification. He adheres to a
comprehensive doctrine but does not seek to ground political
arguments in the values of that doctrine. Abe claims that society
should implement policy A because it is consistent with his
comprehensive doctrine‘s view of the moral good. Zeke says that
that conception of the good conflicts with his own, and as such he
cannot reasonably accept Abe‘s justification. Zeke suggests that
Abe appeal to shared aspects of their society‘s political culture.
Abe responds by saying that it is disrespectful that he be asked to
discard his comprehensive doctrine, which is very important to
him, when making this important political argument. This is the
point Brower gets at. My response is to ask what, then, is the
alternative? It seems as though the only way out of this impasse
for Abe is that Zeke accept his conception of the good and
therefore his political argument. But this undermines any attempt
at equal respect that Brower wants to make. If this is what
comprises equal respect, then Abe‘s demand of Zeke is no less
disrespectful than Zeke‘s demand. For people who value
conceptions of the good and their importance as much as Brower
does, it follows that they would then find it unfair to ask someone
else to defer to their conception of the good, as that would be
demanding that they disregard a personally constitutive value.
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I respond that Brower‘s standard for equal respect is too
high to be feasible, and that it will inevitably lead to the impasse
mentioned above. Given the aforementioned fact of reasonable
pluralism, which I take to be uncontroversial in a free society, this
impasse will occur constantly. Public justification is compelling
precisely because it is a mechanism for this plurality of doctrines
to exist without anyone having to defer to another‘s conception of
the moral good. A more proper standard for equal respect is to
consider each comprehensive doctrine to be as valuable as any
other. This standard of respect, together with the fact of reasonable
pluralism, leads us to conclude that those who hold conceptions of
the good to be vitally important to people would in fact find a
reason to endorse public justification. It provides a mechanism for
political cooperation while maintaining everyone‘s deeply
important values and ensuring that the standard of equal respect is
not violated. This conclusion in addition to the strengths of public
justification I mentioned earlier provides a very strong basis for the
acceptance of public justification by those who do not necessarily
endorse Rawls‘ ideal of the reasonable.
Objection 2: Self-Defeating
The second objection to the theory of public justification I
will address is presented by Steven Wall in his article, Is Public
Justification Self-Defeating?. Wall argues that public justification
is in need of justification, and is unable to satisfactorily meet its
own demands to justify itself to those who it would apply to. In
other words, Wall is arguing that public justification is not in itself
sufficiently publicly justifiable to justify itself as a principle for
determining the legitimacy of political authority. Wall begins his
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argument by defining public justification in a way that is coherent
and continuous with the way it has been defined here. He claims
that among the relevant requirements for political authority to be
publicly justifiable is what he calls the ―acceptability requirement.‖
Wall defines this by saying, ―…the justification must be one that
can be reasonably accepted (or not reasonably rejected) by those to
whom it is addressed.‖13 There is nothing problematic here. He
goes on to discuss how we must make a distinction between a
public justification and a correctness-based justification. For Wall,
a correctness-based justification is one that demonstrates that a
conclusion is correct, whereas public justification, something that
has already been made clear, is distinct from this. This is
significant for Wall because if proponents of public justification do
not hold that political authority must be legitimized by both of the
aforementioned justifications, then they are left to answer why
public justification is even worth discussing. Wall continues by
explaining that this can be resolved by claiming that public
justification serves to mark the outer limits of our freedom14, and
as such leads to what Wall calls the ―reconciling function‖ of
public justification, which serves to show that each person has a
good reason, by appealing to public justification, to accept political
authority. This function demonstrates why a correctness-based
justification is not inherently sufficient for legitimizing political
authority.
Wall argues that despite the appeal of the reconciling
feature of public justification, it is still not an inherently correct
13
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theory of political legitimacy. This, Wall explains, ―…is why it is
reasonable to say that [public justification] stands in need of
justification.‖15 In other words, since public justification does not
claim to be correct on moral grounds, it needs to be justified by
other means. So, Wall asks, what sort of justification is required?
The answer is that public justification must satisfy its own
requirements, and for this reason the theory might be selfdefeating. As Wall puts it, ―If [public justification] were indeed a
self-defeating principle, then it would fail on its own terms. This
would give us a reason to reject it.‖16 Wall proceeds by claiming
that supporters of public justification must now either demonstrate
that public justification does not apply to itself, or that it does in
fact meet its own demands. Wall addresses the first claim and
argues that it is untenable because it contradicts the very purpose
of public justification. To claim that public justification does not
need to meet its own demands would be to say that any given
authority is publicly justifiable but then not offer a reason to accept
the constraints of public justifiability. This does not get us
anywhere.
Wall addresses the second claim against the self-defeat of
public justification in two ways. In the first, Wall argues that any
attempt to argue that public justification applies to itself because of
values that permeate contemporary democratic societies would
have to contend with the objection that the principle of equal
respect is in fact not embedded in modern democratic societies.
This results in there being at least some people in contemporary
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society who would not reasonably accept the theory of public
justification. Secondly, Wall discusses how even if there did exist
some sort of background political value that all members of a
society shared, people would disagree as to the particular nature of
that value. In this case there would be so much disagreement
about the shared value that the value would be too thin a concept to
appeal to when giving public reasons.
Wall concludes his discussion of public justification by
expressing doubt that there is any recourse for those who support
public justification to prove that it in fact is not self-defeating.
Additionally, he notes, political legitimacy might be a matter of
degree, and that public justification still serves to legitimize
political authority better than any alternatives. He concludes by
claiming that given that even if these might be valid options for the
proponent of public justification, they do not refute the overall
claim that public justification is self-defeating.
To begin my response to this objection, I note that Wall
seems to give a charitable presentation of the general principle of
public justification. I will also concede here that since public
justification is not a correctness-based justification, it does need to
be justified further. I will here accept the claim that in order to
avoid being self-defeating, public justification must either be said
to not apply to itself, or must itself be publicly justifiable. I will
refute this objection by showing that public justification is itself
publicly justifiable. This is because, despite Wall‘s insistence to
the contrary, there is indeed a commonly held political conception
of justice in contemporary democratic societies, and it is that
conception of justice that can be appealed to in order to justify the
theory of public justification, as well as other political claims.
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Although there are considerable disagreements when it comes to
moral conceptions of justice, such as how to punish criminals and
what moral codes people ought to abide by, when it comes to
political discourse Americans still share fundamental intuition
about what political justice is. By this I mean our political culture
holds that taxation without representation, for example, is unfair
and unjust in a political sense. Americans expect the will of the
people and the spirit of the constitution to be enforced as matters of
justice and would as a group reject a leader or proposal that
violates the basic tenets of democracy and representation. We have
an understanding of society as what Rawls calls ―…a fair system
of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.‖17
We have a sense of basic liberties as defined by our constitution.
This commonly-held conception of justice, broadly defined,
functions as a baseline that publicly justifiable arguments can
appeal to. In other words, this shared conception of political
justice in American political culture is a common ground that
demonstrates that the principle of public justification can be
applied to the United States. I am confident that such shared
conceptions of justice exist in similarly democratic nations.
Here it is important again to note the distinction between
agreement and a shared political conception of justice. People
agree when for whatever reason they both find an argument or idea
appealing. A common conception of political justice, however,
goes beyond agreement because it is a fundamental aspect of the
democratic political culture that members of a free society share.
They share it not because it is in accord with their conceptions of
17
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the moral good, but because it is part of the political culture they
belong to. People who disagree on political and moral matters may
still appeal to this shared political value and offer compelling
arguments (i.e. public reasons) to each other. It is from these
public reasons that people may come to an agreement about
political decisions or policies. Because of this common ground I,
or anyone else, can offer arguments in political disputes that are
reasonable for my opponent to accept on the basis of political
justice.
Wall also argues that even were a shared political value to
exist within a society, ―…it does not follow that everyone has
reason to accept the particular interpretation of this principle that is
needed to ground [public justification].‖18 I contend that even
given differing interpretations of this value, the fundamental core
of the value, such as justice, would suffice for the purposes of
public justification. Additionally, Rawls himself addresses this
concern in his presentation of the idea of an overlapping
consensus, wherein he echoes my claim. As he writes,
―While…all citizens affirm the same political conception of
justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same reasons…but
this does not prevent the political conception from being a shared
point of view from which they can resolve questions concerning
the constitutional essentials.‖19 As a result, public justification is in
fact not self defeating because it can meet its own demands, and it
can be shown that modern democratic societies do have sufficient
shared political values for public reasons to be feasibly presented.
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Conclusion
The principle of public justification, that political authority
is legitimized and political disputes resolved by both parties
appealing to arguments that the other side can reasonably accept, is
to me a powerful principle. Because it is not limited by
conceptions of the moral good and because it can help us to escape
the partisan rut we as Americans seem to be stuck in, public
justification can act as a means to end long standing and seemingly
irresolvable political disputes. In addition, the emphasis of the
reasonable over the rational ensures we avoid the pitfalls of
unrelenting rational self-interest, such as those presented in the
prisoner‘s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. Although
objections are leveled against the theory, they are not sufficiently
strong to dissuade us from accepting public justification and its
advantages in terms of fairness, respect, and pragmatism. In the
end, public justification remains the most reasonable and
compelling method for adequately resolving political disputes and
legitimizing political authority. I genuinely believe that this
principle is the best way to overcome the obstacles of political
oppression and divisiveness, in spite of people‘s desires to adhere
only to their conceptions of the good. Were just Americans to
accept this principle, the contemporary political climate would
improve tenfold, and much more genuine progress could be made.
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HAVING CHILDREN: REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS IN THE
FACE OF OVERPOPULATION
Kianna Goodwin
Abstract Overpopulation is a serious threat to future persons‘
quality of life. One that I believe can only be addressed by
adopting reproductive values that inspire justice for future
generations. In this paper I discuss theorists whose views I argue
support limiting the right to procreate. I believe enforcing
reproductive responsibility is necessary to curb the problem of
overpopulation and therefore maintain a standard quality of life for
future generations.
It‘s common to think of having kids as a personal
opportunity to experience a unique happiness and our ability to
make choices about procreating as a key expression of our identity
and personal autonomy. These factors make us feel that the
decision to have kids is a deeply individual choice and more
importantly that there exists no ethical justification which could
diminish this fundamental right.
Our world population has doubled in the last 40 years,
which means by 2050 we could potentially have 12 billion people
in the world. Overpopulation occurs when the rate of birth exceeds
the rate of death. People today have the capacity to live longer
lives than ever before, yet lack of access to clean water alone
prematurely kills millions across the globe every year. Despite the
countless global struggles that lead to premature death we are still
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reproducing at a rate that surpasses our rate of death. If we were to
fix all the world‘s problems that lead to unnecessary death we must
still contend with the fact that we are subsisting on a planet with a
limited ability to provide space, supply food and produce energy.
Even if it were possible to overcome the injustices of inequality by
radically altering the distribution of resources or achieve
technological advancements that are more sustainable there will
still come a point at which none of these achievements will be
enough to support the sheer number of people that will populate
the earth. Overpopulation is a subject we do not breach publicly for
fear of appearing absurd or anti-freedom; however I feel it is an
issue of major ethical concern and one that needs to be addressed
in order to negate this impending situation.
Discussing overpopulation is taboo because it threatens to
breach the fortified value we have placed on reproductive
autonomy. But I feel that the possibility of bringing people into a
world headed for self-destruction is a greater ethical concern than
avoiding taboo. Overpopulation is something that threatens the
wellbeing of future generations and taking steps to alter this
trajectory necessarily demands sacrifices from present generations,
namely sacrificing complete reproductive freedom. I believe
present people remain unconvinced of this necessity because their
current reproductive values do not foster/support concern for future
generations. So in order to properly address this issue of
overpopulation, which greatly threatens future generations we need
both a change in reproductive policy as well as a change in social
values. Success is dependent on the implementation of both to
make a difference because it would be impossible to enforce such
infringing policies if they didn‘t reflect actual social values. In this
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paper I will discuss some philosophical reasons as to how we
might justifiably limit the right to procreate in the face of
overpopulation. I am concerned specifically with the ethics
involved and how we are able to reconcile concern for future
generations vs. our own desires for procreative liberty. First, I will
establish that a state of overpopulation is in fact undesirable and a
situation to be avoided because it has negative consequences for
the societies where it occurs. Secondly, the defining characteristic
of overpopulation is that it‘s a problem which worsens over time,
so next I will argue for why present generations should feel a
connection to future generations who will inherent a worse
problem than the generation before. Namely, I argue that the
connection between generations is representative of how we
understand our procreative duties and this in turn plays out in our
reproductive ethic and how we relate to future generations. I will
devote a section of the paper to deconstructing some of the
reproductive ethics and customs we have now and examining how
these views impact where our values lie regarding future
generations. In the next section I will look at alternative ethics
which carry different perspectives on procreation, therefore
creating a different value system that I believe naturally prioritizes
future generations. Finally I hope to make an appealing case for
limiting procreative freedom in a way that reflects our values
regarding having children, both present and future and provides
them with a better quality future.
How Having Too Many People Negatively Affects Everyone’s
Quality Of Life
In his work ―Tragedy of The Commons‖ Garrett Hardin
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argues that there must be a restriction placed on limitless
population growth because of existing persons‘ inability ―to bear
the full burden of the children they have.‖ He insists that
overpopulation is inherently a no win situation and the biggest
mistake we make when thinking about overpopulation is our
inability to factor in institutional sacrifice as a reputable solution.
Population grows geometrically, i.e. exponentially and this means
that eventually the world‘s resources are guaranteed to diminish
because it is not possible to support an infinite population on a
terrestrial landscape that is finite. Hardin uses the example of a
―herder‖, who sees the common pasture as a limitless means to
expand his herd of cows because they can graze freely and in as
many numbers as he is capable of procuring. The herder does not
consider this use of the pasture to negatively affect him on the
individual-level, especially since he stands to gain so much
personally from having a large and ever expanding herd. The
―tragedy‖ is that everybody else has come to the same conclusion
and so the pasture is not able to maintain itself under the strain of
so many cows, let alone actually nourish them all. This is a simple
analogy for the effect of large populations of self-interested people
living in a limited world. Pollution also originates from the same
thinking, except that instead of taking something indiscriminately
from the commons something is indiscriminately put into the
commons, which leads to the destruction of the original
fruitfulness, so that we are effectively ―fouling our own nest.‖ 1
Having a limitless population, (again, actually impossible) or at
1
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least a population double the current size would require that we
learn to limit consumption of resources so as not to exceed the bare
minimum needed to survive. That means if a man must eat a
minimum of 1600 calories a day to survive/manage all his daily
obligations then all calories consumed beyond that amount would
be considered possibly beneficial but not necessary and therefore
no longer part of his diet. Consuming more than this would be
taking something beyond his share and therefore impending on
someone else‘s ability to live. I do not think we can conceive of
living on a planet with 20 billion people where our lives are so
dependent on just servings for total survival. Hardin uses this
example to emphasize that the more people we have on the planet
the more we will be forced to downgrade from our expected
quality of life, if we expect to continue without destroying our own
living environment.
But this brings up questions like: Why care what happens
to the planet beyond my lifespan? Or about the lives of people who
don‘t already exist now? If having 15 babies and spoiling them to
their heart‘s content suits me and is within my power to bring
about then why not do it? I believe these ultimately disastrous
sentiments reflect the current vision of reproductive liberty and can
only be addressed by first understanding and then assuming other
interpretations of reproductive rights.
Reconsidering Commonly Accepted Values Regarding
Procreation
Procreation is normally understood as an autonomous
decision in two fundamental and problematic ways: as an
autonomous bodily decision and as something related to an
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individual‘s self-conception. Understanding procreation as simply
an expression of a one‘s bodily autonomy and an extension of
one‘s ownership over their physical self is inherently problematic.
This view focuses on the right to experience one‘s body in anyway
one pleases, including pregnancy; and furthermore that being
pregnant is a phenomenon like any other biological process. This
makes it seem as if the birth of a child is an extension of one‘s
physicality in the same way that growing out one‘s hair is, i.e. as if
the unborn child were simply a by-product of one‘s sole individual
organs. But becoming pregnant and maintaining the intention to
carry the child to term so that it can eventually flourish as its own
independent organism is something that‘s different in kind, not
degree, from any other bodily function. Yes, any child who is born
was at some point part of its mother‘s body. But after its birth it no
longer functions as an extension of her body and instead lives as its
own being; again, showing that the mother‘s body does not
continue to wholly account for this new being‘s continued
existence. In this case pregnancy acts as the original link in the
causal chain that will become someone‘s entire life. While the
pregnancy should necessarily be identified as this causal link it
also means that the biological mother cannot claim her decisions
affect only her and her own body when pregnancy leading to birth
necessarily means that her decisions will come to affect at least
two persons.
Here I think it is important to clarify a distinction made by
Ruth F. Chadwick between begetting, bearing and rearing children
because all of these are separate concepts silently at play when we
talk about ―having children‖. The fact that we indiscriminately
employ the vague term ―having children‖ inevitably leads to
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misunderstandings. For example begetting is often a major part of
how men conceptualize their procreative role; but if a man over
emphasizes his role as begetter over and above his other duties
because he has not internalized the two other roles associated with
fatherhood then he might behave indifferently and spawn many
illegitimate children. The greater outcome of this self-ascribed
definition of father is that it can leave many children without the
proper care they deserve.
What is important to grasp here is that each step in the
procreative process is meaningful and necessary for creating new
life but also potentially isolated from the other aspects involved.
Secondly, a procreator may feel an emotional connection with any
of the steps including: conception, gestation and labor, and the
care/ raising of the child. It is also possible to connect with none of
them, which is problematic for cultivating a society which
demands accountability for their children‘s quality of life. In the
same vein I realize not everyone is capable of every aspect of the
procreative process; while some cannot conceive or carry a child
others may not be able to rear one because of some critical
personal deficiency/hardship. The problem remains that ―having
children‖ is an ambiguous undertaking at best. It might seem like
this lack of clarity ―issue‖ can be solved simply by separating out
the rights that should pertain to each role (begetting, bearing or
rearing) but on the whole this isn‘t too far from the system we have
now. Currently, everyone has a right to procreate and to bear
children at their own convenience. The same goes for rearing their
children until reasons surface that expose them as unfit to care for
a child and their right to raise their children can be taken away. But
someone‘s right to conceive and bear children cannot be
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terminated. We do not feel it is within anyone‘s moral capacity to
force sterilization on someone who has demonstrated a severe
inability to raise their own children in a loving, stable home.
Similarly, but less problematic is that no one can be forced to raise
a child they have conceived. These rights are all negative rights
that allow us to relinquish our responsibility in some regard to our
offspring and while we do have laws in place that require us not to
brutalize, starve or sell our children I can‘t say that we have any
that prioritize our children‘s right to a quality life over our own
individual freedom.
Hopefully one can see that current procreative liberty
operates as a very complex and far-reaching right. This is because
the societal attitude implies that it involves anything one finds
meaningful and fulfilling for his or her own private life. The
problem is that what‘s considered meaningful and or personally
beneficial to someone about reproducing is subjective and might
include: experiencing the miracle process of labor, passing on
one‘s genes by donating sperm or the choice to give up custody
and terminate all parental rights. All of these examples involve
extremely different intentions but nonetheless result in the creation
of a new life. I think it‘s contradictory to be concerned with the
wellbeing of existing children yet sanction all of the varied
intentions that create new children who may end up suffering from
difficult situations caused by those intentions. There are some
possible intentions held by the begetters of children that directly
lead to a lower quality of life for their child as they are assisted by
attitudes of indifference, self-centeredness, or shortsightedness. A
set of values that demands total procreative freedom as well as
welfare for children is creating a hierarchy of values, which places
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the interests of parents first and then scrambles to address the
problems directly resulting from that hierarchy. I believe it‘s sound
to question the intentions behind someone‘s involvement in any
aspect of the reproductive process and more importantly to accept
that some intentions are not justified when the impact or result of
that decision carries such huge implications for persons
other/beyond oneself. My point is that just because it is possible to
separate the roles involved in procreating doesn‘t mean we should
limit the responsibility regarding the care of children by believing
that some roles bear no weight in the welfare of children.
Why Care About People Who Do Not Exist?
Philosopher Derek Parfit is also very concerned with doing
the best for our children yet runs into a wall he calls ― the nonidentity problem‖ when considering choices that may affect their
future. In a classic thought experiment we consider a woman who
contracts an illness while pregnant, one that would cause a
considerable deformity in the child resulting from the pregnancy.
However, if the woman waits just three months to have a child the
illness will be gone completely and her child will be perfectly
normal. According to Parfit one‘s identity is necessarily rooted in
the unique circumstances of their birth, three months later the
circumstances would be entirely different the resulting person
would be a product of these different circumstances and therefore a
different person. Although at first it seems like the woman should
wait to have the baby because it would be better for her child on
closer inspection we realize that she is actually choosing between
two different people and on this view we can‘t say that it would be
better for the first child if the non-afflicted second child were born
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instead. This realization leaves us in a bind where it would be
better for no one either way as potential persons i.e. people who
are not born have no concrete identity. However, Parfit does not
want his view of identity to create an apathetic view of the future,
and I feel that as long as we know that future people will exist, and
they will, then we have a responsibility to them not to cause any
harm, ―Remoteness in time has, in itself, no more significance
than remoteness in space. Suppose I shoot an arrow into a distant
wood, where it wounds some person. If I should have known that
there might be someone in this wood, I am guilty of gross
negligence. Because this person is far away, I cannot identify the
person who I harm but his is no excuse. Nor is it any excuse that
this person is far away. We should make the same claims about the
effects of people who are temporally remote.‖ 2
Unfortunately Parfit runs into more trouble when he tries to
reconcile the non-identity problem with utilitarian values regarding
future persons. He calls this new problem the ―repugnant
conclusion‖ and it stems from the idea that if we want to maximize
happiness then if we have a population whose happiness is on
average what we consider optimal then by adding a few extra
people whose happiness is slightly below this the total amount of
happiness increases from result from this addition. This ends up
being a slippery slope where by adding more and more people we
end up with an overlarge population whose lives are barely worth
living. I believe these dilemmas to be counterintuitive in that they
both assume what is important is that ―happy people‖ be born, and
2
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seems to construct people as merely ―happiness machines‖. ―Just
as a boiler is required to utilize the potential energy of coal in the
production of steam, so sentient beings are required to convert the
potentiality of happiness, resident in a given land area, into actual
happiness. And just as the engineer will choose boilers with the
maximum efficiency at converting steam into energy, Justice
(utilitarianism) will choose sentient beings who have the maximum
efficiency at converting resources into happiness.‖ 3 It‘s not good
that people exist because they‘re happy but that happiness is good
for people who exist. What the repugnant conclusion assumes and
the theorists that I reference deny is that we have an absolute duty
to bring happy people into existence.
Alternative Viewpoints That Better Support Future
Generations
When it comes to procreating it is possible to have a kid
whom you love dearly, that you can provide for, who never
experiences random terrible tragedy, who you have a great
relationship with, who‘s healthy, that loves their life and is a good
person. It might be the case that all of this characterizes your
parenting experience, or it might not be… but there is no guarantee
either way. David Benatar4 is keenly aware of this and says that
life inherently holds suffering as it necessarily involves enduring
bodily decay and confronting mortality; there is however, no one
who is possibly harmed by non-existence. He also believes that
3
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there are lives so miserable that by our own standards we could
consider them not worth living. We therefore have a responsibility
to avoid this cruelty and to not bring about such lives. So even on
utilitarian grounds, more is not always better. But because the
nature of existence is at best neutral (containing both happiness
and suffering) we have no duty to bring ―happy‖ people into
existence either. The ―neutrality‖ of life does not imply that great
happiness and minimal suffering and great suffering and minimal
happiness are ultimately equal in their value but that the potential
for either scenario to occur or the scales to tip in either direction
remains equally possible. Even if all precautions are taken to
ensure a happy life for someone their life will necessarily contend
with the presence of unhappy scenarios, which means there is no
such thing as a non-tempered, unaffected and therefore totally
happy life. We cannot say that existence holds the potential for
total happiness and is therefore preferable to non-existence because
we cannot possibly produce a sliding scale that shows the point
where life is total happiness. Therefore you cannot bring into
existence nor account for totally happy people in the world.
However, you may be able to discern circumstances where
someone‘s life is total suffering and therefore not worth living. The
best that we could hope for is that they are contentment with the
proportions of suffering and happiness in their life. Not bringing
such people into existence causes them zero harm, not a
proportional amount of harm, and so this option is always justified.
The obvious consequence of adopting this view is that procreation
is rendered seemingly… unnecessary.
Yet Benatar‘s view is that we may still choose to procreate
if we wish so long as we‘re bringing into existence people whose
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lives would be worth living. But how do we define a life worth
living? This is where Benatar gets a lot of flack since it‘s unclear
what decides whose life is worth living and whose is not. I think
this is a misinterpretation of Benatar‘s intention in that it fails to
differentiate ceasing to exist from having never existed. Benatar
recognizes that people may have lives that started out as barely
worth living but became lives of high quality and conversely that
there are lives which started out worth living but are now barely
worth continuing. Whatever the circumstance people‘s lives are
necessarily linked to the individual suffering they‘ve experienced,
and asking whether they wish they‘d never been born is completely
futile. Despite whatever handicap they are faced with Benatar says
people often view their lives through a distorted lens of attachment
regardless of what they would say of their own circumstances
objectively. What we are really talking about is not terminating
existing beings but refraining from causing lives to begin that are
not worth living; it‘s preventative. In effect, by limiting the amount
of actual people who are harmed.
Shiffrin further uses the concept of harm to help us see how
exactly the role of parent is to be understood. Like myself, she makes
it clear that what she is not trying to do is belittle the difficulty
involved in properly carrying out parental duties, but to draw attention
to the moral implications involved in creating a life. She is therefore
talking about a situation involving strict liability because of the
inherent one-sidedness of this relationship where the parent and only
the parent chose the life of the child. Furthermore this child will
inevitably come to suffer harm in their life, the existence of which is a
product of the parent‘s desire to have a child. She calls this ―wrongful
life‖. Shiffrin defines harm as it ―primarily involves the imposition of
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conditions from which the person undergoing them is reasonably
alienated or which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would
rationally will;‖ furthermore ― harmed states may be ones that preclude
her from removing herself from or averting such conditions.‖ 5 What is
important to note is that harm is firstly something that the person being
harmed did not will. Harm is not just loss or pain but anything which,
―exerts an insistent intrusive and unpleasant presence on one‘s
consciousness that one must just undergo and endure.‖ 6 This to me is
a perfect description of the anxiety that is an inherent part of survival
The analogy often used involves a rescue scenario in which it
is necessary to break the arm of an individual in order to get them free
of a car wreck (where the danger could potentially escalate) and save
their life. By choosing to harm this person in the act of breaking their
arm you have also carried out the action necessary to save them from
harms greater than a broken arm. The relevance is that it‘s necessary
for people to suffer some harm in existence in order to enjoy the great
benefit of life. Shiffrin openly denies that this is an accurate parallel.
She says a ―pure‖ benefit is not solely the removal of harm but the
ability of the benefit to improve the overall quality of life for the
recipient. The rescue case is not an example of a pure benefit because
it addresses only the removal of a single greater harm, (greater injury
or death for the victim in the accident), but does not necessarily
disallow the existence of yet another harm to this person later in life.
In real life procreation does act as a benefit which avoids obstructs any
greater harm. The rescue scenario exemplifies Shiffrin‘s insistence that
this analogy ―illegitimately trades upon a common equivocation of
5
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―benefit.‖ 7 In other words that we speak as though removing someone
from harm is what benefits that person. In reality it does not follow
that it is the act of doing the saving which is the moral justification for
inflicting harm but the greater positive (beneficial) outcome that is the
result of the saving. Conversely the beneficial act of creation doesn‘t
allow justification for harm because the greater outcome of procreation
is not that a greater harm is averted. It is not appropriate for us to think
it acceptable to harm someone just to gain a benefit. Such an action
only becomes morally innocent when we do it to remove some greater
harm. We are certainly not justified in inflicting a minor harm for the
prospect of a greater benefit.
There is another often-cited example used in attempts to
emphasize the inherent good of life by drawing a connection
between life and benefits which I believe is relevent. In this
scenario the hypothetical character called ―Wealthy‖ injures
another character, ―Unlucky‖ in an attempt to bestow benefits
which would improve the overall quality of Unlucky‘s
circumstances. Wealthy is a philanthropist of sorts who decides to
charter a plane so that he may distribute his solid gold bricks
indiscriminately by randomly throwing them overboard. One of
these bricks falls on Unlucky and the impact injures him as one
expects a hit from a gold brick would. Though Unlucky is caused
significant pain from his injuries he will definitely live and the
gold brick is his to keep. Once again the given example
presupposes many things, including as already stated, the fact that
it is morally justified to harm someone simply for the sake of what
is assumed as a benefit at the time without the ―beneficiary‘s‖
7
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consent. Now, what if Wealthy included an additional 1.5 million
dollars meant as anticipatory compensation for the injury caused
by dropping the brick? Shiffrin and myself believe this is a false
solution; if the compensation is ―built in‖ to the harm then it seems
as if Wealthy is preemptively pardoning himself from any
culpability as well as disregarding his subsequent duty to seriously
address any and all harm done. In order to legitimately act in
compensation for a harm then one must seriously address the harm
itself as it stands alone. This means as separate from the delivery
or execution of the harm i.e. certainly not exploiting any potential
for benefit in order to justify doing the harm itself. I think the
concept of wrongful life is inherently different from the rescue or
financial scenarios used in thought experiments for them to be
compared. In the case of procreation not only are we committing
the much more serious act of creating brand new life but in this
case we neither save nor prevent anyone from a greater harm.
The key to understanding the wrongful life concept is being
able to come to terms with naming all the things that are scary and
difficult about having and raising children. No one wants his or her
child to suffer, so then, why is it so difficult to understand that they
will suffer? And how is it not in the nature of a parent to naturally
assume responsibility for all that their child feels, endures,
achieves, etc? This theory is really not much more than a
reflection of these basic inclinations that are intrinsic to good
parenting. I believe this appeals to the greatest of all parental
instinct and that is to shield one‘s child from harm. Opponents to
wrongful life might again say that any possible horror experienced
by a child is not cause enough for a parent to call their child‘s life
wrongful. I think Shiffrin would disagree and say that a parent‘s
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instinct to protect is so severe that the failure to do so could
potentially create such guilt that they‘d prefer their child to never
have been born. Not because they do not value their child‘s life but
because they acknowledge the unfairness of a child suffering who
did not ask to be brought into this world.
Another critique of wrongful life questions the point where
a parent should cease to be liable for all harm experienced by their
child. The concern for how far into lives of future people we are
responsible for is something that concerns Parfit as well.
Personally, I think that the point at which a parent ceases to be
liable is relative to the initial harm incurred by the child in their
youth. Again following Shiffrin and as well as intuition I think the
concern is really whether the parent took proper steps prior to
conception as well as during the child‘s early years that showed
consideration for their future. Ideally, the child will become
completely responsible for itself so far as they were provided the
tools to do so by their parents. If the point at which their life
becomes unmanageable can be traced back to an original and
significant harm done by the parent then that parent should be held
responsible contributing to the current situation. But again
appealing to intuition it should follow that the older the child gets
the murkier that trace line should be due to the growing agency
(autonomy!) of the child. And this is true for Parfit as well; it
would be wrong to deny the initial connection we do have to our
children‘s future because we are not able to see forever into the
results. The better it is seen to that children are given what they
need to make their own decisions and inform their own actions the
less it can be said that their lives are limited by the decisions of
their parents. Similarly we must leave behind a quality of life that
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reflects our own standards for our children or be responsible for
negative quality of life they experience. Giving life is currently
seen as a gift, something for which we should be never-endingly
grateful for, something that is beyond reproach, we should not
demand more of the giver. But giving life is not something that
pardons you from your responsibilities, in fact quite the opposite,
having children only extends your responsibility indefinitely.
What Different Values Means Practically
When we begin to grasp the kinds of values regarding
parenting and procreation perpetuated by Benatar and Shiffrin I
believe we are better able to accept a difficult course of action like
limiting population. We see limiting our procreative liberty as less
about our own limited freedom and more about doing what‘s right
by future persons by providing them a certain quality of life. It‘s
easy for us to accept that we have a moral duty not to force
undesirable situations on others. We now have the ability to
include future persons based on a strong understanding that we
actually dictate who these people will be and therefore have just as
much of a relationship with them.
According to population scholar Michael Bayles, the
greater the need for population control the more likely there will be
a greater need for limits on freedom as well. This is referring to
problems which are dire (immediate) and require solutions beyond
volunteerism or family planning. For Bayle guilt plays a major role
in our society; it influences how we feel about our own actions;
however it does not necessarily change them. The desire not to
harm future generations may be instilled in present generations but
it does not curb the tragedy of the commons. That is why we will
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eventually need policies that allow us to execute these views. He
insists that because no specific values regarding quality of life have
absolute priority (subjective) it‘s necessary to evaluate policies
based on their ability to successfully accomplish objectives for
present and future persons. This means that a policy is only
justifiable if it actually realizes the desired effects. Bayles also
emphasizes that some freedoms are greater or more important than
others and that this should also dictate how we are to address
certain population concerns. He advocates a pragmatic use of our
perceived spectrum of freedoms. For example, it is less of an
infringement on peoples‘ freedom to be able to have up to two
children rather than no children. The main difficulty of
implementing such policies, whether they be positive incentives,
negative incentives or compulsory is to insure a level of equality
regarding the actual effects. Neither Bayles nor myself thinks that
it is ethical for people of lesser means to bear the greater burden of
limiting population growth. Again what this means is a pragmatic
approach and an emphasis on equality. I think that it‘s also
important to emphasize that poverty does not necessarily make for
life barely worth living. There are other values in regards to quality
of life to be prioritized which are more universal like, mental
stability, sobriety etc.
Hardin states that humans intuitively feel guilt for however
they‘ve failed ethically. But regardless of whether guilt is a
naturally occurring response, it‘s also useless in bringing about an
optimal desired result. Along this line I believe any person is
capable of feeling a deep love for their child and still failing them.
Hardin proposes what he calls ―Mutual coercion mutually agreed
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upon.‖ 8 He feels that coercion regularly practiced simply means
bringing about the desired result that everyone wants but doesn‘t
want to contribute to themselves, like taxes, and that the same can
be said of limiting the resources/rights to reproduce infinitely.
Responsibility Hardin says, is a product of social arrangement and
does not occur on its own. We cannot measure, control, or affect
how much a procreator loves their progeny but what we can do is
take steps to ensure a basic quality of life for them so that they are
able to pursue lives worth living.
Conclusion
By adopting reproductive ethics that inspire justice for
future generations I believe the limits on procreative freedom
become less burdensome for present generations. Whether
institutionally enforced social responsibility is successful relies on
our own personal relationship with the values we are upholding.
Overpopulation is a threat to future persons‘ quality of life, which
means essentially that it‘s a threat to our children and our
children‘s children as well as to ourselves.

8
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THE IRONY OF IRONISM: A CRITIQUE OF RORTY’S
POSTMETAPHYSICAL UTOPIA
Jeffrey Rivera
Abstract In Richard Rorty‘s work Contingency Irony and
Solidarity, Rorty attempts to elucidate a mechanism for dealing
with the public dissent likely to arise from a group of individuals
he terms ―ironists‖. This mechanism, a strong public/private
distinction, he hopes will allow for a self proliferating, ever
progressing liberal utopia. This paper will reject this distinction as
internally incoherent under its own terms, and will assert that even
if Rorty‘s distinction is successful, it ultimately attempts to
proliferate the type of individual we would like to avoid.
In his book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Richard
Rorty urges us to rethink our conception of what a liberal society
should look like, and which values it should hold and promote.
Rorty claims that our current vision of a liberal society is one that
is governed by the idea that cruelty, the promotion of suffering, is
the worst thing that we as liberals do. In addition to this, Rorty
appeals to the idea that a special kind of suffering, humiliation, for
a liberal, is an especially bad form of cruelty. Rorty is aware
however, that the type of individual likely to cause civil unrest and
humiliation, the unorthodox thinker, is also a potential catalyst for
political, cultural, scientific and philosophical progress. He is at
once the liberal hero, an enigmatic poet who makes the world his
own, but he must also be the villain: the egoist par excellence.
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Recognizing the danger and importance of such individuals, Rorty
creates a description of liberalism which might give us the best of
both worlds; private self creation, as well as public unity and social
cohesion. In this paper, I will argue that the mechanism that Rorty
asserts to bridge this gap, the affirmation of a strong public/private
distinction, will not feasibly do the work which he requires.
Furthermore, I seek to show that even if this distinction holds up,
the ironic liberal should not be the type of individual we would like
to promote in a utopian society.
What is an ironist, and why should a liberal society protect
the autonomy of these individuals? In order to answer this
question, Rorty appeals to historical change as being a product of
the evolution of language. Rorty describes the ironist as being
indebted to a specific historical view, one that will see the strong
poet, the thinker who re-describes and creates something new, as
instrumental to intellectual progress.
The ironist understands that he is born into a specific
historical juncture. This notion can be equated more or less to the
existential notion of facticity found in thinkers such as Heidegger
and Kierkegaard. This is the idea that, with the inception of one‘s
life, comes a set of specific conditions which relate to and
characterize that being. For Rorty, the most relevant aspects of
one‘s facticity seem to be the subject‘s relation to history, and
specifically historical discourse, and the language games he is
prone to play given his position within this canon. This is a
specific contingency which all beings must depart from in order to
become self-creators.
The key difference between the ironist and the liberal is
brought to light with regards to this realization. Whereas the liberal
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is content to play the current language games and realize his selfcreation through these paradigms, the ironist views his being born
into a specific paradigm as constraining. He feels that if he is to be
the strong poet, one who fears his self-creation is merely a replica
of a past self, he must create a very strong sense of his own
identity. This cannot be done within the current paradigm because
it places importance on specific modes of thinking. Rorty shows us
this in his analysis of the character of specific time periods. For
instance, if we look at thinkers whom we perceive as being
particularly influential, we see that they do not merely find or relay
information in light of the current views on an issue, they seek to
re-describe the phenomenon under a new sort of view. For instance,
Einstein‘s theory of relativity does not simply work out some
inadequacies of Newton‘s theory, it fundamentally re-describes all
relevant phenomena in a completely different light. It somehow
makes us see things in a different way and therefore makes things
new. This is the sort of re-description that the ironist sees as
important to his self creation.
We might use this sort of example to point out another
important feature of Rorty‘s theory, namely that there are specific
historical conditions of possibility for the adoption of new
language games. The first of these is that new descriptions of the
world are brought about in light of past inconsistencies or
uselessness of older language games. This might be understood in
a similar fashion as scientific theory choice. As discourse
progresses within a subject (slowly, as a product of small
contingencies), problematics arise within it. For instance, Newton‘s
theory cannot properly describe phenomena when approaching the
speed of light. These inconsistencies are typically dealt with by the
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introduction of ad hoc solutions. Novel re-descriptions remove
these inconsistencies by creating a new view of the interactions of
the phenomena at hand.
It is important to note here that novel descriptions initially
have no place within a the extant language game, because they are
not truth candidates within that language game. As they are posited,
re-descriptions are metaphorical, but have the potential to become
truth candidates as they are adopted by language users – as those
language users begin to interpret the world in that particular
fashion. For Rorty, it is crucial to realize that this process of
language adoption is not one of the language user‘s rational choice,
but a process. Since the individual statements of novel language
games are not truth candidates, the old and new languages are
adopted not in light of a comparison between the novel and the
previous descriptions of phenomenon, but by the slow shifting of
the way particular agents see themselves and describe their world.
Rorty recognizes that for most (for the non-ironists), the creation
of an idiosyncratic language is non-essential to their notion of selfcreation and as such, they are not want to change their manner of
speaking. To put it another way, non-ironists don‘t necessarily see
themselves as, but inherently are, people who value a form of
historical continuity.
This valuing of continuity is also implicit in the liberal‘s
relationship to what he calls his ―final vocabulary‖. A user‘s final
vocabulary is constituted by those terms which he uses to relate
himself, his desires, his goals, and values, to others. A user‘s final
vocabulary is ―final in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth
of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative
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recourse.‖1 Again, the liberal has no problem using typical
language games to elucidate his ultimate conception of self. He
sees the evolution of his final vocabulary as linear. The ironist that
Rorty describes, on the other hand, sees particular vocabularies as
constraining to his notion of self creation, as the ironist is someone
who cannot simply take the paradigm which was factically
imposed upon him and proceed from there in self creation. He
must appropriate and re-describe the past in order to make it his
own and become a completely idiosyncratic self creation. The
liberal is content to move forward, while the ironist wishes to
create an entire new line. He must idiomatically create the taste by
which he will be judged. If the ironist creates his own vocabulary,
he has thereby created his own novel system for truth candidacy
and therefore can see himself as authentically created.
We might remark that this description of the ironist sounds
very much like the picture of the ―authentic being‖ described by
Heidegger or Satre, or Nietzche‘s ―ubermensch‖. Presumably,
many of us would find the promotion of this type of self creator as
questionable, as they have been traditionally linked to anti-liberal,
(and sometime fascist) ideology. However, Rorty offers a different
take as to why we should wish to steer clear of the ironist type.
Rorty describes liberals as those who think that the
promotion of suffering as the worst thing liberals due. Further,
Rorty describes a special sort of suffering that should be avoided
within liberal societies: humiliation. Ostensibly, it is a special type
of suffering for liberals because we, as liberals, are concerned with
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self-creation. Following his linguistic self-narrative view, Rorty‘s
formulation of humiliation is done in terms of linguistic
communication. Humiliation is a special sort of suffering in the
sense that it is a forced shift in one‘s final vocabulary and therefore
one‘s self creation becomes compromised. Because the ironist is
ever anxious about the terms in which he describes himself as a
result of his rejection of objective language choice, and therefore
truth, Rorty asserts that the ironist is the sort of human being by
nature who has no respect for the humiliation of others‘
vocabularies. He is therefore the villain of the liberal society, while
at the same time being the catalyst for change and progress.
What does it mean to humiliate someone linguistically, and
what are the conditions of possibility for this form of cruelty? As
we have discussed, Rorty believes that shifts in language are
products of many small re-descriptions which lead to a shift in
one‘s final vocabulary. These shifts in vocabularies slowly lead to
paradigmatic language changes. Slow language changes are
normal and covetable, as they are based on the decisions of the
agent (or groups of agents) and help to inform his self narrative.
What occurs when we liberals are humiliated, Rorty asserts, is that
our final vocabulary has been forced to shift, resulting in a major
challenge to one‘s identity. It is important to note that the ironist is
immune from this sort of humiliation because they are aware that
―the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change‖
and they are ―always aware of the contingency and fragility of
their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.‖2
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Fortunately, Rorty seeks not to promote the ironist, but the
liberal ironist. The liberal ironist, is an individual who holds fast to
his ironic values privately, but shows no sign of ironic ideology
publically. Rorty asserts that the liberal ironist can maintain this
view because he understands that his, and everyone‘s, language is
ultimately nothing more than a view informed by contingencies
which an ironist must continually overcome. To put this point in
another fashion, the ironist understands that truth is merely a
property of a specific language game. He sees that the language
games we choose to play are based upon contingencies about the
way the world is, and thus how we see the world. He also
recognizes that these games shift over time; they are savored or
spit out by different cultures, political factions and intellectual
movements. In short they see language and therefore truth evolving,
and therefore reject the ability to make objective decisions about
the value of playing any one language game over another. Rorty
feels that this relativistic position allows a strong enough reason
for the ironist to affirm a public liberal standpoint, while also
embracing a commitment to hiding his ironism in the shadows of
his or her private life.
It is this mechanism that will allow for his ever-evolving
flourishing post-metaphysical utopia. Rorty claims that through the
linguistic evolution the ironist offers, paired with a sense of
solidarity afforded by his liberal values, we can create a stable
liberal society full of ironists. Since each of these ironists seeks to
break with the status quo, Rorty claims we will have more and
more re-descriptions, and therefore more fuel for future ironists‘
self creation.
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I would like to offer three criticisms here. First, such a
liberal society has a low potential to be endorsed by the ironist,
even if he firmly holds that the public/private distinction should be
enforced. Secondly, the distinction causes the ironist to be an
almost pitiable character and therefore we should not promote a
society where ―irony is universal.‖ Lastly, the ironist by becoming
a liberal destructs too much of what it means to be an ironist, to
make the label ―ironic liberal‖ plausible.
First, it seems to me that to force the ironist into affirming a
particular political conception is antithetical to the idea of the
ironist. Just because the ironist is ostensibly immune to humiliation
by means of language (as his final vocabulary is ever in flux), does
not mean that his language and desires are not limited by the
holding particular political ideologies. In holding particular
political doctrines, we are acting antithetical to the idea that the
ironist is a human being who is ever in flux about his self
description. By positing a reason to hold liberalist ideals, he is
further constraining himself. He is more likely to be a mere replica,
and therefore he might get the sense that his public affirmation of
liberalism constrains his self narrative. Indeed the ironist does not
merely mentally gratify his own idiosyncratic language, but seeks
to use it to describe himself and his desires. If he finds his desires
are contrary to the desires of liberalism, then he is at a loss to
express his desires.
In examining the justification of his liberal ideals, it seems
to me that these ideals do not stem from the ironist‘s ironic values.
If the justification for the agent‘s irony comes from the realization
of the contingency of his final vocabulary, then it seems to me that
this view cannot inform a liberal viewpoint. Since the ironist thinks
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it is fatuous to regard his or her final vocabulary as being stable,
why should the ironist respect the contingent values of others? It
almost seems like the liberal ironist takes more seriously the ideals
and values of others, while rejecting and suppressing his own. If
this is the case, he has no reason to be a liberal, since his selfcreation is merely a secondary concern.
Furthermore, it seems like the ironist is precisely the type
of person who would reject the type of justification which Rorty
believes might inform the ironist‘s decision. The justification given
for an ironic affirmation of liberal ideals is necessarily an intersubjective one. If I, as an ironist, understand that each individual‘s
views are unimportant, then I may see others as like myself and
may seek to promote the welfare of others self creation. This to
me seems to be antithetical to the sort of view which the ironist
wishes to pursue in the sense that it seems close to positing an
objective truth about the intrinsic nature of the self. It is the truth
that each person‘s self narrative is important to his or her self, but
recognizes that it is the product of a plethora of contingencies. As
such we get a tacit appeal to inter-subjective truth when we posit
the ironist‘s defense of liberalism. This sort of truth positing
cannot be affirmed by the ironist.
Another seeming inconsistency within the ironist position
is that he sees himself as somehow historically privileged.
Although his view of history has led him to the Nietzschean
conclusion that any truth about man is necessarily a truth about
man for a small period of time (perhaps within a given language),
he still has based this view on a particular conception of history.
He sees himself as having found some sort of objective truth about
the ebb and flow of historical paradigms. Not only has he
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discovered the truth of this assertion, but he lives his life in
subservience to this fact. His ever changing self narrative, his
attitudes toward others, are dominated by this realization. This
seems like the ironist ironically takes his beliefs a bit too seriously,
and therefore must reject a major tenet of his ironism.
If the ironist is such that he sees his final vocabulary as
utterly contingent, what does it matter if he or she has put their
stamp upon history? It is just something that will be seen as fodder
for re-description by a future agent. Since the ironist sees his
facticity governing himself as a bad thing, as something in the way
of self narrative, why would he want to join in creating a
potentially entangling factical paradigm for future agents to live
within? Of course, this fact is unavoidable. If the changing of
language is a result of many small contingencies, then of course
every agent who uses a language could possibly (and unbeknownst
to that agent) contribute to a change in the predominant
paradigmatic language. Therefore, the intention of the ironist must
be misplaced. If there is no way of knowing what particular states
of affairs our thoughts might manifest as a result of discourse, it
should not be desirable that one language be put in place of
another.
This criticism lends itself to the idea of the private
containment of ironism. Since language for Rorty is a causal
mechanism, it seems unlikely that private irony can be contained.
We have no certainty over which statements might or might not
influence other agents‘ self descriptions. Therefore the affirmation
of a distinction between public and private asserted is obtuse. For
instance, as a philosopher, I continually read other philosophers,
and in doing such an action, simply reading a book, my final
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vocabulary is under the threat of being affected. Any proposition,
unbeknownst to me, might be some sort of secret key for
deconstructing my entire vocabulary.
This point is echoed in Charles Taylor‘s ―Ethics of
Authenticity‖. In his own attempt to bring authenticity into the
liberal sphere, Taylor rejects the premise that authenticity is a
purely self-created notion. Our familial, social and political
relationships are instrumental in our personal pursuit of
authenticity. Taylor recognizes that the culture of authenticity
within liberal societies is one where the value of self-choice is
paramount. However, the reality of the situation is that when we
make choices, we don‘t simply value the choice, we value
specifically what we choose to defend and its relationship to our
daily lives. ―On the intimate level, we can see how much an
original identity needs and is vulnerable to the recognition given or
withheld by significant others.‖3 Basically, the self creating
individual cannot atomistically enjoy self creation. He cannot keep
it private. He must use the external world to validate his language.
The liberal ironist of course, in his anxiety over the potential
contamination of the public via his ideals, does not have this option
open to him. We see that atomism necessarily undermines ironism,
as that ironism has no means of expressing itself and therefore the
ironist has no way of seeing his language as useful.
To say that we must in fact revere the public/private
distinction in order to protect ironists seems obtuse. Past political
and intellectual cultures have been far more repressive with
regards to autonomy. This did not stop any of the past ironists from
3
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having their work influence future historical paradigms. If the
ironist has such a strong grasp upon history, how does he need
protection? This seems to me to raise the suspicion that Rorty is
not actually concerned with a wariness of the public‘s self
description being undermined by the ironist, but a protection of the
ironist from external forces. For if the ironist is such that he is
disposed to regard his self created vocabulary as ever in flux, what
reason should the ironist have to be wary of political institutions
possibly dominating his ends?
Let us look further at my claim that the ironist cannot
possibly stop himself from the threat of contaminating public
liberalism. The sources which cause a language user to adopt
certain ways of looking at problems, creating his own meaning,
cannot be intrinsic to the self. Self creation is entirely a process
which is co-formed with and projected upon external forces. If one
wants to reject that any force outside of the self should be used as a
tool for self creation, then one rejects any possibility of selfcreation. If we are unaware of how languages shape or might shape
our future language, then how can the ironist save his own final
vocabulary? Isn‘t his final vocabulary continually barraged by
external language games? On top of this, the ironist is already
skittish about his ever changing final vocabularies and self
perceptions. Given this picture of an ironist, it seems unlikely that
he might avert the possibility of (even unintentional) humiliation at
the hands of other language users. What is left for Rorty‘s liberal
ironist but an ever anxious, hermetic existence?
However, this is not the kind of life we live. Political and
social concerns are implicit in the idea of self creation. We do not
live in some kind of personal vacuum of our own intuitions. Our
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relationship to others and the world (perhaps also history), is
important to our definition of self and without these we cannot be
the ever changing self determiners that Rorty wishes us to be.
Without conditions of significance, reasons to care about
something or other, we simply have no criterion with which to
make choices valuable to us. If we are to accept Rorty‘s paradigm
of self choice, for your life‘s story to remain untainted, we would
of course (if possible) have infinite control over our final
vocabularies, we would reduce the possibility of humiliation. But
what kind of life would the ironist enjoy? His self narrative would
consist of pure self created fantasy. It would be trivial without an
external public to project his ideals upon. Ironically, by having
infinite power for self assertion and value creation, the ironist
would have removed his possibility of having such a power.
The idea that an ironist can live in this way, is of course
ridiculous. It seems that what Rorty is concerned with is not in
fact, the firm distinction between public and private spheres, but of
the protection of the individual‘s self narrative against societal
commandeering. The purpose of positing the public/private
distinction in the first place, was an attempt at the reduction of
humiliation and cruelty: the worst thing liberals do. But it was
posited in order to protect the general public against the ironist.
However, what it looks like is that the ironist himself is the one
which is being protected by the distinction. Since self creation and
therefore irony, cannot possibly be privatized, anyone and
everyone is subject to the humiliation of the ironist, (including
other ironists). In short, there is no guarantee that private irony will
not ―contaminate‖ the public notion of liberalism: the aversion to
suffering. In affirming the public private distinction Rorty is not
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saving the public from the ironist, but the ironist from public
interference.
The ironist is also put in a peculiar psychological
disposition with regard to his work. As we‘ve noted, the ironist is
such that he regards the relative unimportance of his self creation
as the basis for his public liberalism. It is hard to see how the
ironist can see his views as being important to the progression of
history, but yet as unimportant to others. In fact, doesn‘t the ironist
wish to influence other, futurally contingent ironists? Because of
his break with his facticity, he is concerned with the progression of
history: of specific futural agents‘ potential synthesis with his
vocabulary.
These remarks show that the ironist is in fact concerned
with something external: with his position and relationship to the
evolution of language and therefore historical paradigms. He
regards his existence as contingent upon his history, and also as his
self-creation as relational to this history.
We might ask ourselves now, if an ironist is unconcerned
with external forces when it comes to self creation, aren‘t we
affirming a metaphysical transcendent? It seems like in affirming
the individualization of the self, atomization, we are falling into a
pitfall where self-hood is no longer questionable. The ironist is a
deconstructionist on many fronts, he is able to laugh at his own
final vocabulary and assert its meaningfulness, but at the same
time he is on a particular side of the metaphysical pole, a side
which his heroes like Nietzsche and Heidegger are antithetical: the
subject-object distinction. In a post-metaphysical society, it is
unclear how Rorty can possibly start with a metaphysical claim:
the self exists. As this claim is part of a justification of the
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public/private distinction, and because as an anti-metaphysician the
ironist can reject this premise, it is hard to see why all ironists
might adhere to it.
Another worry about the ironist position is that in adhering
to a strict privatization of ironists, is one raised by Daniel Conway.
If we are to privatize the ironists‘ pursuits, we necessarily force
him into an anti-social hermetic existence. The liberal ironist is one
whose liberalism comes before his ironism. As such, the ironist
feels responsible not to influence the final vocabulary of others.
But if the ironist is afraid of this notion, and he is unsure whether
his language may or may not change the self describing actions of
others, he might not have any reasons to perform acts of overt
kindness. As Conway puts it, the ―liberal ironists thus double
conserve themselves, sequestering themselves in the private sphere
and ingesting moral edification that may prevent future
expenditures of cruelty.‖4
Rorty perhaps attempts to give us a way out of this. The
liberal ironist, in his commitment to avert suffering, can attempt to
understand the ways those who speak with different vocabularies
might be humiliated. To do this he suggests the ironic liberal to
study authors such as Nabokov and Orwell, authors who describe
humiliation.
Again, we might look at this sort of provision and evaluate
whether the ironist is the sort of being we wish to encourage. In
addition to his private self creation, the ironist is also compelled to
study artistic works. He is committed to not only knowledge of
4
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historical paradigms, but of an understanding of different types of
cruelty. What sort of moral imperative is Rorty giving to the
ironist? This seems to me to be a direct violation of the ironist‘s
metaphysical aversion. Even privately the ironist is seen to be
dominated by his political affiliation with liberalism. The ironist is
committed to a form of hyper liberal asceticism.
In his work, Rorty has attempted to give valid grounds for
the promotion of ironists within our society. However, it seems
that this characterization is good for neither liberals nor ironists.
Though Rorty seeks to (furtively) increase the autonomy of the
ironist, he implicates him in a life without a possibility for
authentic self creation. The onus is placed upon the ironist himself
to avert anti-liberal claims, whereas the liberal comes off scot free.
As such, we would do good not to create a liberal society where a
strong Rortian public/private distinction is honored.
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A DEFENSE OF A WITTGENSTEINIAN OUTLOOK ON
TWO POSTMODERN THEORIES
Sarah Halvorson-Fried
Abstract The way postmodern thinkers deal with issues of
language and power has been highly influenced by Ludwig
Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. Wittgenstein‘s
conception of language as a collection of ―language-games‖ based
on agreement in use rather than a direct reflection of objective
reality is central to these issues. In this paper, I will show how this
Wittgensteinian conception manifests itself in two important
contemporary theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty and
the feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray. I will show how Rorty‘s
and Irigaray‘s Wittgenstein-influenced theories both bring
Wittgenstein‘s philosophy of language into a more social context,
and argue ultimately that through such theories we can better
understand social issues in our modern world.
Much of postmodern theory deals with issues of language
and power. According to many postmodern thinkers, most of the
relationships between language and power go unnoticed, as the
public usually sees language as a neutral medium within which we
can communicate. But language has the power to oppress, the
power to assign identities, the power to liberate. The way
postmodern thinkers deal with these issues has been highly
influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language.
In this paper, I will show how this influence manifests itself in two
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important theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty, a
―distinctive and controversial [pragmatist]‖1 and the feminist
philosophy of Luce Irigaray, a prominent name in the French
school of feminism. I will respond to criticisms of Rorty that call
his theory misrepresentative, and identify the disparity between
Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals as a vital reason to accept Rorty‘s
invocation of Wittgenstein. I will identify Wittgensteinian concepts
in Irigaray‘s feminism and establish a similar disparity in goals. I
will then use a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray to illustrate the
purpose and value of analyzing postmodern theory under a
Wittgensteinian lens. Ultimately, I believe that it is through such a
lens that we can better understand many postmodern approaches to
the relationship between humans, language and the world. In
particular, I will show in this paper that his conception of language
as based on agreement in use is central to both Irigaray‘s feminism
and Rorty‘s liberal ironism.
I. Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein
Rorty refers to Wittgenstein‘s later work in order to argue
against the prevailing acceptance of universality and representation
of truth in political and philosophical systems. In Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity, he criticizes the basing of political systems
on sweeping political theories and ideologies and proposes a new
―politics of redescription.‖ In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,
he criticizes the epistemological tradition of Western philosophy,
disparaging its perception of the ability to discover truth, and

1
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proposes a turn in philosophy toward a more conversational, less
argumentative and truth-value-based approach. In both works,
Rorty uses Wittgensteinian philosophy as a defense for his
rejection of universalizing systems.
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty spells out
implications of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language,
identifying Wittgenstein as one important thinker who revealed the
human-created, shifting nature of ―vocabularies.‖ Rorty‘s
―vocabularies‖ can be thought of as analogous to Wittgensteinian
―language-games‖ and refer to specific cultural collections of ways
of thinking, communicating, and acting (ways of living). Rorty
argues that if vocabularies are indeed created contingently and in
constant shift, if they are ―optional and mutable,‖2 then the values
they express, too, are optional and mutable. He asserts that neither
the vocabularies nor their values should be imposed on anyone,
and that political systems should seek to include multiple
vocabularies. Such systems he terms ―liberal utopias,‖ inhabited by
―liberal ironists‖ who would recognize their own contingency,
acknowledging the possibility of shifting truth and shifting
morality, which continue to change as they are influenced by
different (contingent) factors. Seeking to provide people with the
most freedom of expression possible and alleviate the most
suffering possible (this is the ―liberal‖ part), they would promote
their causes through redescriptions rather than arguments.3
Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Donald Davidson, Wittgenstein
is a stepping-stone on the path to Rorty‘s land of liberal utopias,
2
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where we all recognize contingency. According to Rorty,
Wittgenstein helped us along this path by revealing the
contingency of language: In positing that language forms an
objective framework based on agreement rather than adhering or
corresponding to an (already-existing) objective framework,
Wittgenstein makes us see language as a product of historical
contingencies. Here it is useful to explore Rorty‘s use of Donald
Davidson‘s philosophy of language, another stepping-stone.
Davidson, like Wittgenstein, asserted that what makes language
work is understanding between speakers, not expression of truth.
Davidson‘s notion of ―passing theories‖ from his 1986 paper ―A
Nice Derangment of Epitaphs‖ states that understanding between
two linguistic beings occurs when their concepts of a word‘s
meaning converge. Each person‘s concept of each word‘s meaning
is in constant shift relative to context, so understanding – and
meaning – are also in constant shift. This assertion helps us
recognize the contingency of language by revealing its lack of
necessity, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution revealed the
contingency of the biology of species.
Davidson lets us think of the history of
language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught
us to think of the history of a coral reef. . . . Our
language and our culture are as much a
contingency, as much as a result of thousands of
small mutations finding niches (and millions of
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and
the anthropoids.4

4
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Just as the present state of species has depended on many
contingent factors, so has our language. Rather than an expression
of or correspondence to reality, it is somewhat a product of chance:
Things could easily be otherwise. In addition, they are bound to
continue to change. For this reason, according to Rorty, no singular
ideology can be the right one: The circumstances under which
ideologies and social theories come into being will never be static.
As situations change, so should the vocabularies we use and the
values on which our political systems are based.
Rorty does for philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature what he does for politics in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity, presenting this idea of redescription rather than appeal
to universal truth within the discipline of philosophy. In this book,
Rorty criticizes the epistemological tradition and details what he
sees as a necessary shift in Western philosophy. He uses the
arguments of several philosophers, including Wittgenstein, to
critique the representational view of knowledge central to
traditional epistemology. According to Rorty, Wittgenstein, along
with Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, and Davidson, showed that neither the
mind nor language is capable of mirroring reality. Subsequently,
the discipline of philosophy had to change, because epistemology
ceased to make sense.5 As such, the traditional questions of
philosophy are no longer relevant to our time. They are not, as
many believe, timeless. The last sentence of his book reads,
The only point on which I would insist is that
the philosophers‘ moral concern should be with
5
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continuing the conversation of the West, rather
than with insisting upon a place for the
traditional problems of modern philosophy
within that conversation.6
We should not ―insist on a place‖ for these traditional problems
precisely because they will not, as so many philosophers have
believed, lead us to discovery of universal truths. When we do
philosophy, according to Rorty, we should neither assume that we
operate outside the boundaries of contingency nor that we have a
privileged ability to discover ―truth.‖ Rather than some sort of
elevated search for truth, he claims that our Western tradition of
philosophy is just another vocabulary (or language-game).
Instead, as in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty
would have us enter a more conversational approach. Once more,
Wittgenstein‘s influence is clear. Under Rorty‘s ―naturally holistic
conversational justification,‖ which he favors over the ―reductive
and atomistic‖ justification of the epistemological tradition, social
justification of belief creates knowledge. Just as language finds
objectivity of meaning in social agreement under Wittgenstein, so
does knowledge find objectivity of truth in social agreement under
Rorty. Under this view, philosophy as a search for truth is
nonsensical: We ―have no need to view [knowledge] as accuracy of
representation‖ since ―we understand knowledge when we
understand the social justification of belief.‖7 Rorty terms this view
―epistemological behaviorism‖ and once again attributes his theory
to Witgensteinian influence.

6
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Explaining rationality and epistemic authority
by reference to what society lets us say, rather
than the latter by the former, is the essence of
what I shall call ‗epistemological behaviorism,‘
an attitude common to Dewey and
Wittgenstein.8
And for Rorty, if we recognize philosophy‘s inability to discover
truth in any objective sense, then we should change the discipline.
Just as in Contingency, Irony, and Soliarity, Rorty would have us
reject a privileged, contingently created position of philosophy in
favor of a conversational discipline inclusive of multiple languagegames.
A legitimate worry for many critics is that Rorty
simultaneously makes normative claims while rejecting
normativity. This may indeed be a problem for Rorty, but for the
purposes of this paper it is not relevant. My task here is to show
the validity of Rorty‘s invocation of Wittgenstein. Another worry is
that in expounding on the created nature of meaning, Rorty is
rejecting objectivity of meaning in any form; in ordinary words,
for instance, like ―apple‖ or ―table.‖ Such a rejection would make
Rorty an anti-realist. I do not think he aims to do this: Rorty‘s
concern is primarily with the abandonment of essential identities in
order to allow for shifting notions of selves, cultures, and truths.
He makes this distinction himself in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity.
We need to make a distinction between the
8
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claim that the world is out there and the claim
that the truth is out there. To say that the world
is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say,
with common sense, that most things in space
and time are the effects of causes which do not
include human mental states. To say that the
truth is not out there is simply to say that where
there are no sentences there is no truth, that
sentences are elements of human languages, and
that human languages are human creations.9
Rorty is decidedly not an anti-realist, though he does have a
pluralist notion of truth: Since truth is not ―out there,‖ since it is
created by humans, it can be created in many ways. The last worry
I will explore in the next section: that in fact Rorty may not be able
to use philosophers like Wittgenstein as he does; that he may be
misrepresenting them and that his use of Wittgenstein may be
unfounded.
II. Is Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein Valid?
Rorty makes bold claims when he uses philosophers like
Wittgenstein to support his politics and philosophy of
redescription. Is this use valid? We might ask, as some have: How
can Rorty make the jump from Wittgenstein‘s notion of language
as use to ―contingency of language‖ in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity? Does Wittgenstein really exhibit language‘s
contingency? Does Rorty accurately represent Wittgenstein in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, when he cites Wittgenstein
as one of the philosophers who changed the nature of
9
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epistemology? Does he interpret Wittgenstein‘s notions of
language-games and of language as agreement correctly? I argue
first that he does in fact represent Wittgensteinian concepts of
language accurately, and second that these questions are somewhat
inappropriate, because Rorty and Wittgenstein have very different
goals. Wittgenstein is trying to determine the nature of
communication. His task is quite an apolitical one: He simply
wishes to discover the true nature of language, and he discovers it
to be a practice based on custom. Rorty has a larger goal in mind:
He wishes both to convince us that all of our practices based on
custom are not necessarily right, that we cannot justify anything
with an appeal to ―truth‖ since everything we do and think is not
necessary but contingent, and to propose new systems – of society
and of philosophy – based on this recognition. It is because of this
disparity of purpose that Rorty‘s use of Wittgenstein is not, as
some critics have proposed, invalid. Rather, Wittgenstein‘s
philosophy of language, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution, is
useful to Rorty for purposes of illustration: Wittgenstein serves
both as a useful comparison and as an important predecessor. In
appealing to Wittgenstein, Rorty is simply laying out for the reader
Wittgenstein‘s influence on his own theory.
Wolf Rehder is one of these critics. In ―Hermeneutics
versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-Discussion of R. Rorty‘s
‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‘‖ Rehder disparages Rorty
for his use of philosophers like Wittgenstein.
As witnesses for his holistic, antifoundationalist,
and pragmatist new view of philosophy as
hermeneutics, Rorty calls, among others,
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Foucault,
Dewey,
Wittgenstein,
Sartre,
Kierkegaard, Quine, Gadamer, Feyerabend and
Heidegger, a truly motley group of big names.
However, he makes only makes a meager case
against epistemology and traditional philosophy
with this impressive phalanx of witnesses for
the prosecution. It is not going too far to say that
his backing up his case with this echelon of
genuinely great men does not only not do justice
to their philosophical work, but even tends to
demean their work and their role in the history
of philosophy. This is so, because Rorty‘s
‗positive‘ case, his hermeneutic turn and
proposed transcending of truth-oriented inquiry
is, unfortunately, surprisingly naïve.10
It is naïve, according to Rehder, because there cannot be useful
conversation without conflict, nor can it exist without a common
language or discourse. In Rehder‘s view, Rorty is proposing the
opposite: agreement between different languages and discourses.
―Any fruitful discussion is based on some sort of disagreement.‖11
This is a commonly held view: To engage in conversation, we must
share a language-game; and to debate, we must disagree. It seems
to me, though, that in criticizing Rorty on this point Rehder is
simply not taking Rorty seriously: Rorty‘s point is that useful
conversation is possible – better, even – if it considers perspectives
of multiple vocabularies. To say that useful conversation must
happen within the same vocabulary is to refuse Rorty‘s proposed
10

Wulf Rehder, ―Hermeneutics versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A ReviewDiscussion of R. Rorty‘s ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‖ Zeitschrift für
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science
14, no. 1 (1983): 95, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170640.
11
Ibid., 96.

87

shift, to disregard his entire point of making the discourse of
philosophy more inclusive of multiple language-games. Rorty‘s
usage of all of these philosophers to defend his ―naïve‖ system
obviously troubles Rehder. After all, he says, ―[It] does not only
not do justice to their philosophical work, but even tends to
demean their work and their role in the history of philosophy.‖ It is
this criticism that I will now address.
First, Rorty does seem to accurately represent Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein created a new framework for objectivity based on
social agreement rather than on truth. This agreement in no way
determines truth or falsity, but instead forms a new standard of
objectivity. In response to the invisible interlocutor in section 241,
―So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?‖ Wittgenstein offers an alternative: ―It is what
humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language
they use.‖12 Agreement does not determine truth in the world, only
truth in our agreed-upon shared account of the world – in our
shared language. It is this agreement that allows us to
communicate with one another. People are understandable when
their definitions accord with socially accepted ones. When Rorty
says that Wittgenstein ―[explains] rationality and epistemic
authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the
latter by the former,‖13 he seems to be correct: Wittgenstein‘s
account of a socially formed objective framework does conform to
Rorty‘s ―epistemological behaviorism,‖ as it locates objectivity in
social accordance.
12
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Second, it is useful to ask why Rorty appeals to ―this
impressive phalanx of witnesses.‖ Does he aim to represent them?
Given the difference in Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals, strict
adherence is not necessarily essential. Any apparent disparity
between Rorty‘s Wittgenstein‘s systems is unimportant, because
Rorty and Wittgenstein are not making the same kind of claim.
They are not talking about the same kind of thing. When Rorty
says, ―the truth is not out there,‖14 he does not mean that we create
the objective world. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes between
―the claim that the truth is not out there and the claim that the
world is not out there.‖15 He means that our social and cultural
institutions, our beliefs, our methods of inquiry (like philosophy)
are created in the same way that language is, in the same way that
evolution is. Rorty does not really claim to adhere to Wittgenstein,
so he cannot be criticized for it. In both Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty invokes
Wittgenstein as an important influence, but not as his only
influence. Where Wittgenstein‘s goal is to discover and describe,
Rorty‘s is to reveal, convince, and change.
III. Illumination Through Irigaray
Irigaray is Wittgensteinian in many of the same ways as
Rorty: She holds a pluralist view of truth, rejects normativity, and
uses Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games and forms of life.
But because she does not invoke Wittgenstein‘s name to defend her
views, as Rorty does, she is never criticized for misrepresentation,

14
15

Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5.
Ibid., 5.

89

as Rorty is. This fact reveals Rorty‘s immunity to such criticism.
Her theory also illustrates the effectiveness of applying later
Wittgensteinian philosophy to postmodern theories. Through an
exploration of her work, I hope to show this usefulness.
In To Speak Is Never Neutral, Irigaray questions the
assumed impartiality of language and calls on us to recognize both
its sexed nature as ―the language of man‖ (a title of one of her
chapters) and its unfairly universalizing tendencies. She states in
her introduction, ―This book is a questioning of the language of
science, and an investigation into the sexualization of language,
and the relation between the two.‖16 In ―Linguistic Sexes and
Genders,‖ she identifies the sexism inherent in language,
examining particular words in her native French. In ―This Sex
Which Is Not One,‖ she states that ―female sexuality has always
been theorized within masculine parameters‖17 and attempts to
conceptualize it differently, outside these parameters. One of
Irigaray‘s main concerns throughout her various works is to show
how the current linguistic system is oppressive to women while
claiming to be universally neutral, an idea clearly influenced by
Wittgenstein, as I will show. Another concern is to show how
change is possible through new feminist language-games, the
details of which can be confusing and have been debated, but
which is clarified through a Wittgensteinian reading of her theory.
Irigaray uses the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games
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as well as his conception of objectivity as agreement to describe
the problem of a universal language that is catered toward men but
purported to apply to women as well. According to Irigaray, the
language we accept as universal – the language of politics, of
science, of philosophy – is actually an oppressive, particular
language-game.
A sexed subject imposes his imperatives as
universally valid, and as the only ones capable
of defining the forms of reason, of thought, of
meaning, and of exchange. He still, and always,
comes back to the same logic, the only logic: of
the One, of the Same. Of the Same of the One.18
Just as, in Wittgenstein, we cannot form a private language because
all words we use are defined by the linguistic community, so, in
Irigaray, is it nearly impossible to escape from the purportedly
universal dominating male language-game. In the same vein as
Rorty, Irigaray questions the value of rationality and criticizes the
language of traditional philosophy, which is decidedly male and
which is imposed on women while masking itself as universal to
all.
From [Irigaray‘s] point of view, the
philosophers, of whatever persuasion, are
comfortably installed in the male imaginary, so
comfortably that they are completely unaware of
the sexuate character of ‗universal‘ thought.19
18
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How, then, is feminist theory even possible? The problem is as
follows: ―Not using logic risks maintaining the other‘s status as
infans . . . Using logic means abolishing difference and
resubmitting to the same imperatives.‖20 If we operate outside the
dominating language-game, we will not be taken seriously, and if
we operate within it, we are giving in, trying to fit ourselves into
the oppressive system.
Irigaray‘s solution, possible under Wittgensteinian
influence, is to form a new language-game that challenges this
discourse. Irigaray appeals to the female body in the formation of a
new language of feminism, under two assumptions: First, that the
male body is already intrinsic to philosophy – in ethics, for
instance, where the point is to enhance positive effects on the body
(e.g., health) and circumvent negative effects (e.g., death). Second,
that the female body is currently defined by male desire and male
language.21 The body is important both in the symbolic and in its
realized form for Irigaray. Rather than being forced to conform
either to the supposedly universal language of men, based on the
male body, or to form a new language based on the male-created
female body, ―the female body has to be allowed its own imaginary
existence in the form of symbolic difference.‖22 This imaginary
existence can only be realized by privileging female life, female
sexuality, and the real female body, as they are ―for themselves.‖23
Irigaray‘s solution is Wittgensteinian because it relies on
Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games as flexible, changing
20
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and organic and of language as a form of life. Formation of a new
language-game is possible because language-games are always
coming into and out of being. The female body itself is an
important part of the female form of life, and so can be appealed to
in Irigaray‘s formation of a new feminine language-game.
Importantly, Irigaray does not declare herself
Wittgensteinian; but a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray both
makes sense, as I have shown, and clarifies some aspects of her
solution. Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith show how such a
Wittgensteinian reading clarifies and does justice to Irigaray in
―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Philosophy and Gender in a Language
(Game) of Difference.‖ Specifically, a Wittgensteinian reading
solves an interpretative conflict among Irigaray scholars. Critics
have typically either called Irigaray essentialist, which she
explicitly claims not to be (her disparagement of universalizing
language is clearly anti-essentialist) or as speaking in metaphor or
symbolism when she speaks about the body (since they know she
is anti-essentialist, they cannot imagine she would invoke the real
body). Even Margaret Whitford, a prominent Irigaray scholar,
acknowledges the difficulty of reading Irigaray, in that ―we are not
quite sure what status is given to Irigaray‘s statements.‖24 She
wonders whether they are ―empirical descriptions . . . ideal
descriptions . . . descriptions of the reigning imaginary . . . or
perhaps simply metaphors again.‖25 Reading Irigaray under a
Wittgensteinian lens, say Davidson and Smith, ―might provide a
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third alternative‖26 and solve this conflict: Through Wittgenstein,
we can come to terms with Irigaray‘s simultaneous rejection of
essentialism and appeal to the body in formation of a new,
subversive, feminine language-game. Wittgenstein‘s notion of
―blurred concepts‖ or ―family resemblances‖ lets us recognize the
possibility of using something like the female body to create a new
language-game without essentializing it.
Women‘s anatomy might be understood as a real
component of the patterns, context, and
environment that might give rise to a feminine
language-game. So, while anatomy is not an
essential referent to which language must be
fixed, it is a valid and pertinent feature of a
feminine form of life.27
Wittgenstein told us that definitions need not always be fixed, that
a ―the indistinct [picture] is often exactly what we need.‖28 In the
same way, female anatomy need not be essentialized to serve as a
reference point for the creation of a feminine language-game. We
see, then, that Wittgensteinian philosophy does not only manifest
itself in Irigaray‘s theory; it can also help clarify it.
IV. A Difference of Goals: Language and Power
Like Rorty, Irigaray has a political goal, one that is vastly
different from Wittgenstein‘s descriptive one. Rorty and Irigaray
26
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both assume that language has power: In both of their theories, it is
language that oppresses and language that has the power to
liberate. This relationship between language and power was termed
―discourse‖ by Michel Foucault, and refers to language and other
shared aspects of culture as a mechanism that perpetuates itself
through use, never calling itself into question. Central to this idea
is the Wittgensteinian one that language is based on agreement in
use, that social agreement in use forms the objective frameworks
within which we communicate. Wittgenstein was the philosopher
to assert that there was no ideal language capable of representing
reality. Maxine Greene says in ―Postmodernism and the Crisis of
Representation‖ that our postmodern task ―may be a matter of
recognizing that there is no single-dimensional medium reflective
of the ‗facts‘ of the world, but a multiplicity of language games, as
Ludwig Wittgenstein made so clear.‖29 Postmodern thinkers like
Foucault, Rorty, and Irigaray, as well as Judith Butler, Monique
Wittig, and Edward Said, among others, have accepted this task,
drawing out the social and political implications of Wittgensteinian
philosophy of language.
Wittgenstein thus proves to be invaluable to postmodern
theories of language and power: Though Wittgenstein never
approaches the social and political ideas that theorists like Rorty
and Irigaray do, his work is ultimately their basis. For this reason,
and as we have seen through these two case studies, a
Wittgensteinian reading of postmodern theories helps us
understand them.
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V. Eliminating False Clarity: The Value of WittgensteinInfluenced Postmodern Theory
Both Rorty and Irigaray use Wittgensteinian notions of
language and social agreement to call into question the universality
we so often use to solve political, philosophical, and scientific
problems. Irigaray questions the universality of political,
philosophical, and scientific language, while Rorty questions the
ability of universalizing, truth-seeking systems of politics and
philosophy to provide us with acceptable solutions. I once heard in
an ecology class that ―our best chance of solving problems is to
recognize the complexity of the situation rather than appeal to an
ideology.‖ The professor said such an appeal gives us ―false
clarity.‖ It seems to me that this is true, that more realistic views do
not think themselves universal, and that Rorty‘s and Irigaray‘s
Wittgenstein-influenced theories that seek to reveal the complexity
of the situation in lieu of the false clarity of universalizing
political, philosophical, and linguistic systems are ones to consider
with utmost seriousness and thoughtfulness.
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THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW: WHY
MARYA SCHECHTMAN CANNOT REQUIRE IT FOR
PERSONHOOD
Andrew S. Lane
Abstract In her book The Constitution of Selves, Marya
Schechtman names four features essential for personal existence:
survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and
compensation. She rejects reductionists theories of persons,
specifically that of Derek Parfit, claiming that they cannot support
the four features. Instead, she proposes a theory of persons which
she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View. Because she
believes this is required to support the four features, she also
argues that for an individual to be a person they must hold this
view. Drawing from the work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson,
I will argue that her arguments are inconsistent and do not show
that reductionist theories cannot support the four features. As a
result, I conclude that Schechtman is wrong to require the
Narrative Self-Constitution View for personhood.
This paper will deal with the theory of personal identity
proposed by Marya Schechtman in her book, The Constitution of
Selves.1 In this work, Schechtman claims that there are four basic
features of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-
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interested concern, and compensation.2 These she abbreviates as
the ―four features.‖ Regardless of potential additions or
emendations to the list, I will not question these features. As far
back as John Locke, accounting for moral responsibility is a key
motivation for personal identity theory and this continues with
more contemporary philosophers like Derek Parfit. Moral
accountability seems required for a functional society. If a person
at time T1 does not survive and there is a new person at time T2,
generally our intuition is that the person existing at time T2 would
not be responsible for the actions of person existing at time T1.
Thus, it seems necessary that a person must survive across time to
some extent, otherwise nobody could be held accountable for past
actions. The work of Galen Strawson will be useful in considering
this question of moral accountability. Self-interested concern and
compensation also seem necessary for ―personal‖ existence,
though not for ―impersonal‖ existence. It is not of necessity that
the former is better than the latter, but this essay will set such
considerations aside. I will take personal survival to be a valid
target, which is Schechtman's aim, without justifying whether or
not it is any better than impersonal survival. Schechtman believes
that Reductionist views, like that of Derek Parfit, cannot capture
the four features, and thus fail as accounts of personal identity.
Instead, she advocates what she calls the Narrative SelfConstitution View, which she feels is required in order to capture
the four features.
The Narrative Self-Constitution View holds that a person
creates his or her identity by forming an autobiographical
2
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narrative. According to this view,
the difference between persons and other
individuals...lies in how they organize their
experience, and hence their lives. At the core of
this view is the assertion that individuals
constitute themselves as persons by coming to
think of themselves as persisting subjects who
have had experience in the past and will
continue to have experience in the future, taking
certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all,
individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is
their doing so which makes them persons.3
Those who do not adhere to this narrative view, those who do not
think of themselves as persisting subjects and construct narratives,
are not persons according to Schechtman. I claim, however, that
the narrative self-constitution view is not the only way to capture
the four features. As a result, Schechtman is wrong to deny
personhood to individuals who do not view themselves narratively.
The motivation for her requirement that an individual view
themselves narratively is that to account for personal existence, we
need to capture the four features; thus, if we can capture the four
features another way, while this does not exclude her narrative
view as one of the potential ways, which I believe it is, it is not
required, and thus individuals who are non-narrative should not be
excluded from personhood.
The Reductionist View of Derek Parfit
Before considering the views of Derek Parfit, it will be
3
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useful to establish some distinctions concerning identity. First,
there is the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity.
For example, take two sheets of printer paper. The two sheets are
qualitatively identical, for they share the same qualities, but are not
numerically identical, because they are two different physical
objects. While the two sheets are not numerically identical with
each other, each is numerically identical with itself; each is one
and the same sheet of paper. This is one of the basic principles of
logic: self-identity.
Second, there is strict and non-strict identity. Strict identity
requires that X1 and X2 be exactly the same in all ways; the
smallest change of any kind destroys the strict identity of the
objects. With non-strict identity, however, some change is
permitted without destroying the non-strict identity of the objects.
With the paper example, X1 and X2 are not strictly qualitatively
identical, because if we compare closely enough, the fragments of
pulp are not arranged in exactly the same configuration. Strict
identity in this case would require that all the atoms making up the
paper, and their arrangement, be exactly qualitatively identical.
However, X1 and X2 may be considered non-strictly identical. For
most purposes, it would be more useful to a person to consider X1
and X2 (non-strictly) qualitatively identical, because what matters
to us about the sheets of paper is not on the level of atoms; for our
purposes the sheets are qualitatively identical. The criteria for what
qualifies for non-strict identity will vary depending on the objects
in question, and this will be dependent on the perspective of who is
considering the objects and their purposes. The strict/non-strict
distinction applies to numerical identity as well. With the problem
of personal identity, the two objects in question will be in different
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temporal locations. To say that the paper is self-identical in a given
moment considers space, while the time aspect is constant. When
considering whether the paper is numerically identical at different
moments also considers time. Strictly, the paper would not be
identical at different moments because the atomic makeup will
have slightly changed, for example from the effects of light.
However, we may say that they are non-strictly identical if all that
has changed are the atomic differences from light, because these
differences are irrelevant to what matters to us about paper.
One of Parfit's central concerns is moral accountability. As
mentioned in the introduction, if a person at time T1 is not the same
person at time T2, then it seems that the person at time T2 could not
be held accountable for the actions of the person at time T1, for
they are not the same person. When we look at an individual across
time, they are never strictly identical at two different times. Atoms
have changed and psychological makeup is in constant flux. Thus,
when speaking of an individual at two different times, they are
never strictly-identical on a reductionist account. If one holds that
there is, as Parfit would say, a further fact of identity, then one may
argue that there can be strict identity across time. If, for example,
there were an immaterial, eternal substance, perhaps a soul, and
this substance provides identity, then it may be strict identity. None
of the philosophers discussed in this essay argue for such a
substance, and because it is not within the scope of this paper to
properly argue against it, I will set this possibility aside. The
person at two different times may, however, be non-strictly
identical. The question then becomes, what criteria should we use
to decide whether or not they are (non-strictly) identical? For
Parfit, the mind is more important than the body and thus seems
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the natural place to locate this identity. As a result, he articulates
psychological criteria for identity.
For this, Parfit defines three terms: psychological
connectedness, strong psychological connectedness, and
psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is ―the
holding of particular direct psychological connections.‖4 Parfit
cites memories, beliefs, desires and intentions as examples of
individual psychological connections. For example, if a person at
age 18 has the memory of running from a dog when they were
younger, and this person still has this memory when they are 20,
this would be an example of a direct psychological connection.
Parfit claims, ―since connectedness is a matter of degree, we
cannot plausibly define precisely what counts as enough. But we
can claim that there is enough connectedness if the number of
direct connections, over any day, is at least half the number that
hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.‖5
Strong connectedness means over half of the possible
psychological connections hold. Strong connectedness is not
transitive. A person at time T1 may be strongly connected to the
person at time T2, and the person at time T2 to the person at time
T3, but it does not follow that the person at time T3 is strongly
connected to the person at time T1. Psychological continuity is ―the
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness.‖ 6 While
strong connectedness is not a transitive relation, psychological
continuity is. Thus, the person at time T3 would be psychologically
4
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continuous with the person at time T1, because they are linked
through time T2 to which they are both strongly connected. A
person at two different times may be considered (non-strictly)
identical if and only if they are psychologically continuous. Like
the Buddhists and David Hume, Parfit claims that there is no Self,
where the Self would be an unchanging entity or essence that can
provide identity for an individual across time. That is, there is no
―further fact‖ of identity; identity simply consists in holding
psychological continuity.
The Extreme Claim and the Moderate Claim
In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that
we are Selfless persons, that there is no Self to provide the further
fact of identity, instead claiming that our identity simply consists in
overlapping chains of strong psychological connections, but thinks
that this is not such a terrible thing. In fact, he feels that adopting
this view was a positive change in his life. In response to his view,
however, he sees two possible reactions; one he calls the Extreme
Claim, the other the Moderate Claim.
The Extreme Claim says that ―if the Reductionist view is
true, we have no reason to be concerned about our own futures.‖7
If in the future, my future self will not be the same person as my
current self, then I have no reason to care for this person. It is not
me. For example, why should I care if smoking damages my body,
for it will not be me who dies of cancer. The Moderate Claim,
however, says that psychological continuity with a high degree of
connectedness gives us a reason to be concerned for our future
7
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selves.8 Parfit believes that even though it will not be the same
person in the future by strict criteria, it could be the same person
on a reductionist account, and the present person may still have
concern for the future person. He likens this to how we may be
concerned for our children, even if they are not us. The relations
that justify this are not a deep separate fact. If these relations give
us reason to care, then psychological continuity may give us
reason.
However, one may still object that it will not be one in the
future, so why should one be especially concerned today about
what one shall care about in the future? Why should a person care
about either their future selves or other people's future selves? To
this, Parfit says that he does not have an argument to completely
refute the extreme claim. Both claims, he thinks, are defensible.
Though, he believes that we are not forced to accept the extreme
claim. He wonders,
It may be wrong to compare our concern about
our own future with our concern for those we
love. Suppose I learn that someone I love will
soon suffer great pain. I shall be greatly
distressed by this news. I might be more
distressed than I would be if I learnt that I shall
soon suffer such pain. But this concern has a
different quality. I do not anticipate the pain that
will be felt by someone I love.9
Thus, because he cannot refute the Extreme Claim, he accepts it as
a defensible response to his position. However, he maintains that
8
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the Moderate Claim is also defensible. Neither claim, he thinks,
necessarily follows from his theory. Which claim a person holds
will depend on the feeling of that person.
Schechtman's Argument from the Extreme Claim
Schechtman believes that reductionism cannot support the
Moderate Claim and as a result we are forced to accept the
Extreme Claim. Because the Extreme Claim cannot support the
Four Features, Reductionism, she claims, cannot be true. She
maintains that instead of accepting this as an interesting result of
Parfit's theory of personal identity, it should be seen as a reductio
ad absurdum of Parfit's reductionist account, because it cannot
support the four features.10 Her argument has two premises.
Premise 1 is that ―the four features require numerical identity–
qualitative similarity will not do.‖11 This is because ―self-interested
concern is an emotion that is appropriately felt only toward my
own self and not toward someone like me. We all know the
difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the
pain of someone else.‖12 As Parfit himself recognized, this is a
difference of kind and not of degree. While we may potentially
care about another person's pain more than our own, we do not
―anticipate‖ the pain. Premise 2 claims that ―the psychological
continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being
me and someone being like me–that all identity amounts to on this
view is psychological similarity between distinct individuals.‖13
10
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Schechtman believes that the extreme claim follows from
these premises. If there is no difference between being the same
person, and being like a different person, how can we decide if it is
the same person, and thus how could we consider them to have
self-interested concern? If qualitative similarity between distinct
individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, then the
continuity theory fails to account for the importance of identity.
She believes that to avoid the Extreme Claim, we need a theory
where one and the same experiencing subject can exist at two
different times; if person-stages are the only subjects that have
experience in the theory, and person stages are not of the same
subject, then this cannot happen.14
The Tribal Example
Regardless of the Extreme Claim, Parfit insists that, even
though his rejection of the Non-Reductionist view led him to be
less concerned about his future, he was still more concerned about
his own future than that of a mere stranger.15 To account for this
concern, and to counter Schechtman's argument that we are forced
to accept the Extreme Claim, we need to deal with the problem of
anticipation. The Narrative Self-Constitution view, I argue, does no
better than reductionism on this account. We also need to show that
this concern is of a different character than the concern for others,
because otherwise she can simply claim that it is not self-interested
concern and thus does not capture the four features. To approach
this, let us look to an example that Schechtman herself uses while
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defending her demand for a conventional linear narrative against
the claim of chauvinism: the ―Tribal‖ example.
At some point, the deviation of an individual's
self-conception from the range of narratives
standard in our culture can be so great that
comprehension of and interaction with such
individuals becomes difficult. This is the sort of
divergence that can often be found in cases of
extreme cultural difference. In such a case the
narrative self-constitution view might recognize
that this culture has persons, but also note that
their concept of persons-and so the persons
themselves-are quite different from in our
culture. For instance, a tribal culture might
assign to an ancestral lineage much of the role
that the individual person plays in our culture–
responsibility, for instance, may be felt most
directly for all of the actions of an ancestral line
rather than for the actions of the individual
alone, and self-interested and survival concerns
may also be primarily attached the lineage.
Presumably the members of this culture would
also recognize what we call a single person as a
natural unit, but this unit would play a different
role in their interactions and practices.16
Schechtman would still consider these people, even though they
have distinct selves spanning multiple bodies across multiple
lifetimes. The person here, would thus involve the entire lineage,
which she feels means that their concept of a person is different,
but that they can still meet her criteria of supporting the four
16

Schechtman, Constitution, 104.
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features. Schechtman does not deny that Parfit is correct that we
are distinct selves at different times; rather, she feels that we need
narrativity to connect these selves as a single subject in order to
capture the four features. Although Schechtman uses this example
to defend her theory, it may also be used to illuminate why we are
not forced to accept the Extreme Claim.
Why We Are Not Forced to Accept the Extreme Claim
We may now turn to Galen Strawson. He speaks of people
as either episodic or diachronic. Someone who is diachronic sees
themselves as existing across time and feels a deep connection to
their past, whereas an episodic ―has little or no sense that the self
that one is was there in the (further) past and will be there in the
future, although one is perfectly well aware that one has long-term
continuity considered as a whole human being. Episodics are likely
to have no particular tendency to see their life in Narrative
terms.‖17 Further, Galen Strawson thinks that ―the heart of Moral
responsibility, considered as a psychological phenomenon, is just a
sort of instinctive responsiveness to things, a responsiveness in the
present whose strength or weakness in particular individuals has
nothing to do with how Episodic or Diachronic or Narrative or
non-Narrative they are.‖18 For Strawson, moral responsibility does
not depend on whether or not it was the same (transient) self in the
past. He claims that he, the present self, feels responsibility for past
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Galen Strawson, ―Against Narrativity,‖ in Ratio. 17.4 (2004): 428-452. Rpt. in
The Self? Ed. Galen Strawson, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005), 65.
18
Galen Strawson, ―Episodic Ethics,‖ Philosophy. 82.320 (2007). Cambridge
University Press. Rpt. in Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 220.
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actions that he, the present self, did not perform. While Strawson
most identifies with the present self, which he claims is very short
lived, he also recognizes that as a whole human being he exists
across time. People may feel a sense of responsibility for the
actions of their family members, or community, etc, even though
they did not perform them. This is especially easy to see in the case
of children. Parents often feel responsibility for the actions of their
child, even though they are fully aware that the child is a distinct
person. Strawson claims that in the case of responsibility, there is a
―phenomenon of natural transmission‖ that does not require
diachronic self-experience.19 For example, when a person dies their
family members often handle any obligations of the deceased that
remain open, including debt, regardless of the fact that they are
distinct persons. A person holds himself responsible when he feels
this sense of responsibility, even if the present self is not the same
self that committed the original action.
Parfit's theory considers a situation that is similar with his
Nobel Prize Winner example. He writes, ―Suppose that a man aged
ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize,
confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a
policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime,
this man may not now deserve to be punished.‖20 When
considering his accountability, we question his present state,
whether and in what way he is similar to the person who did the
action. In the case of the Nobel Prize winner, we look to see if the
present self is similar in certain ways to the past self, and this is

19
20

Ibid., 221.
Parfit, Reasons, 326.
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relevant to whether or not we hold him responsible. That they may
be considered two different people does not preclude us from
holding the present person responsible for the past person's actions.
Does the present self, the Nobel Prize winner, still attack police
officers? Or, does he still have psychological similarities that are
relevant to this question? Is he peaceful, does he respect the police
and other people in general, does he have a temper, are all relevant
questions. Further, these questions affect whether or not he, the
Nobel Prize winner, will feel responsible for this action.
Schechtman, however, maintains that qualitative similarity
is not enough for responsibility, but this does not seem to be
universally the case. We find examples where people feel a sense
of responsibility even if they (the present self) did not perform the
actions. While Schechtman accepts transference between living
bodies in the Tribal example, within the life of a single human, this
is not much different. There are multiple selves within the lifetime
of one body instead of multiple lifetimes with multiple bodies; if
anything, this should be easier for Schechtman to accept than the
situation in the Tribal example. The difference is only one of
distance and greater known qualitative similarity. In contrast to the
above example, one may feel a much stronger sense of
responsibility for an action they committed yesterday than for the
actions of their ancestors. Here, they know a much greater amount
of qualitative similarity holds, and feel themselves to be much
more the same person. Even an episodic person may say this. In
the case of the Nobel Prize winner, the qualitative similarity may
be much weaker, and thus he may feel less responsible, for this is
pushing closer to the situation of someone feeling responsible for
an ancestor's actions as opposed to feeling responsible for the
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actions of yesterday. While this is not the same as it would be if it
were the same self, strictly speaking, feeling the responsibility as
who did the action, the practical result is not different in a
meaningful way; the responsibility, as a feeling, does not
necessarily require that it be the same self as the self who did the
action.
Schechtman allows that these tribal individuals are people,
just different people. They feel responsibility for their ancestor's
actions. Schechtman denies that we may feel responsibility for
what we, the present self, did not do if we accept the reductionist
view, but she will allow this if the conception of a person ranges
across multiple bodies, presumably if they are conceptualized in
the right way, with narrative. This allowance, however, can be
turned around. If a tribal person is allowed to range across multiple
bodies and lifetimes, even though Tribal body 1 will not feel the
pain of their son, Tribal body 2, they may still have concern for it,
and she must accept this in the tribal society for her theory to be
coherent. In this case, one may speak of self-interested concern
without anticipation, which is inconsistent with her argument for
why we are forced to accept the Extreme Claim. She doesn't argue
for why her theory allowing the tribal lineages to be people does
not apply equally in the case of a single individual with multiple
selves in our own society. She merely rejects this possible
conception of a person out of hand. Moreover, she gives no
argument to justify her particular choice for what it means to be a
person in our own society. Having considered the views of Parfit
and Strawson, it is clear that there are other options for what it
means to be a person and these alternative conceptions cannot be
ruled out just because they are different. It seems like she must
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actually require that these tribal individuals are not people, for they
cannot anticipate the actions as their own, or she must expand her
concept of anticipation so that if the individual conceptualizes
themselves in such a way that they have concern for future persons
they take to be themselves (in the non-present self sense), this must
be as acceptable as the anticipation she believes she establishes
with her narrative self-constitution view. Otherwise, her example is
meaningless, and she is open to the charge of chauvinism, for she
has no good reason to exclude other possible self-conceptions. And
thus, she is wrong to require her self-conception for personhood.
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CONSCIOUSNESS AND AI: REFORMULATING THE
ISSUE
Patrick Holzman
Abstract In this paper, I explore the ―issue‖ of consciousness in
artificial intelligences, the problem of whether they can be
conscious, specifically going for simply asking what consciousness
involves, instead of more technical aspects of the field. I use
Robert Kirk's concepts of the "Basic Package" as well as "Direct
Activity" to outline what being conscious involves, and attempt to
apply it to artificially designed and constructed beings. I assume
that artificial conscious intelligences will be constructed,
eventually; my goal is to suggest a specific and more useful way of
thinking about consciousness, which will hopefully accelerate the
inevitable.
The science of artificial intelligence deals with attempts to
make programs or machines that can function in an intelligent way.
What "intelligent" means is dependent on our own judgment and
defined for the most part in terms of our own actions. Humans (and
animals) act "intelligently," and so when we want to create an
artificial intelligence, what we want is something that acts like us,
that at least appears to make complex judgments and choices about
its environment. Note that I have deliberately phrased this
description of AI with phrases like "acts intelligently," or "appears
to make judgments," or "functions in a certain way." That is, I've
put these goals in terms of what the intelligences do, what their
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behavior is, without any mention of their internal structure, and in
doing so l leave open the question of consciousness and the
"mind."
From my fairly limited understanding of the perspective of
those working with AI, this is entirely reasonable. The goal of
engineers working in AI is to create something that acts
intelligently. The challenge is the execution, the structure of the
program, but the goal itself is purely based on behavior. I might
even be so bold as to say that many researchers in AI assume that
"consciousness," and rational judgment, whatever these involve,
will come out in the wash, around when we get things that can
truly act like a person. However, I feel that consciousness should
be a goal in itself,1 and the path to consciousness will involve the
amplification of some already existing "bare awareness" or
"internal life" found in all systems. I will first talk a bit about the
field of artificial intelligence, then consciousness in general (that
is, attempt to define what I'm talking about in the first place), then
introduce Robert Kirk's idea of the "Basic Package" or the
"decider," and then finally his concept of "direct activity" and the
"Basic Package Plus" to work out how one could judge whether a
thing has consciousness or not. Using these, Kirk constructs a
model of consciousness, or at least the salient aspects of
consciousness in terms of testing for it. I agree with his views, and
ultimately I will conclude that the phenomenal aspect of
consciousness is not as important as the ability to make judgments
and to actually understand the world.
1

More precisely, I feel that creating an AI that would qualify as one of Kirk‘s
―deciders‖ is worthwhile as a goal; I think it will be clear why after I describe
Kirk‘s concepts.
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The claim "AI researchers don't care about consciousness"
is something of a straw man, but I want to dispel even the smallest
hint of behaviorism. To be blunt, logical behaviorism, the opinion
that all there is to having a mind is acting in a certain way, seems
absolutely incomprehensible. In this sort of behaviorism, the
statement "he believes that it will rain" is identical with the
statement "he carries an umbrella and otherwise acts in certain
ways." But this is quite false. Consider a hypothetical table-based
system, wherein all conceivable inputs are associated with various
outputs: input A at state J causes output X and state K, input B at
state M causes output Y and state N, all down a table. Given a long
enough table, and a fast enough method to access it, you could
have an AI that perfectly replicated a human.2 However, it seems
rather obvious that this would not possess a rational mind, would
not analyze the world or make judgments, but instead function
purely through reaction.
A behaviorist would say that this is an unfair criticism;
such a thing would be impossible to execute. If we were to create a
being that acted like a human, and fully like a human, able to react
to an indefinite variety of situations, and its hardware was limited
to something the size of a human head, then it seems reasonable to
assume that such a thing would likely be acting in a complex, rich
way, actually having an internal functioning of similar convolution
to ours, if likely with a different sort of structure. Phrased this way,
behaviorism is much more about practical judgments about the
nature of things we could encounter or build. This still misses the

2

I do mean, though, an extremely long table, with a great many states and inputs.
Essentially the false human‘s entire life story would count as a single state.
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point behind asking whether something really possesses a mind or
is conscious—unless there is something beyond the material,
possession of a mind must line up with some physical state of
things. Furthermore, advances in technology may allow us to make
astonishingly complex AIs that, nonetheless, will have no true
mind.
The goal at the moment is to make programs that solve
problems humans are still not very good at, such as traffic control
or chess. Generally this is done by formalizing the situation
mathematically, then writing a program to manipulate this
formalization and find what best fits a certain criteria. It is not that
"is efficient" is the criterion, but rather that there is some variable
in the formalization that the program attempts to minimize or
maximize. Once the formalization is "translated" back into our
own understanding of the problem, this variable is identified with
efficiency, but a significant part of the work when making the
artificial intelligence is this formalization, in determining how best
to abstractly represent the problem. Even when researchers attempt
to create AIs that learn through something like a "neural net," they
must first create a domain within which the AI will function; the
problem has changed from solving a certain problem in a certain
language, to working out the language and what problem is
involved while still using a certain other language.
Here I want to begin to use words like "syntax" and
"semantics," but I think doing so would be dangerous—such words
have been used many times before and have vague definitions.3 It

3

I also suspect the way I use these words, or at least what I consider important
about them, is different from many others‘.
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might be best to carefully lay out what I'm talking about. When I
refer to consciousness, I am to a certain extent going by Nagel's
idea of having a "what it's like.‖4 My eventual conclusion is,
however, that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, this feel, is
not what is valuable. Rather, the value comes in the ability to make
judgments about the world; whether our perception is immediate or
has no phenomenological aspect is irrelevant. The distinction I‘m
trying to focus on is one between "consciousness" and
"awareness," between "perception" and "sensation." Awareness,
sensation, is simply having a first-person perspective from which
certain things are experienced, while consciousness, perception, is
to have some context, some interpretation of that sensation.
Perception is sensation with internal context; consciousness is
awareness with actual meaningful content. This is a very fuzzy
distinction, one that will be better distinguished when I get to
Kirk's deciders and the basic package. One possible way to think
of it is by the concept of "raw feels," which here would just be
sensation. The "raw feels," the sensations, are the raw bits of
context-less information that comes into a system, which for some
things is then interpreted and becomes perception, becomes
conscious. For those things which are not conscious, sensation
cause some reflexes to fire, and in this manner they are yet aware.
Terms and Assumptions
In earlier versions of this paper I freely used
"consciousness" when what I meant was "a mind," in this sense of

4

Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical
Review. 83 (4): 435-450.
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"rational and analyzing" that I've been stressing. To jump ahead,
the distinction between an unconscious and a conscious mind is, in
Kirk's terms, the addition of "direct activity," the fact that for a
conscious mind perception is irresistible and happens
automatically. Perception of the world directly affects the mind,
changing how that being will achieve its goals or what its goals
are, with no need to reflect on its body of knowledge. This ―direct
activity‖ is what is entailed by consciousness, the ―what it‘s like.‖
The actual rationality should not be properly referred to as
―consciousness,‖ except in that explicit sense of rationality. That
is, we are not discussing ―conscious vs. unconscious,‖ but rather
―conscious vs. reflexive‖ or something along those lines.
By "system" I really do mean any sort of system. For the
most part I'm talking about complex life-forms, but computer
programs, robots, even things like toasters or thermostats count as
a "system." The "basic package" and "deciders" will be detailed in
more depth later, but essentially a "decider" is something that
analyzes information about its environment, forms goals, and then
executes those goals. I will say that systems that are deciders have
"minds," and "mind" here means "rational, complex mind."
"Consciousness" refers to minds or deciders that have direct
activity, Kirk's "basic package plus." Unfortunately, I do not have
a simple term for systems that are not deciders that still have direct
activity. I think they could be called "non-rational sensing
systems."
I will go ahead and assume there is nothing beyond our
physical bodies at work when we speak of the mind. Our brains do
things, and this activity, from a different perspective, is called
―mind.‖ Brain activity does not ―produce‖ minds over and above
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the brain, they is not ―caused‖ by that activity. Rather, the activity
in the brain somehow is the activity in the mind. You could not
have a human brain functioning the way it does without also
having a mind. This is not a contingent fact, but rather a fact about
the sort of activity that occurs in the brain, that it is also conscious
mental activity, when viewed from the inside. I take this as a
matter of faith, and feel no need to defend this. It seems for the
most part obvious, and, honestly, not that interesting.
I will also assume that consciousness is an interesting and
worthy topic of discussion. There is something that it is to be
conscious; you and I can feel it just by thinking. This needs to be
acknowledged, and explored. Finally, I will also assume that the
mind could best be described as "activity within the brain when
viewed from a different perspective." Searle gives this formulation:
―Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in
the brain and are themselves features of the brain.‖5 I would agree,
with a caveat about the exact use of language. I want to stress that
the mind is not ―caused‖ by the brain, but is the brain; I think I
mean the same as Searle, but that I am insisting on a certain
language. Searle talks about the mind being an emergent property
of the brain, in the same way that wetness is an emergent property
of H2O. Now, is wetness ―caused‖ by the H2O? Not exactly, not in
the same sense that a rock causes a window to shatter. H2O does
not ―produce‖ wetness, but rather it is wet, in sufficient quantities.
―Produce‖ and ―cause‖ evoke to me feelings of ―extrude‖ and
―impart,‖ not ―possess.‖ However, if we are to say that the brain
―causes‖ the mind in the same way that H2O ―causes‖ wetness,
5

John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT, 1992, 1.
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then it‘s quite fine. Indeed, the other half of his formulation is that
mental phenomena ―are themselves features of the brain.‖
Although I've focused on just this example, I think similar sorts of
situations abound and are what actually make up many of the
apparent differences among various theories.
What is tenuous, and interesting, is the use of ―from a
different perspective,‖ when saying what the mind is. An objection
can be raised that this physicalist explanation does not account for
all aspects of the mental, that there is an ―explanatory gap.‖
Nagel‘s Bat6 and Jackson‘s Mary7 are paradigmatic thought
experiments/arguments for this ―internal perspective.‖ The
explanatory gap implies that knowledge of the physical world will
not give you the knowledge of ―what it‘s like.‖ However, for now I
am not focused so much on what it is like to be something, but
rather whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any specific thing. I
suspect there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be a cat, and that there is not a
―what it‘s like‖ to be a rock, and furthermore that we can tell this
empirically, and where the line is, just from physical facts. Even if
physical facts can‘t tell what it is like, they can still tell whether
there is a ―what it‘s like.‖ It is interesting to pursue whether we can
tell ―what it‘s like‖ to be something, and I will do so, somewhat,
but the difficulties we have in doing so do not change our
knowledge that there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be something.

6

Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” (Philosophical Review, 1974).
Frank Jackson, “What Mary didn’t know” (Journal of Philosophy, 1986). I’m
going to assume some familiarity with both of these.
7
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Brain/Mind Identity
Before I get much farther, it may be valuable for me to
clarify my position, especially towards mind/brain identity. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states ―The identity theory of
mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to
states and processes of the brain. [. . .] Consider an experience of
pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The
identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just
are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes.‖8
On my view, there are two ways you can interpret this in terms of
AIs possessing minds. One way is to say that, obviously, an AI
cannot have a mind, as minds are identical to brains and thus nonbrain possessing AIs will not possess minds. The other way, my
way, is to say that AIs can quite easily possess minds, just minds
that are very unlike our own, as their brains are unlike our own, in
structure. What is the mind in the brain is the brain‘s structure—
the mind is not a non-physical object whose parts can be identified
with the parts of the physical object of the brain, but rather the
organizational relations of the mind are identified with the
relations in the brain. The mind is already nothing more than a set
of relations; what the mind is identical with in the brain is those
relations of the parts of the brain.
The sort of identity theory I agree with is an odd sort of
token-token identity. A token of some activity in the brain is
identical with a token of some activity of the mind. Types of
tokens in the mind are defined in terms of behavior and similar

8

J. J. C. Smart, ―The Identity Theory of Mind‖ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2008).
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phenomenological characteristics, and those tokens in the brain
have similarities as well, but the link of types of mental tokens to
types of physical tokens are on account of the linkage of the tokens
themselves. ―Pain is identical to c-fiber firing‖ does not mean that
a being with no c-fibers cannot feel pain. Rather, individual tokens
of pain in humans are found to link to tokens of c-fiber firing, but
the link between pain and c-fiber firing in general is only on
account of the commonality of the tokens of pain. In a being
without c-fibers that still feels pain, such as a robot, we could say
―pain is identical to a red wire firing,‖ or whatever the case is.
Obviously this leaves the question of whether the pain in
the robot is the same as the pain in us. I feel it is not, unless we‘ve
made an effort to make a robot with the same physical and mental
structure as us, but I still feel that it is reasonable to say it has pain,
as long as it has connections to its physical body that induce
unpleasant sensations in it and that serve a similar role as pain in
us.; ―unpleasant‖ will be dependent on whatever reward
mechanisms we design it to have. If a robot is has a mind, has a
way of forming goals, some of which include the preservation of
itself, has ways of gathering information about damage to its body,
and has some sort of unavoidable phenomenological sensation that
carries this information to its mind which encourages it to avoid
that damage, then it has sensations that can be usefully called
―pain.‖ It may not be pain like ours, but it is no less pain that ours
is.
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Kirk’s Basic Package9
In order to deal with things like consciousness, or the mind,
or the idea of an "internal perspective," you need fairly strong
definitions, or at least reasonably clear guidelines of what will
constitute such things. Instead of trying to form yet another new
framework, I've decided to use Robert Kirk's ideas of the "basic
package," and "deciders,‖ as well as his ―direct activity,‖ because
the entire system seems to be the most reasonable and acceptable
one I‘ve read yet. A decider is something that makes judgments
about the world, analyzes it, and forms goals and what it sees as
the most appropriate paths to those goals. This is in contrast with
systems that act purely on reflex, and Kirk uses this contrast
extensively to lay out what he means by a "decider." An example
of a general reflex system would be a clam, which shuts its shell
when exposed to certain sensations. It is important to remember
the distinction I tried to make between consciousness and a
"mind"—a conscious mind is a mind with this direct activity, but a
system does not need to have a full rational mind to have direct
activity. A clam still has sensation, and an internal perspective,
despite not having the full, rich consciousness it would possess
with the basic package. What Kirk focuses on is ―perception,‖
which refers to sensation in a system that can learn, and which is
an integrated part of a conscious mind. Fully conscious systems are
partially defined by perceiving their environment and learning
9

Kirk uses the concept of the “basic package” extensively. It is developed
through chapter 6, and put forward on p. 89-96, and throughout the rest. The
concepts of various sorts of reflex systems, and deciders, are developed first,
through p. 77-89. The discussion of sensation and consciousness is from p. 5861, as well as p. 92-94.
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from their perceptions; similarly, perception is only perception in
the sense that the system can do something consciously with the
information, instead of having the sensation just cause a reflex.
By Kirk's view, there is a succession of increasingly rich
reflex systems. Initially, there is the ―pure reflex system,‖ such as a
clam. These are systems with hardwired responses to stimuli,
which are genetic (for biological systems) and cannot be altered by
the system itself, nor are they designed to be altered by the external
world. The ―road to the decider‖ is not simply a matter of
increasing complexity—a complex organism like an oyster is just
as much a pure reflex system as a protozoon, although biological
organisms with greater complexity are generally partially that way
to allow for more complex responses. There are then ―pure reflex
systems with acquired stimuli,‖ where there is a slight amount of
room for new responses to develop, and ―built in triggered reflex
systems,‖ wherein certain stimuli open up subsections of the list of
responses, which themselves otherwise stay inactive. Finally, just
before we cross the threshold into the deciders, are ―triggered
reflex systems with acquired conditions.‖ Kirk‘s example is the
dragonfly, which learns to have a specific nest, but for whom that
learning process is automatically set up to happen. That is, the
dragonfly does not decide ―this is where I‘ll set my perch,‖ but
rather certain conditions cause the variable ―perch‖ to get
permanently filled in, which then gets plugged into the triggered
reflex system.
The threshold between this and the decider is the capacity
of ―monitoring and controlling the responses,‖ and is the important
part Kirk as emphasizes:
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We have reached a highly significant watershed.
For a system to monitor and modify its own
behaviour involves a major break with the reflex
pattern. Monitoring and modifying must involve
not only the organism‘s being able to perceive
its own behaviour, or at least the effects of its
behaviour on its environment, but also to adjust
its behaviour in ways appropriate to its goals.
That requires it to be able to control its own
behaviour on the basis of its information, in a
way that none of the types of systems so far
considered is capable of. [. . .] It seems probable
that what we can conveniently refer to as
‗monitoring‘, modifying‘, and ‗controlling‘ are
highly complex processes, capable of being
realized to a greater or lesser degree, at different
levels of organization in the system as a whole,
and in an indefinitely wide range of possible
internal structural patterns.10
He further says that what is important is the integration of all
these processes. There is no requirement of how these processes
must be executed, just that there are capabilities. To be a decider,
to have the ―basic package,‖ is for something to be able to—
(i) Initiate and control its own behavior on the basis of
incoming and retained information: information that it can
use;
(ii) Acquire and retain information about its environment;
(iii) Interpret information;
(iv) Assess its situation;
(v) Choose between alternative courses of action on the basis
10

Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (New York: Oxford, 2005), 87.
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of retained and incoming information (equivalently, it can
decide on a particular course of action); and
(vi) Have goals.
Moreover, all of these must be unified and integrated.
It‘s possible that a thing could have faculties similar to
some of these, but to have these fully they must be all present and
interrelated. Put another way, it makes no sense to talk of ―goals‖
without something being able to acquire and interpret information,
or to choose between various actions, nor does it make sense to
talk about controlling behavior unless a thing has goals, or
interpreting or assessing information unless it‘s going to be put to a
use, to a choice. A thing can ―sort of‖ interpret information, a
thermometer for example, but it will not be doing so for itself. This
again has a great deal to do with perception, which is just sensation
that conveys information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer
sensation, experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems,
without there being any understanding or perception, despite there
often being some apparently intelligent reaction. This relates back
to Kirk‘s definition of perception—sensation that conveys
information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer sensation,
experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems, without
there being any understanding or perception, despite there being
reaction, often seemingly intelligent reaction.
Bringing this back to the subject of artificial intelligence,
what we deal with when we have seemingly intelligent systems is
instead this very bare pure reflex system. Kirk will freely admit
that he does not know enough of the subject of animal neurology to
give clear examples of each sort of reflex system. Similarly, I will
say that I am not sufficiently familiar with the programming of AI
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to say what sort of system any one example is. However, by my
earlier outline of an AI, what we currently have is often still a very
simple sort of reflex system. Even the "learning systems" are likely
only so-called "triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions,"
where certain approaches to learning are acquired, but are still
within the reflexive framework set up beforehand by the
programmer. It is entirely possible, though, that I am wrong here,
and that what is causing me to hesitate is something else.
Direct Activity11
In Kirk‘s view, the basic package is not sufficient for
phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is ―direct
activity,‖ or the direct action of sensation on the creature‘s
decision-making process. We all experience direct activity, when
any sort of sensation comes our way, because we cannot help but
sense it. Initially it‘s difficult to even understand what Kirk means
by direct activity, because it‘s unclear what the alternative would
be. The simplest example of information gained indirectly is
subliminal information—when we do sense something, and file it
away somehow, but do not notice it and actually perceive it at the
time. The information has been acquired, and can be used to alter
our goals or our methods, but in order to do so we must indirectly
access them after the fact. Kirk stresses instantaneity and priority
in direct activity. The perceptual information is instantly available
to an organism, and it also holds priority, immediately changing
our goals and choices about the world.

11

Another important concept, direct activity is detailed in Chapter 9 of Zombies,
pp. 140-163.
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He uses what he calls a ―rabbitoid‖ as an example,12 stating
that a ―rabbitoid‖ is like a rabbit in all ways, except that sensory
information does not act on it directly, but through some other
method. It is difficult to imagine how this would work, but a
possibility would be that the rabbitoid constantly queries its store
of knowledge. When a fox comes up from behind a hill, the
rabbitoid notices a second later during its regular ―scan‖ of its
knowledge base, and then bounds away, relying on its stored
model of the environment to navigate. A conscious rabbit has an
advantage over a non-conscious rabbitoid in that it will
automatically notice changes in its environment, and will be able
to alter its immediate goals accordingly, while the rabbitoid would
always have some sort of delay in action. The very best that a
rabbitoid could do, would be to constantly re-scan its knowledge
multiple times per second. This distinction still holds if you
assume that rabbits do not possess full rational minds; the reflex
system possessed by a rabbitoid would still function better if
information about the environment directly affected its system
instead of it needing to constantly retrieve stored information about
the world.
The Red Herring of Thought
I want to interject a bit about conscious thought, and then
about bats, before returning to consciousness. Thought is often
considered a very important aspect of being human, and seems
conflated with consciousness itself. But what happens when we
think? One might say, we become aware of what‘s going on in our
12

Ibid. pp. 142.
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mind, that we ―look inside.‖ I think there‘s a problem with this,
that our everyday sensation of thought and introspection is too
naïve, and problematic. Imagine this extremely simplified and kind
of silly picture of the mind, gained (of course) from introspection:
there is a sort of ―black box,‖ in which all mental activity occurs.
This box takes certain
inputs, many of which are
―conscious,‖ although
some are not, and
produces various outputs.
These outputs include
motion, activity, and
speech, but (here is the
point) also include
―thought,‖ which is
nothing more than aborted
speech and self-produced
sensation, re-routed back into the box. On only part of the ―edge of
the box‖ is the ―membrane of consciousness.‖ In terms of this
metaphor, things are conscious only as a result of passing through
this membrane. Our knowledge of our mental activity is known
only so far as we produce thoughts that are then reintroduced into
consciousness. The activity within the black box is completely
unknowable, and can only be inferred from the thoughts produced.
This is a very flawed picture. Consciousness is not a
membrane, there is not a line when things ―become conscious‖ in
the brain. However, the salient point is that introspection is not
directly accessing or monitoring our mental processes. Instead,
thought is output that is reintroduced back into the system. This is
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also flawed in that the reintroduction likely does not happen all at
the same level—it would be better to imagine the circular arrows
happening within the box, making loops of various sizes. But
again, the point is that thought is activity re-routed, not the brain
actively looking at itself.
This seems like it would be efficient, more than growing
some specialized "introspection" capability. If the brain has taken
the time to create systems dedicated to processing, say, language, it
makes sense that when we think in terms of language we simply
route the output of our thoughts, as if we were speaking, back into
the language processing bits, using the same hardware we‘d use if
we were hearing, instead of developing a new system to ―monitor‖
our thoughts. Similarly, at earlier stages, our ability to remember
and imagine things significantly overlaps with our capacity to
sense things, and so it seems reasonable that instead of developing
a new ―imagination‖ capacity, we rather develop the ability to
stimulate those systems dedicated to dealing with perception. This
also explains the sensation of thought, why it actually has a
―sound,‖ instead of just being abstract activity.
So, What is it Like to be a Bat?
I assume a bat has sensation, and also consciousness. What
I mean is, there is something it is ―like‖ to be a bat. Perhaps it
doesn‘t have active thought, but it makes decisions, and its actions
are complex and nuanced, reasoned. Nagel asked what it is like to
be a bat; he, and others, concluded that we cannot know, that the
life of a bat is fundamentally alien to us.
But at least attempt to imagine what being a bat is like. The
problem, initially, and as Nagel stresses, seems to be echolocation,
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something we have no real analogue for. But this doesn‘t seem
entirely impossible, merely very difficult. Try this:
Close your eyes (perhaps read the instructions first, or,
imagine closing your eyes). You can still hear, can you not? With
your eyes closed, drop something like a book to your desk, and
notice how you intuit its position from your impression of the
sound. If you were to reach out, you could grasp it with some
difficulty. If it were to make noise constantly, you could grasp it
with near ease. A sharp sound to your left will give you an
impression of “something” there. With your eyes closed, a man
walking around a room, or a floor above with a thin ceiling, will
give you an impression of motion, of presence. Focus on that
impression of presence, separating it from the sensation of the
sound itself.
Now, with your eyes closed, feel out your surroundings. You
can tell that this is a box, or that is a sphere. You can feel the
dimensions of your desk, and you have an almost visual
experience of this the size and shape of things. These sensations
can be deceptive (how large are your teeth, when sensed with
your tongue, and then when felt with your fingers?), but that is not
surprising.
Imagine the sensation you experience when a noise is heard,
the sense of location and position. Isolate the feeling of position,
the feeling of “a presence,” from the sensation of the noise itself,
that it is a noise. Focus on the feeling of position and presence.
Now, imagine the sensation of feeling the shape of an object, and
isolate the impression of the form and size from the feeling of
touch itself. Merge those feelings of position, as if you were
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experiencing a thing’s form through a constant torrent of sound,
where the sensation of any individual sound was drowned out by
the ubiquity of the torrent, leaving only the feeling of position,
form, size, and distance. What is there is not the sound, but the
almost eerie sense of “something there,” the odd itching at your
back, like the feeling of being watched without experiencing the
watcher.
Pretend you were blind, and had to live off of touch and
sound to navigate, but then were able to somehow merge the
impression of presence you get from sound, having the sounds
themselves fade into the background, and then were to combine
this with the feeling of form and shape gained through touch,
having the feeling of touch itself be replaced with that background
noise, extended to the range of your hearing. You would reach out
constantly, as if touching through sound.
Nagel would say that this is what it would be like for a
human to be a bat (and even then, only barely), and would press
the point, asking what is it like for a bat to be a bat. A human has
its own beliefs, desires, goals, and so on, and to imagine what a
bat's internal life is like is impossible since these will always
interfere with our attempts. However, I feel that you can run into
the same sorts of problems with asking a question as apparently
simple as ―what is it like to be yourself?‖
First ask, what was it like to be yourself? Imagine yourself
ten years ago, or even a day ago. How do you do this? Well, you
extrapolate. I myself at this moment a day ago was bumbling
about, taking a shower, not really interested in anything, assuming
I‘d wake up a little in an hour or so and figure out what to do then.
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Right now I‘m coming off of a long, caffeine-fueled writing
session. Ten years ago I would be napping on an hour-long bus
ride; if I was awake at this moment ten years ago, I‘d have been
just woken up for some reason. Certainly, both of these involve
being fairly groggy and sleepy, and to that extent I can imagine
what it would have been like. However, the phenomenal quality of
each experience is very different. The sleepiness I feel now is very
different from ten years ago, and it is difficult to evoke that feeling
in myself because to do so I would need to overwrite my current
feeling. I cannot remember what it feels like, I can only
extrapolate, evoke the feeling.
But is this only because sleepiness is a muddled, vague
feeling? Consider pains. When I was younger, I stubbed my toe.
I‘ve done so many times over the years, in fact. And yet can I
accurately remember what it felt like? No, only that there was an
accompanying feeling of suffering. If anything, what I remember is
the suffering, not the pain itself, and even that suffering is
extrapolated. How I related to pain then is much different than how
I relate to it now. What I feel when I imagine that pain is not what
it was like for past me to feel pain, but what it would be like for
present me to feel past me‘s pain, and only poorly. How different
is this from trying to think what it‘s like to be a bat? Not
impossibly so—and it is not a matter of kind, but of degree. It is
much easier to imagine what it was like to be me feeling pain than
what it‘s like to be a bat; but neither is perfect.
What if I asked, what is it like to be you, a second ago? No
no no, that‘s silly, surely. But pinch yourself. Ow. What was it
like? Well… it hurt, yes, but can you evoke that sensation again?
Not really. You can recall the suffering, and what the pain was sort
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of like, and how it still hurts a little now, but none of that is what it
was like to be you a second ago, feeling that pain. So what is it like
to be you, right now? Anytime you try to focus on that, you can
only evoke the feelings a second later. What it is like to be you is
constantly slipping away. You can only experience ―what it‘s like‖
to be anything, namely you, as it is experienced. To actually feel
what it‘s like, you need to have the feeling at the moment. This
also somewhat makes sense evolutionarily—why would we go
through incredible effort and cost to repeat pleasurable actions if
we could merely evoke the pleasure in our minds on command?
That we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat is not so
surprising when we cannot even imagine what it is like to be
ourselves. And yet this does not tell us that there was nothing that
it was like to be ourselves, and it does not tell us that there is
nothing that it is like to be a bat, and this says nothing about telling
whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any entity through physical
observation.13 Our memories are not just ―not as vivid,‖ but
entirely false, constructed. We cannot know the past ―what it‘s
like,‖ or others‘ ―what it‘s like‖-s, just as we cannot know the
―what it‘s like‖ for a bat—but we would not deny consciousness to
our past selves, or to other people.
What is it Like to be a Thermostat?
To ascribe emotions, desires, or beliefs to a thermostat is
silly. When I say that a thermostat has experience or sensation, I do
not mean anything approaching our own experience. As Kirk
13

A significant amount of this is paraphrased from Kirk (2005), ch. 5, especially
p. 61-68.
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would say, we are deciders, we interpret information and make
decisions based on that information according to goals. A
thermostat whose setting aligns with the ambient temperature does
not ―feel content.‖ A thermostat set to a higher temperature does
not ―desire to make things hotter.‖ A thermostat does not ―believe
maintaining the temperature is good.‖ A thermostat does not
perceive, because it does not interpret its sensations, does not work
with information. Emotions, desires, and beliefs are fantastically
complex and important aspects of our experience. Some day we
will make a machine that does experience emotion and desire, and
have beliefs, but it will be no time soon14. This is a reasonable and
worthy goal, but it is important to realize how difficult it will be.
So if we cannot say that a thermostat ―desires to make things
hotter,‖ in what sense does it have an internal experience?
When I ask ―what is it like to be a thermostat,‖ I‘m
speaking of something that it is very, very difficult to imagine. It is
hard enough to imagine what being a dog is like; harder still to
imagine the life of a slug, and of a bacterium; so when we get
down to something as bare and simple as a thermostat, we are truly
a long ways away from our own experience. It is not even enough
to try to sense things thoughtlessly, as the sensation of a thermostat
is nothing like ours in any way. A thermostat is simpler even than
an individual neuron.
All I mean is that the thermostat ―senses.‖ It senses the
temperature the same way a protozoon senses light levels and
moves accordingly, or the same way a bacterium senses a certain
14

No, I don’t have support for this, but I consider it the same sort of statement as
“someday we will colonize other planets.” Barring something horrible
happening, or the discovery of some extreme limiting factor, it seems so.
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chemical in its environment and stops dividing15—really it must be
far more simple than that, but it is the same sort of ―basic reflex‖
as a clam closing its shell in response to certain stimuli, or a slug
retracting a feeler when it touches something rough. In the same
way that animals have moved from those basic reactions to our
own, we should attempt a similar project to move from the
thermostat (well maybe something else) to a conscious being like
us. What this requires is a move from the ―reflex system with
acquired conditions‖ to the actual ―decider.‖
Conclusion: Does “Consciousness” Matter When Thinking of
Artificial Intelligence?
It depends on what the connotations of ―consciousness‖ are,
which brings us back to Kirk‘s direct activity. If the difference is
between having direct activity or not, between being a rabbit or a
rabbitoid, it seems in fact that consciousness is of no importance,
and the focus on ―what it‘s like‖ is missing the point. If, instead,
―consciousness‖ is taken to deal with the difference between
sensation and perception, between acting on reflex, or making
judgments, having goals, and so on, then it is obviously of high
value. A system that can actually analyze the world and make
judgments will have an advantage over something that acts on
predefined rules, assuming it is meant to deal with the sorts of

15

Certain protozoa sense light, and then move their flagella to move toward it,
but only when it is fairly mild; bright, constant light has no effect. Colonies of
certain bacteria maintain a size by having each bacterium secrete a chemical,
and then stop division when the chemical reaches a certain concentration, which
lines up with a certain population.
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complex and variable situations that humans and other animals can
handle.
In other words, we should not be asking whether computers
will be conscious; that is a matter of how they relate to
information. What matters is how they process it, and the
incidental aspects of consciousness (the instantaneity, the priority)
should not be taken as essential to having a mind.
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COULD CONSCIOUSNESS EMERGE FROM A MACHINE
LANGUAGE?
Genevieve H. Kaess
Abstract Behaviorists believe the following: if the output of
artificial intelligence could pass for human behavior, AI must be
treated as if it produces consciousness. I will argue that this is not
necessarily so. Behaviorism might be useful in the short term,
since we do not know what causes consciousness, but in the long
term it embodies an unnecessary hopelessness. I will attempt to
establish in this essay that certain empirical knowledge of
consciousness is within the realm of possibility. I will then use my
own definition of certain knowledge to shed light on ways in
which computer programming falls short of producing human-like
consciousness.
I. Introduction
―The best reason for believing that robots might someday
become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we
are a sort of robot ourselves.‖1 Daniel Dennett‘s offhand
introduction to his essay ―Consciousness in Human and Robot
Minds‖ serves more generally as a summary of popular
contemporary philosophical thought regarding artificial
intelligence: it is possible, in theory, because human intelligence is
1

Daniel C. Dennett, ―Consciousness in human and robot minds,‖ in Cognition,
Computation & Consciousness, ed. Masao Io, Yasushi Miyashitatt and Edmund
T. Rolls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 17.
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possible. Human life, and consciousness with it, is no more than
the machinery of nature. What remains unclear is to what degree
(if at all) and in what ways the mechanisms that produce human
consciousness must be imitated in order to create artificial
consciousness, and whether knowledge of the creation of artificial
consciousness can ever be certain.
In this paper, I will argue that syntactical computer
modeling is not sufficient for artificial consciousness. I will
approach this point by first examining views of philosophers
(specifically Alan Turing and Hilary Putnam) who have suggested
behaviorism as the standard by which to judge consciousness in
artificial life. I will suggest that although behaviorism provides an
immediate solution to the problem of other minds, the adoption of
behaviorism as a long-term solution embodies an unnecessary
hopelessness regarding certain knowledge of consciousness.
Applying the same standards for certain knowledge that we do for
other phenomena, we can come to certain empirical knowledge of
the causation of consciousness. The rejection of this claim, I will
argue, is dualistic. Finally, using the standards that have
traditionally been sufficient for certain knowledge, I will explain
why one specific example (which I will discuss in section V) casts
doubt on the claim that AI can be achieved through computer
programming.
II. Definitions
For simplicity‘s sake, the term ―artificial intelligence‖ (AI)
will refer, in this paper, to artificial consciousness. Traditionally,
consciousness has been deemed an unnecessary (or at least not
necessarily necessary) condition for artificial intelligence. On the
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contrary, I believe intelligence and consciousness to be
inextricably linked. Intelligence, by definition, is the capacity to
learn and understand2; understanding is a feature of consciousness.
Information processing, then, can only be qualified as intelligence
if it has conscious manifestation. Consciousness will be
understood (in this paper) as thoughts and emotions such as
humans experience them. I exclude non-human animal
consciousness from my definition because the goal of AI scientists
is to produce human-like intelligence (which, by my definition,
entails human-like consciousness). By limiting the scope of the
definition of AI in this way, a more comprehensible argument will
emerge; current knowledge of the nature of consciousness in other
organisms is imperfect, and any discussion of it would be based on
conjecture.
The science of AI depends on the truth of one basic
assumption: consciousness is a natural physical process. There is
no spiritual realm of thought that exists separately from nature;
therefore, provided limitless resources and a thorough
understanding of the mind, we would be able to reproduce it
artificially. Computational AI depends on the possibility that this
can be realized using computer programming. In this paper, I will
assume that AI is possible, but I will provide evidence that
computational AI is not. Henceforth, ―AI‖ will refer to
computational artificial consciousness, and ―computational

2

This definitiveness of this definition is disputable. However, there is no doubt
that this is one commonly used definition of ―intelligence.‖ Since I am merely
using it to justify my choice to define AI in the way that I do, and not as a
premise to any of my arguments, the definitiveness of my chosen definition is of
little consequence.
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functionalism‖ will be understood as the philosophical position
that such AI is obtainable.
To say that the creation of artificial intelligence can be fully
realized through computer programming is tantamount to saying
one of two things: (1) the human mind is itself nothing more than a
computer3 – an information processing tool – or (2) computer
programming and the mind can produce equivalent cognition
without holding any additional features in common. I will discuss
the second possibility in section VI. For the most part,
computational functionalists hold that the first is true: information
processing is the necessary feature of the mind. Certainly it is true
that the human brain has a biological medium distinct from that of
a computer, but that is all it is: a medium that realizes and supports
the brain‘s intrinsic informational processing. Human
consciousness, they believe, is a feature of the processes, not of the
medium.
Computer programming, at its most basic level, is a series
of 0s and 1s, which answer the question of whether or not various
features exist. I will refer to these 0s and 1s as ―computer syntax.‖
Computer syntax is itself a mechanical feature of the computer,
which is programmed in by humans. When prompted, it sets in
motion a series of mechanical events within the computer that lead
to the visible output on the screen or, in the case of AI, the
observable actions of a robot. The 1s and 0s can be combined in
very complex ways to produce impressive outcomes. In the
1950‘s, the research of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon suggested

3

John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992).
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that ―a computer‘s strings of bits could be made to stand for
anything, including features of the real world, and that its programs
could be used as rules for relating these features.‖4
The idea for AI was not born solely of the impressive
capabilities of computers. It emerged also from the notion that
computer programming is the best model for the workings of the
brain. Most neurons give and receive signals in short blasts. They
operate under an all or nothing principle - either they‘re firing or
they‘re not. This is similar to the 1/0 duality of binary code. AI
scientists posited that these neuronal impulses could be modeled
by computer programming to the same effect: intelligence.
III. The Problem of Other Minds
But how would we know if that happened? Current
scientific knowledge does not account for consciousness. This is
called the ―problem of other minds,‖ and it is the foundation, as
well as the limiting factor, for philosophical arguments regarding
AI: we do not know what exactly consciousness is, and therefore
we cannot test for it in others. One can only be certain of one‘s
own consciousness. For some philosophers, this is grounds for
suggesting the adoption of a behavioral standard by which we
might judge what constitutes intelligence and what does not.
In his article ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖
Alan Turing described his most lasting contribution to philosophy
– the ―Turing test.‖ Turing devised a game in which two people (a
man – ―A‖ – and a woman – ―B‖) sit in separate rooms as an

4

Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), x.
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interrogator questions them. All identifying features are hidden
from the interrogator. His goal is to determine which is the man
and which the woman; the goal of one of the two competitors is to
confuse the interrogator and the goal of the other is to help him.
Turing then posed the question: ―What will happen when a
machine takes the part of A in this game?‖5 The interrogator now
must determine which of the two is the machine. Turing asserted
that if a machine could win this game as frequently as the typical
human, it would be unfair to deny that it had consciousness. After
all, we do not require proof of consciousness in one another. Until
consciousness is de-mystified, Turing believed, we must adopt this
principle of equity.
Although the Turing test is not a definitive test for
consciousness, many have accepted it as the standard. We do not
have the knowledge to recognize consciousness in others; therefore
we are engaging in cognitive chauvinism if we suggest that a
machine with humanlike cognitive capabilities (insofar as they are
measurable) lacks consciousness. Turing‘s solution is pragmatic:
to avoid prejudice, we must judge consciousness in non-humans in
the same way we do in humans – behaviorally.6 The strength of
his position is that it is safe; it makes no conclusive claim about
what constitutes consciousness, but instead suggests the adoption
5

A.M. Turing, ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ Mind 59, no. 236
(1950): 434.
6
I would argue that we do not always usually use behavioral characteristics to
determine whether other humans are conscious. Instead, we assume that they
are conscious (because of their biological status as humans) regardless of
whether or not they could pass the Turing test. However, I will grant Turing this
point, since it is probably true that the reason we assume humans have
consciousness, even if they cannot pass a Turing test, is because as a general
rule, humans behave as if they are conscious.
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of a standard.
Hilary Putnam expressed slightly stronger opinions in his
essay, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life‖: we cannot
expect to gain complete understanding of psychological states by
studying brain physiology. ―Psychological laws are only statistical
… to say that a man and a robot have the same ‗psychology‘ … is
to say that the behavior of the two species is most simply and
revealingly analyzed at the psychological level (in abstraction from
the details of the internal physical structure), in terms of the same
‗psychological states‘ and the same hypothetical parameters.‖7 For
example, anger is defined by one‘s claims and actions, not physical
brain states. It is identified by behavioral features, not biological
ones. This being the case, Putnam contended that ―it is …
necessary … that one be prepared to accept first-person statements
by other members of one‘s linguistic community involving these
predicates, at least when there is no special reason to distrust
them.‖8
Putnam constructed the following scenario to illustrate his
point: suppose that sometime in the future the robots we have
invented build robots of their own (Putnam calls these
―ROBOTS‖). The philosopher robots then sit around debating
whether or not ROBOTS have consciousness. This is akin to our
current actions. Since we do not understand consciousness, we
have no less duty to ascribe consciousness to robots than we do to
one another. The question of consciousness, Putnam concludes,
cannot currently be solved. Whether robots should be treated as if
7

Hilary Putnam, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life,‖ The Journal
of Philosophy 61, no. 21 (1964): 677.
8
Putnam, Robots, 684.
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they have consciousness, then, ―calls for a decision and not for a
discovery. If we are to make a decision, it seems preferable … to
extend our concept so that robots are conscious – for
‗discrimination‘ based on the ‗softness‘ or ‗hardness‘ of the body
parts of a synthetic ‗organism‘ seems as silly as discriminatory
treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.‖9
The acceptance of a behavioral standard may be the most
appropriate immediate solution, but Turing and Putnam seem to
have been content to let it go at that. Turing declared the concept
of consciousness ―too meaningless to deserve discussion.‖10 They
adopted a perplexing stance for philosophers – agnosticism – and
many contemporary philosophers are happy to follow suit; debate
over consciousness is not just meaningless, they believe, but
impossible to resolve. The turn to behaviorism came not from
conviction of its worth, but from the lack of a better option. I will
argue that such a position of hopelessness is unnecessary;
consciousness can be known empirically.
The problem of other minds rests on the assumption that
consciousness is accessible only through first-hand experience.
But this is dualistic. If each person‘s consciousness exists only in a
special bubble that has no physical manifestation, then it is not
physical. To say that consciousness is both material in nature and
fundamentally undetectable is to make a claim that is dramatically
inconsistent with contemporary scientific thought. Substance is
thought to break down into particles that have both charge and
extension; if consciousness is material (an assumption required for

9
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any form of artificial intelligence), it must be detectable at some
level if the detector knows where to look for it. But that is the
problem: how do we figure out what to look for when we don‘t
know what to look for? How do we make the connection between
objectively viewed matter and that which we experience as
consciousness?
Those who find the problem of other minds unsolvable
might answer that we need proof, and that proof is impossible.
First-hand experience cannot provide conclusive evidence
regarding the nature of consciousness. Self-reporting is not
sufficient for understanding of consciousness, because we are
unaware of the causal mechanisms within our own brains.
However, it seems to me that if we could thoroughly observe an
individual‘s brain in conjunction with honest reporting of his
mental states, we would discover much about the nature of
consciousness, and perhaps even its causation. Honesty cannot be
ensured for any given individual, but given numerous repetitions of
the experiment and the assumption that most people are honest,
useful data would emerge. For example, consider the following:
the materialist understanding of consciousness requires that it must
be possible, in theory, to replicate minds. This would be done,
perhaps, by tweaking one person‘s neurons in various ways until
the person had the personality, memories, etc. of another; the
purpose of this exercise would be to learn which changes in the
features of the brain are necessary for changes in consciousness.11
Depending on how we tweaked the neurons and to what effect, we
11

Obviously, there are ethical and practical barriers that would prevent the
manifestation of this scenario, but I intend it only as a hypothetical situation to
help illustrate my later point.
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could draw links between brain states and conscious experience,
from which we could conclusively accept or reject computational
functionalism.
One objection might be that hypothetical scenarios like this
one spawn sticky questions regarding personal identity. If my
consciousness changes entirely to that of another person, or even if
it just changes a little bit, do I really still exist or has my body just
taken on a new identity? If I cease to exist, then clearly I cannot
testify regarding certain knowledge of the change in my
consciousness, in which case the success of the experiment
(drawing links between consciousness and brain state) will depend
on correct behavioral analysis. If I claim to have experienced a
change from one personhood to another, in fact it suggests that I
have not experienced such a change; upon becoming the second
person, I would lose memory of the first. Even slight changes
might be impervious to awareness. If I lose a memory, for
example, and all memories of that memory, I cannot know that I
have lost it. Self-reporting, even combined with brain observation,
therefore becomes an inadequate method for the discovery of
mental causation and third-person reporting of consciousness is not
definitive. Furthermore, even if we do establish, using inductive
reasoning, that a certain change in the brain produces a certain
change in the nature of consciousness, it still does not speak to
whether that feature of the brain caused that moment of
consciousness itself. The brain might be an intermediate link in
the consciousness-producing causal chain. For some philosophers,
the lack of the plausibility of certain knowledge regarding the
causation of consciousness is reason enough to dismiss the entire
question.
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Those who get caught up on the problem of other minds are
forgetting one of life‘s early lessons: knowledge of causation in the
physical world is never certain. Young children often are
preoccupied by the question, ―Why?‖ Adults who are grilled by
these children are usually eventually reduced to the answer,
―Because that‘s just the way it is.‖ We can superficially
understand causation, but when we examine our understanding, it
becomes clear that all we actually do is recognize patterns. For
instance, we think we understand why a ball rolls (it was pushed)
and we think we understand why the push causes the ball to roll
(the transference of energy). For many of us, the understanding
ends there, but an expert in physics might be able to answer the
question ―why?‖ a few more times. Even our physics expert,
however, is eventually forced to concede a lack of understanding.
You do not wholly understand a cause if you do not understand the
cause of the cause. Furthermore, all of these alleged causal
understandings are actually theories based on induction. We
believe that if the ball is pushed (under certain conditions), it will
roll. But that belief is based on our repeated observation of this
phenomenon. We have merely recognized a pattern, and
concluded from it a causal relationship. Humans are only capable
of identifying correlation. Causation is supposed, never known.12
Furthermore, we assume similarity in internal structure in
entities that display similar characteristics. If a rat is born of a rat,
looks like a rat and acts like a rat, we feel certain that it has internal
organs much like those of other rats and we will come to
12

David Hume, ―An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,‖ in Modern
Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, Second Edition, ed. Roger Ariew
and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009).
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conclusions based on this assumption. We believe in those
conclusions with such absolute certainty that we bet our lives on
them; rats are often used to test products to determine their safety
for humans. If we truly believed extreme variation in the physical
nature of rats possible, such tests would be worthless. Induction is
by its nature uncertain, but humans trust it.
If we adopt a standard for consciousness in the name of
objectivity, but refuse to accept that the causation of consciousness
can be understood empirically, we have, in fact, failed to view the
situation objectively. As the example of the rolling ball
demonstrated, inductive correlative reasoning is good enough to
use to identify other causal physical relationships. In the case of
the rolling ball, we have come to the inductive conclusion that
pushing the ball causes it to roll. If we repeatedly observe that a
certain brain state corresponds to a certain mental characteristic, it
is fair to assume causation, just as we assume that it is the push
that causes a ball to roll, not that the push was an intermediate link
in the causal chain13. Correlative evidence can demonstrate a link
(or lack thereof) between brain physiology and consciousness.
This evidence can be used to make conclusive claims about the
nature and causation of consciousness.
Of course, the problem is that we have not yet accumulated
enough correlative evidence to make conclusive claims about the
causation of consciousness. But the situation is not hopeless. By
adopting a position of behaviorism, one approaches this problem
13

Additionally, if brain states are intermediate links in the causality of
consciousness, then it is unlikely that syntactical modeling would produce
consciousness, since it models a feature of brain states and would therefore be
modeling an intermediate step.
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from the wrong angle. If you turn to robots for the answer to the
question of consciousness, you are looking in the wrong place.
Clearly, one cannot look into a robot to determine whether or not it
has consciousness. That would be like trying to determine whether
something plays music without any knowledge or understanding of
the nature of music. A more practical course of action is to look
for the root of consciousness, and to do that, it is far wiser to look
where we assume it does exist (in humans) than where we are
trying to create it (robots).
IV. On Correlation
Correlation can be used in two ways. First, as I have
suggested, positive correlation can lead to valid causal claims. If a
light turns on every time I flip a functioning light switch, I might
make the inductive claim that flipping a functional light switch
causes a light to turn on. Induction is useful, but not a logically
strong form of reasoning. It might be, for example, that one cause
has two effects, and I correlate the two effects to each other rather
than to their mutual cause. For example, a faulty light switch
might produce a spark immediately after I flip it, just before the
light turns on. I might induce that the spark causes the light to turn
on. This would have the same inductive validity as the claim that
flipping the switch turns on the light, but it would not be correct.
Negative correlation, however, is logically conclusive.
Only one instance of the correlation of A and B is required to
disprove the conditional statement, ―If A, then not B.‖ For
example, the belief that no dogs bite humans can be disproved by
the single instance of a dog biting a human. If use of computer
programming to produce AI tends to have human-like results in
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behavior, the behaviorist might inductively conclude that the two
are equivalent and computational functionalism correct. However,
it takes only one demonstration that the brain and the computer,
given equivalent structural changes, produce different results to
show that, at the very least, our current programming provides a
flawed model of the brain.
V. Implications for Artificial Intelligence
In Section III, it was established that the search for the root
of consciousness need not be futile so long as one is looking in the
right place: the human brain. When we pose the question of
whether AI might produce consciousness, it is important to recall
that most of the initial hope for AI stemmed from its similarity to
brain processes. Neurons send signals to one another with short
blasts of energy, which is in some ways similar to how computers
process binary code. However, it is important to note that this is
not strictly true. Not all neurons fire in short bursts; some send
longer signals not accounted for by computer syntax. Additionally,
neurons exist in a net, whereas binary programming is linear. In
his book What Computers Still Can‘t Do, Hubert Dreyfus
described the problem of ―know-how.‖ When a person becomes an
expert at a task, he no longer needs to think through all the steps of
the task, but rather the proper course of action is immediately
obvious. For example, a master chess player does not have to
think through the rules of the game before making a move, but
rather sees the position of the pieces on the board and knows
instantly what to do. By contrast, the more data the computer
chess player has about the game of chess, the more information it
will have to analyze before making a move. Although, in general,
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consciousness alone is a poor means for understanding underlying
mental causation, in this case it was indicative of an underlying
mechanism. Neuroscientists have explained the ―know-how‖
phenomenon by the fact that when two neurons are simultaneously
excited, the connection between them is strengthened.14 Newer
models of AI (―connectionist‖ models) have incorporated links like
these into programming, but they are poor models for neural nets.
Ultimately, even connectionist programming boils down to binary
code.
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant that
neuronal impulses are the source of consciousness and that binary
code is a decent model for them. The question now is whether
being a model is good enough to produce consciousness, or if there
is some further biological feature necessary. For binary code to
model neuronal information processing, one must be able to
imagine that at any given moment, the neurons of the brain can be
mapped syntactically. The alteration of patterns in binary code
must produce output to the alteration of neuronal patterns. A
recent study led by Mriganka Sur casts doubt on the causal nature
of brain structure. Sur and his colleagues performed surgery on
newborn ferrets,15 so that each had one eye that sprouted
connections into the part of the brain that is generally dedicated to
hearing (rather than into the visual thalamus and visual cortex).
14

Dreyfus, Hubert L. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
15
Granted, I stated at the beginning of this paper that I was not going to tackle
the notion of animal consciousness. However, the scientific community often
extrapolates findings concerning animal physiology to humans, and I am
assuming that this study is accurate in suggesting that there would be similar
findings if we were to perform this study in humans.
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There was no resulting change in the ferrets; they continued to see
with the affected eyes, using the auditory portions of their brains.16
An immediate change in neuronal patterns (and in our imaginary
syntax which we have mapped onto the brain) produces no change
in consciousness. This suggests plasticity of consciousness that is
not observed in the output of AI. By comparison, it is difficult to
believe that significant change in syntax would not produce
observable change in computer function. In other words, in the
case of computer syntax, there is a conditional relationship: if there
is considerable change in syntax, there will be change in output.17
For neurons, we have seen the equivalent conditional statement
disproved. Here we have established lack of correlation between
the result of neuronal behavior and that of syntactical
programming; at the very least, we must conclude that current
efforts to use computer syntax to model brain functions are
fundamentally flawed. Just as a fundamental change in a recipe
would not necessarily produce an observable change in outcome,
but would very likely do so, this does not prove that syntax does
not produce consciousness, but it suggests as much.
VI. Discussion
We have established that if neuronal impulses and
syntactical programming each produce consciousness, they must
16

Alva Noe, Out of our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons
from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 53-54.
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One possible response to my argument would be a rejection of this claim. I
am not a computer scientist, so I cannot say with absolute certainty that such a
response would be unfounded. However, I think it is undisputable that if the
syntax experienced the same degree of change as the neuronal impulses in this
example, there would be noticeable change.
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do it in different ways. Stalwart defenders of AI might claim that
this is possible: that AI and the brain are fundamentally different
from one another, yet produce equally valid consciousness. To
defend themselves, they would likely revert to the problem of other
minds. However, as I have already claimed, the problem of other
minds should be dismissed as subjective. The claim that
consciousness could be formed in two completely different ways
is, first and foremost, unrealistic. It stems, I believe, from the
belief that consciousness is spiritual – that it rises above and
inhabits the physical world. If we instead accept consciousness for
what it is – a biological phenomenon – it seems no more likely that
computer programming (having proved dissimilar to the brain in
every important way) could produce it than any other biological
phenomenon (e.g. photosynthesis). Furthermore, if we reject the
spiritual view of consciousness, yet accept that consciousness
could be produced in a way that does not model the workings of
the brain, we have no basis to judge what is conscious and what is
not. The notion of consciousness becomes meaningless.
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is good reason to
believe that syntax based AI does not produce consciousness.
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SPATIAL INFORMATION AND DIAGRAMS
Meghan Ertl-Bendickson
[This paper received the 2011 Jakob Laub Prize in Philosophy.]
Introduction
In recent times, it has become undesirable to use diagrams
in logical proofs. Logical proofs, even in geometry, are ideally
purely formal representations. Recent experiments by David
Kirshner and David Landy, however, have shown that the way in
which we physically arrange symbols on a page when we write a
formula affects whether or not we compute it correctly.
Specifically, we normally place multiplied (or divided) terms
closer together than added (or subtracted) terms – following the
order of operations. The operations which are supposed to be
performed first are placed physically closer together than those
which are done later (I shall refer to this as the ―Rule of Spacing‖).
When formula are written inconsistent with this rule, people make
more computational errors. Landy claims that this implies, through
his ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis and his ―syntax‖ hypothesis, that
there are diagrammatic elements to our formal representations. I
argue that even if these spatial relations are diagrammatic, it is not
a problem for logic the way using a conventional diagram would
be. However, while I agree that these results are very important
and need to be discussed, I argue that these spatial relationships are
not actually diagrammatic.

163

Why Diagrams are Problematic for Logic and Math
Before we can examine Kirshner and Landy's results, we
need to understand some background information about diagrams
and why, exactly, it is no longer considered acceptable to use them
in logical proofs. Diagrams were originally developed, in the times
of Ancient Greece, for use in cartography and to find ways to
accurately measure spaces and distances. This means that the first
diagrams were meant to describe contingent, extensional properties
of the real world. ―Geometry as a discipline originated in the need
to solve problems concerned with distances and areas in surveying
and cartography. Its subject matter was therefore the physical
features of the world, and the logical relationship its conclusions
bore to these features was therefore contingent, akin to that of any
physical theory.‖ 1 They were used to deal with specific instances
in space and time, for instance mapping a real landscape in a
particular area. Geometry developed out of these issues.
However, it has since become something quite different. A
critical change came when Descartes presented to us a way to
describe geometric diagrams algebraically, allowing us to convert
diagrams into formal representations.2 This was beneficial to the
study of geometry in a number of ways. It allowed geometry to
directly profit from advances made in the rest of mathematics, so
that if a new discovery were made elsewhere it could be applied to
geometry, as well. It also solved the issue, which had been
recognized for many, many years, that relying too completely on a
diagram can cause error solely because the actual diagrams we
1

Greaves, Mark. 2002. The philosophical status of diagrams. (Stanford, Calif:
CSLI Publications), 77
2
Ibid., 78
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draw are fallible. No drawing of a triangle is ever going to be a
perfect triangle, so basing your calculations on a specific drawing
of a triangle can cause mistakes. Working instead with the algebra
allows us to talk about ―perfect‖ geometric shapes, without having
to worry about whether our diagrams are accurate. Finally, though,
Descartes allowed us to begin to discuss things that are not
visualizable or intuitable. Geometry was no longer restricted to the
domain of things that humans are capable of visualizing. We can
talk, now, of 5-dimensional objects, or shapes with more sides than
we can picture, etc. This final point makes it clear that geometry
had begun to move away from its original purpose – the study of
the real world and extensional, contingent spaces.3
Another shift came with the discovery of Non-Euclidean
geometry. ―After this discovery, it was unclear whether the
theorems of geometry could even be considered to be true of
objects of the world, let alone descriptive of their necessary
properties, because of the uncertainty about the world's actual
geometry.‖ 4 Now there were actual aspects of geometry that
specifically did not relate to our experience of the world. In fact,
we were now left a little uneasy about the exact nature of our
world – what kind of geometry do we actually have? We had
assumed that there was only this one type of geometry based on
rules which govern the real world. But now we could see that there
were others, which follow different rules, leaving us unsure as to
which one we actually live in. And for those types of geometry that
do not represent our world, no diagram could now be of use to us.

3
4
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Diagrams had at one point been essential to the study of geometry,
but since then the development of geometry itself has tended in a
direction in which diagrams can no longer be of substantive use.
Greaves discusses a number of the fundamental reasons
diagrams cannot serve a real purpose in logical proofs. The first
involves the ―requirement of indeterminacy of interpretation.‖5
Basically, diagrams inherently impose one interpretation on a
problem, but there may be others. Using solely formal
representations keeps us from becoming biased towards one
particular interpretation. The second reason is slightly more subtle
and more pertinent to our present discussion. Logicians,
mathematicians, etc have wanted very much to keep psychological
processes out of our rules of reasoning. ―...the consensus among
nineteenth-century mathematicians that proofs in any sort of
mathematics be free of any dependency on facts unique to our
particular psychology...‖6 Logic is meant to be objectively true,
independent of particular human cognition. If the rules of logic are
based on a particular human psychological process, then it
functions only for human beings, not for the objective world.
Further, if a rule of logic is based on a quirk of human cognition,
we cannot be entirely sure it is true. We want to describe the world
as it objectively is, not the world as we subjectively experience it.
The most fundamental problem for diagrams, however, has
to do with a very basic assumption of logic. A logical proof is
meant to be as broad as possible. A proof is not valid if it works
only for one particular instance on one particular day, or if it

5
6
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functions only for one discipline but not others. ―A single
fundamental principle has been at the center of the way that
logicians from Aristotle to Frege have structured their accounts –
namely, that the scope of a legitimate logical theory should be as
broad and general as possible...logic should not be artificially
limited in its domain of applicability, and thus it should attempt to
model whatever is common about reasoning broadly conceived,
however small that common fraction may be.‖ 7 We do not want
one system of logic for biology, one for chemistry, and another for
philosophy. Logic is meant to be a tool applied across all
disciplines to make sure that all disciplines are consistent with the
real world, not just with our own thoughts. Greaves calls this the
principle of maximal scope. Diagrams, we have seen, were
developed for a purpose in direct opposition to this. Diagrams were
meant to describe specific, contingent instances, not broad
axiomatic laws. This makes diagrams fundamentally at odds with
the aim of logic.
Visual Elements in Formal Representations
So, we can see now why it has seemed so important to
remove all aspects of diagram from our formal representations.
Diagrams are contingent, so any diagrammatic element of a formal
representation is a potential weakness to the proof. It is a point at
which we cannot be sure the proof is following the principle of
maximal scope or that it is detached from our psychological
processes. Kirshner and Landy's experiments, however, highlight
the possibility of just such an element. When we write a formula
7
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on the page, certainly that is a visual object. We may call it
'writing' instead of 'drawing', but we must admit that both are
visually processed and involve spatial relationships on the page. So
we need to clearly distinguish what makes something a formal
representation on a page, and what makes it a diagram.
Landy describes two distinctions that have been made. The
first is the concept of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic
representations. Diagrams are intrinsic representations, because the
truth I am trying to show with my diagram is intrinsic to the
diagram itself. I can draw a diagram illustrating that line A is
longer than line B by drawing one line longer than the other – the
difference in lengths of the lines is inherent to the drawing. In a
formula, however, all of the symbols involved are arbitrary. The
truth I am trying to show is extrinsic to the symbols I make – when
I say 1+1=2, nothing about any of those squiggles on the page is
inherently related to the numbers involved or the process of
addition. The drawing of the lines, on the other hand, is not
arbitrary.8
Another way of getting at this difference is to say that
diagrams are direct representations, whereas formal representations
are indirect. The formula 1+1=2 is indirect because I arrive at the
truth of the statement only through knowledge of outside laws
(what the symbol '1' means, what the rule of addition is, etc). But
in the diagram of the lines, the truth directly shown to me through
the symbols involved. I need no outside knowledge (besides
knowing the definition of 'longer') to understand what is being

8
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stated.9 What both of these theories are getting at is the idea of
arbitrariness. Formal representations are arbitrary, diagrams are
not. So in order to decide whether something is diagrammatic or
formal using these definitions, we have to ask whether it is
arbitrary, direct, and intrinsic.
Landy aims to show that there are diagrammatic elements
to formal representations by showing how the spatial relationships
between our arbitrary symbols on the page reflect the processes
going on in our calculations and also how making those
relationships differ from our norm causes us to make errors. ―…the
rule system that governs the interpretation of formal systems carry
functional spatial information – in other words, they are
diagrammatic.‖ 10 Before Landy published his papers, Kirshner11
published a paper examining the curious fact that when people
write out formulas, they place operands closer together or farther
apart in reflection of the order of operations. So, 1+2x3=7 tends to
be written 1 + 2x3 = 7, with the multiplied terms placed spatially
closer together on the page than the added terms. He wished to see
if this spatial grouping affected the way we compute, or in other
words, if these spatial relationships inform the steps we take to
solve an equation.12
To do this, Kirshner made a system called a Nonce
Notation, which is a system of arithmetic completely divorced
from any of the symbols we currently use. This Nonce Notation

9
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had two difference versions. The first was ―unspaced‖, the second
was ―spaced‖. The unspaced version had nothing in common with
our current notation, the spaced version was exactly the same as
unspaced, except following this Rule of Spacing we apparently
use. So the two systems were thus:
Current
a+b
a-b
axb
a/b
a^b
b

Unspaced
aAb
aSb
aMb
aDb
aEb
aRb

Spaced
a A b
a S b
aMb
aDb
aEb
aRb

In the spaced version, the operations which are supposed to be
performed first are placed closer together than those which should
be performed last, just like what we tend to do when writing in our
own notational system.13
Kirshner took a group of highschool students and first
tested them on how well they understood math in our current
notational system. Those who made minimal errors on the test then
went on to take the same type of test, except using the Nonce
Notation. The first test was unspaced, the second was spaced.
These were students who understood the laws of math and the
order of operations, so any mistakes they made would mostly be
due to having trouble with the new notation. He compared the
scores of the first, unspaced test to the scores of the spaced test and
13
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found that indeed, students did much better when the notation was
spaced. Since the only difference between the two was the spacing,
it had to be the spacing itself which made their scores go up.14 This
spacing, which is reflective of the order of operations, does seem
to inform our calculations. It is not irrelevant.
David Landy did a series of experiments to follow through
on these findings. In his first experiment, he tested how well
people could judge the truth of a statement when the spacing of it
was inconsistent (meaning, when the statement did not follow the
Rule of Spacing). So he asked people (in his case, college
students), whether a series of statements were true or false. Some
were consistent (i.e., does ―axb + cxd‖ necessarily equal ―cxd +
axb‖? For which the answer is yes), and some were inconsistent
(i.e., does ―a+b x c+d‖ necessarily equal ―c+d x a+b‖? For
which the answer is no). He found that people made six times as
many errors when the spacing was inconsistent.15 Inconsistent
spacing apparently interferes with people‘s ability to judge the
truth of a statement.
Next, Landy tested whether people really do consistently
add these spacings to statements when they write or type them out.
First he wrote out formulas in words (so, ―one plus one equals
two‖) and asked his participants to write the same formula out in
symbols (―1+1=2‖). He found that people did indeed place
multiplied items closer together than added items.16 Thinking
perhaps this was a quirk of handwriting having something to do
with the length of time it takes a person to think about the formula
14
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(meaning perhaps the gaps were due to a pause in thought), he
tested whether the same would happen when typing on a computer.
This time, participants were asked to convert English sentences
into logical symbols (―if Jack is happy, then Jill is happy‖ would
then become ―A → B‖). Again, however, people left spaces
between groups reflective of the order of operations. So the
spacing was present whether the formal sentences were
handwritten or typed.17
Lastly, Landy tested how spacing affects people's ability to
correctly solve formulae. First he had them solve simple
expressions with just one operator – so, 1+1, or 2x3. Again, these
were either consistently or inconsistently spaced. He found that the
spacing mattered mainly for addition. For formulae where addition
was the operator, when the spacing was wider than normal
participants tended to overestimate, but when the spacing was
narrow, they tended to underestimate (Proximity, 13). The last
experiment involved compound computations, with more than one
operator (i.e. 1+2x3=7). He found that inconsistent spacing led to
errors in selecting the correct operation – operands placed closer
together tended to be multiplied and operands placed farther apart
tended to be added regardless of what the operator actually was.18
Landy proposed hypotheses to explain these phenomena
beyond simply ascribing it to reflecting the order of operations. He
wanted to say that this is not just a representation of the rule itself,
but rather a spatial reflection of the cognitive processes that we use
17
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to follow the rule. For the simple expressions, he proposed what he
called the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis. He speculated that we all
have a ―mental number line‖ in our heads and when we do addition
(but not multiplication), we start at the first number and ―move‖
ourselves along the line the required number of steps and then see
where we end up.19 So for 1+1=2, I would start at one on my
mental number line and then take one step forward. I see that I
landed at two, and therefore know that the answer is two. But when
spacing is abnormally wide or narrow, it influences my perception
of the question so that I overestimate or underestimate the correct
response, respectively. Thus the spacing of the formula on the page
is a visual representation of the act of walking along my mental
number line.
For the compound expressions, Landy offers a somewhat
more subtle explanation. He claims that when terms are grouped
closer together, it is a spatial representation of how syntactically
bound together they are (I shall call this the ―syntax‖ hypothesis).
―...if, as we suggest, understanding formal symbol structures
typically involves spatial resources, then symbolic productions
might be expected to reflect syntactic structure: The less tightly
two adjacent terms are bound syntactically, the farther apart they
should be placed physically.‖ 20 In the expression 1+2x3, 2 and 3
are more tightly syntactically bound than 2 and 1, so I place 2
closer to 3 than to 1 as a visual representation of that tightness.

19
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The Rule of Spacing and the Principle of Maximal Scope
If these are in fact diagrammatic elements in our formal
representation, we have to ask what this shows. We have striven to
remove diagrams from our computations and proofs because
historically, diagrams were meant to represent contingent objects,
relations, etc. Because they are contingent, they cannot follow the
principle of maximal scope, which means whenever possible we
should avoid them in order to keep our math and logic as broad as
is possible. The other problem with the Rule of Spacing is that they
seem to represent, according to Landy's hypotheses, our cognitive
processes. We have tried hard to remove any psychological factors
from math and logic, because, again, we do not want math or logic
to be contingent on the human mind. Theoretically, another species
ought to be able to use logic exactly the way we do. It ought not to
work only for human beings.
However, we cannot just reject the Rule of Spacing solely
because it is diagrammatic. We need to ask whether this is indeed a
weakness, whether it does fall prey to the above problems. I argue
that if these tendencies are diagrammatic, they do in fact still
follow the principle of maximal scope exactly the same way that
any arbitrary, formal representation would, and thus are not in fact
a problem we ought to eliminate. These diagrams are of a different
sort than, say, a drawing of a triangle. Yes, they are a reflection of
the cognitive processes we use to solve equations, but so is the plus
sign or the equals sign. These things are symbolic ways of
communicating the steps we take to solve an equation, and if they
are standardized, the way the equals sign is, we eliminate most the
problems psychological interference might cause. They are not
representations of contingent, extensional objects or relations in
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the material world like our diagrams in cartography were. So while
we have diagrammatic elements in our formal representations, it is
not problematic in the same way.
Why the Rule of Spacing Does Not Yield Diagrams
I do not, however, fully support the idea that these are
diagrammatic elements – specifically because of the differences
between them and conventional diagrams mentioned above.
Certainly they are visual and imagistic. But not all images are
necessarily diagrams – all of our arbitrary symbols we use in
formal notations are also imagistic in that they communicate their
information visually. The distinction we have made is that
diagrams are direct and intrinsic. For the ―longer is larger‖
hypothesis, there could be ways to directly represent that. If we do
perform addition by walking a ―mental number line‖, a direct
representation of this would involve making the spaces between
symbols bigger for formulas in which the numbers involved are
bigger; so we might have 1+1=2, and 3 + 5 = 8. This is a
direct representation of our mental number line: we have to go
further down it to get to 8 than we do to get to 2, so the formula
directly represents this by spacing the numbers farther apart.
But this is not what Landy shown. In fact, what he has
shown is the exact opposite. He proved that there is a common
distance we put between the symbols, and that when that distance
is inconsistent, it throws us off and we come up with the wrong
answer. This may be proof that we are walking a mental number
line and that that is how we do addition, but it is not proof that the
Rule of Spacing is diagrammatic. We have a consistent distance,
and any deviation from that distance is problematic. So while the
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spatial relations of the symbols on the page are important, they are
not any sort of direct representation, and thus are not
diagrammatic.
For the ―syntax‖ hypothesis, there is more of a sense in
which the spatial relationships Landy found are direct. We are
saying that two terms are closer together syntactically, and so we
place them physically closer together on the page. This seems like
a direct representation, or at least, it certainly does not seem
arbitrary. However, the idea of two things being ―more tightly
syntactically bound‖21 is not a reference to a spatial relationship in
the first place. The word ―close‖ is misleading – we are referring
here to a different kind of closeness. Saying two things are closer
syntactically is different than saying Minneapolis is closer to
Chicago than to Paris. There is no real physical distance involved
in syntax, and there never could be, because syntax is not a
physical object to begin with.
What do we mean by ―syntactic closeness‖, then? We may
say that being ―more tightly bound‖ is referring to temporal
distance, in that the terms are more tightly bound because they are
dealt with first and are therefore temporally closer together
(―tighter‖), but then we are right back to referring directly to the
order of operations. They are only temporally closer together
because the rule of the order of operations says they should be, and
if these spacings are only reflective of our rule, then they are most
certainly not diagrammatic, unless we want to say that parentheses
(which are also only reflective of the order of operations) are also
diagrammatic. The spacing would then only be an arbitrary symbol
21
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of the rule, the same way that addition and multiplication symbols
are arbitrary symbols of their own respective rules. If we think
about the order of operations and what it actually says, there is
nothing about physical closeness that directly implies it the way
saying a diagram represents that line A is shorter than line B
because I have physically drawn line A shorter than line B. The
Rule of Spacing, as a representation of the order of operations, is
intuitively helpful, but not intrinsic. Again, for these spacings to be
diagrammatic and not merely imagistic, they have to represent
something in a direct way, and for these reasons if they are only
representative of the order of operations, they do not.
Taking a step back, we have to further note that Landy has
not in fact proved either the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis or the
―syntax‖ hypothesis. He has shown that the spatial relationships
between the symbols on the page affect the way we compute
formulae. He has not shown why this is the case – that would
require a whole different type of experiment. These two
hypotheses might be plausible explanations, but they have not yet
been proven or even strongly supported. Perhaps the Rule of
Spacing is only a symbol of the order of operations, and thus
arbitrary. Perhaps it is not indicative of some deeper cognitive
process. Again, we use parentheses in algebra to help us follow the
order of operations, and we do not consider those to be
diagrammatic, even though they (like any other symbol, even the
numbers) are visual.
The underlying point here is that just because something is
visual does not mean it is diagrammatic. The requirement for
something to be diagrammatic, by Landy's own standards, is that it
is direct and intrinsic. In order for him to support his claim that
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there are diagrammatic elements to formal representations, he
needs not only to prove that the way symbols are arranged on the
page affects the way we think, but also that the spatial relations
involved are direct representations and not merely arbitrary
symbols. Without this second step, all he has shown is that
formulae are imagistic and that there is an aspect of that trait that
affects the way we compute that we have not yet acknowledged.
The Import of the Data
I am not, however, dismissing the findings of Kirshner and
Landy as insignificant. I believe it is still highly important to
examine what their results mean. The issue I see for the disciplines
of mathematics and logic is not that we have diagrams in our
formal representations, but rather that we have implicit rules at
play. It seems that an undiscussed rule has developed and been
passed from teacher to student, and that it is powerful enough to
cause people to make computational errors when it is disobeyed.
Why the rule developed in the first place, which is what Landy is
discussing with his two hypotheses, is an important and interesting
question, but not necessarily relevant to mathematicians, logicians
or philosophers. For those disciplines, the fact that the rule exists is
the crux of the issue.
There are two ways we may address the Rule of Spacing:
We may either actively suppress it, which requires explicit
discussion of its existence and then for teachers to make certain
they are not subconsciously passing it on to their students; or it
needs to be defined and standardized, the same as the rule of
addition or the order of operations. Without doing either of these,
our psychological processes are interfering with our computations
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in exactly the way we fear. The math or logic we do is being
influenced by subconscious mental processes, and there may be
differences in this from person to person. Perhaps what is ―close
together‖ or ―far apart‖ for one person is different for another, and
so when that first person writes out a formula in what they think is
consistent with the Rule of Spacing, it is inconsistent for the
second person, causing them to make a computational error. But if
we make the rule explicit, perhaps standardize the distances
between operands and particular operators, then this would
hopefully minimize the interference of our own subjective
psychologies.
There are, as Landy points out22, a number of benefits to
this rule, such that perhaps we ought not to bemoan its presence.
The fact of the matter is that we are not purely linguistic beings.
We also necessarily process information through our senses, since
that is how we acquire it. This is unavoidable. For the purposes of
written logic and mathematics, this means we process the
information visually as well as linguistically. So incorporating
visual elements into our rules might make it easier for us to process
the information we are trying to convey. Particularly, when we first
teach a student arithmetic, making the order of operations a spatial
as well as a syntactic rule might make it easier to remember and
follow. This would minimize the number of mistakes we make
when computing formulae and help us learn faster.
In fact, the rule could be helpful for teachers as well as
students.23 If we had such a visual rule representing the steps we
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took to compute a formula, a teacher could more easily see why a
student got the wrong answer on a test or assignment. If a student
writes 2 x 2+3=10, it is most likely that he or she did not follow
the order of operations correctly and thus the teacher can much
more easily correct and instruct him or her. On the other hand, if
the student writes 2x2 + 3=10, it is of course still possible that he
or she does not understand the rule of operations, but it is also
more possible that there is some other error responsible. Basically,
this visual rule is a way of representing the steps we took to solve
an equation, the same way we use parentheses. So, it can
communicate more efficiently to a teacher whether a student
correctly understands the rule.
Conclusion
For many years, logicians and mathematicians have worked
to remove diagrams from logical proofs and formulae for the
reason that diagrams, due to the nature of their origins, do not
follow the principle of maximal scope. We have drawn a strict
distinction between diagrams, which are intrinsic and direct, and
formal representations, which are extrinsic and indirect, or
arbitrary. Kirshner and Landy, among others, have rather
convincingly shown, however, that there are relevant spatial
relationships to our formal representations – mainly, we tend to
spatially represent the order of operations by placing physically
closer together those operations which ought to be performed first.
Landy explains these tendencies using what he calls the ―longer is
larger‖ hypothesis in simple expressions, and what I have called
the ―syntax‖ hypothesis in compound expressions. Because these
spatial relationships so strongly affect the way we compute, Landy
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claims they are diagrammatic.
I argue that if this were so, these diagrammatic elements
would in fact follow the principle of maximal scope and therefore
not be a problem the way a diagram of a triangle, for instance, is. I
further argue, however, that even though the Rule of Spacing is
visual and imagistic, it is not diagrammatic because the way it
represents the information it is conveying is not direct or intrinsic.
Regardless, the Rule of Spacing is currently an unacknowledged
rule affecting the way we compute, which is problematic and needs
to be addressed.
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EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
COMPUTER PROOF
Drew Van Denover
Abstract Some mathematical theorems can be proven only with
the help of computer programs. Does this reliance on computers
introduce empirics into math, and thereby change the nature of
proof? I argue no. We must distinguish between the warrant the
proof gives for its conclusion, and our knowledge of that warrant.
A proof is a priori if and only if the conclusion follows deductively
from the premises without empirical justification. I start by
defending this definition, and proceed to demonstrate that
computer-generated proofs meet its criterion.
For more than one hundred years, mathematicians tried and
failed to produce a valid mathematical proof of the ―Four Color
Theorem‖, or 4TC. First proposed in 1852, the 4TC conjecture
remained unproven until Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken
published their solution in 1976. Debate immediately erupted
about the legitimacy of their methods. Unlike every previous
proof, Appel and Haken‘s work made ineliminable use of a
computer program. Their knowledge of the 4TC depended on the
operations of a physical machine—apparently introducing
empirical elements into mathematics, the purest a priori science.
Thomas Tymoczko soon emerged as a chief critic of the possibility
of a ―computer-assisted proof.‖ These CAPs, he alleged,
incorporate contingent facts about the world, whereas
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mathematical proofs require a priori certainty. On his account, we
should reject the 4TC as a true ―theorem‖ lest we fundamentally
alter the nature of mathematical truth. He writes:
[The] use of computers, as in the 4CT,
introduces
empirical
experiments
into
mathematics. Whether or not we choose to
regard the 4CT as proved, we must admit that
the current proof is no traditional proof, no a
priori deduction of a statement from premises
…. I will suggest that, if we accept the 4CT as a
theorem, we are committed to changing the
sense of ―theorem‖, or, more to the point, to
changing the sense of the underlying concept of
―proof.‖1
I disagree with Tymoczko; CAPs can be a priori in the requisite
sense. Something is a priori if it has a non-empirical justification—
regardless of whether humans have a priori knowledge of that
justification. We must distinguish between the warrant the proof
gives for its conclusion and our knowledge of that warrant. I
contend CAPs provide excellent, a posteriori reasons for thinking
that Appel‘s proof has an a priori justification.
Most of the debate turns on what we mean by ―a priori
proof.‖ I begin by discussing competing definitions, and then offer
an account of how computer-generated proofs satisfy the best one.
I conclude that we need not choose between CAPs‘ legitimacy and
the aprioricity of mathematics.

1
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Assumptions
I want to make explicit some of the background
assumptions underlying my thesis. First, I assume that normal
mathematical reasoning, such as we find in ordinary humanproduced proofs, counts as a priori. Following Frege, this is not to
say that we discover arithmetic truths without reference to sense
experience, but rather that their ultimate justification makes no use
of it. Contemporary philosophers of mathematics seem largely to
accept this thesis, and anyone denying it would see no epistemic
difference between computer-derived proofs and the more natural
kind. For the purposes of this paper, we shall therefore bracket
objections to the aprioricity of mathematics in general.
Second, we need to outline our general conception of
―proof.‖ I agree with Rota that a mathematical proof is
fundamentally an argument—a ―sequence of steps which leads to
the desired conclusion.‖2 Like any other argument, proofs proceed
from a set of premises to a conclusion, which we call a
mathematical theorem. I see at least two necessary conditions for
proof-hood (although more may exist). An argument is a
mathematical proof only if (1) the argument is deductively valid
and (2) it is in some sense a priori. These are distinct criteria.
Heuristic arguments are increasingly common in the field, and
indeed they can provide legitimate a priori mathematical
knowledge—however, ―The proposition was true for all of the 106
cases we tested‖ does not amount to a proof of that proposition.
Observe that Goldbach‘s Conjecture, for all its inductive support,

2
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has yet to achieve the status of ―theorem.‖ Similarly, many
arguments deductively entail their conclusions, but because their
premises are fundamentally empirical claims, they do not enjoy a
priori status. Tymoczko‘s argument denies the second condition
that CAPs are a priori, but we will seek to reaffirm it.
Defining “A Priori Proof”
We must clarify what we mean by ―a priori.‖ In this section
I reject the definition Tymoczko uses, which requires proofs
necessarily to generate a priori knowledge. Instead, I offer my own
definition which does not refer to any particular individual‘s
knowledge at all.
Recall that aprioricity is an epistemological concept. It
primarily concerns knowledge—that is, justified true beliefs.3
Specifically, it concerns the ―justified‖ part of knowledge. A given
belief is a priori when its justification does not depend on sense
experience. I agree with Kripke that, strictly speaking, the
predicate ―… is a priori‖ applies to knowledge and belief
exclusively, for they are the only bearers of justification.4 We know
something a priori when we know it on the basis of strictly nonempirical evidence.
As such, calling a proof ―a priori‖ involves a little sleight of
hand. Proofs are neither beliefs nor knowledge. They are
arguments—abstract mathematical constructions consisting of a set
of premises, a conclusion, and the inferential relations between
them. An argument is a proof whether or not any particular person
3

Where the justification and the belief are related in the right way, of course.
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4
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knows it is a proof, and whether or not anyone believes it is a
proof. We need to stipulate what ―a priori‖ means when applied to
mathematical arguments.
Before presenting my own definition, I want to discuss
what I take to be the received definition of ―a priori proof‖:
(1)

An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if it is
capable of providing a priori knowledge of its conclusion to
people with sufficient mathematical ability and knowledge
of the involved concepts.

Intuitively, I find this view highly plausible. As mathematical
apriorists by assumption, we think that all mathematical truth can
be known without sense experience. Naturally, proofs should
provide exactly that knowledge. This definition paints the
following picture: When a mathematician reads the proof of a
theorem, he mentally internalizes each proceeding step. He holds
the entire proof in his mind, and can see why it is true. Because he
knows the workings of the proof, he believes the theorem it
underpins. If asked, he can rely on his understanding alone to
justify that belief without recourse to experiential propositions. His
knowledge of the theorem is completely a priori.
On definition (1), CAPs are not a priori because they are
not surveyable. Since no one mathematician can read the proof in
its entirety, no one person can truly know it. Appel presumably
understands the concepts involved in his proof of 4CT, but when
he justifies the results step by step, he must refer to empirical work
done by computers. For this reason, Tymoczko denies that CAPs
are truly ―proofs‖—they cannot actually provide a priori
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knowledge:
The mathematician surveys the proof in its
entirety, and thereby comes to know the
conclusion …. The proof relates the
mathematical known to the mathematical
knower, and the surveyability of the proof
enables it to be comprehended by the pure
power of the intellect—surveyed by the mind‘s
eye, as it were. Because of surveyability,
mathematical theorems are credited by some
philosophers with a kind of certainty
unobtainable
in
the
other
sciences.
Mathematical theorems are known a priori.5
I agree with Tymoczko that CAPs are not surveyable in the sense
he requires, and if we accept (1), CAPs are not truly proofs.
However, I think we have good reason to reject (1) as the criterion
for a priori proofs: requiring that proofs be capable of generating a
priori knowledge indexes what counts as ―proof‖ to particular,
individual minds. On (1), whether a given argument is a proof
depends on facts about the person attempting to understand it.
Because knowledge is a species of belief, it belongs to
individuals. When Jones and Smith witness the same event, they
form their own separate beliefs about it, which then count as
knowledge if and only if they are true. So ―Jones‘ knowledge‖ and
―Smith‘s knowledge‖ are distinct entities. Further, what is
sufficient to provide Jones with ―knowledge of x‖ may not be
sufficient to provide Smith with ―knowledge of x.‖ What actually
will generate knowledge in a person depends on facts about that
5
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person‘s perception and reasoning processes, and such
contingencies are unacceptable for a good definition of proof.
Imagine an argument that requires hundreds of billions of
pages to write down on paper (for example, suppose we somehow
printed the results from every computation performed during
Appel‘s the proof of the 4CT). That argument would be
unsurveyable in a very real way. The time required to read and
absorb it would exceed the human lifespan several times over. By
(1), the argument is not a proof. But suppose now that modern
technology increases human life expectancy tenfold, and cognitive
enhancements permit us to read quickly enough to digest the
argument and know its contents. The same definition dictates that
now, the argument is a proof. Its proof-status changed because of
strictly empirical facts which had nothing to do with the argument
itself! Suppose further that an environmental disaster destroys the
technology, but leaves record of the argument intact. Has it now
ceased being a proof?
Mathematicians and philosophers often assert that ―false
proof‖ is a contradiction in terms.6 Proofs are certain and timeless.
If Euclid proved a proposition in 300 B.C., that same proof
remains equally valid today. Definition (1) does not capture this
character of mathematical proofs. We do not want our criteria for
proof-hood to depend on any one person‘s a priori knowledge,
because what is a priori knowable in practice will always be
contingent. We need a different concept of ―a priori proof.‖
A better definition of ―a priori proof‖ will determine the
argument‘s epistemic status using only features of the argument
6
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itself—not features of the entities reading it. Remember, to call
something a priori is to say that its ultimate justification does not
depend on empirical propositions; whether any one person‘s
knowledge of that justification is also a priori is irrelevant. Hence,
I offer a counter-definition:
(2) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if:
(a) none of its premises depend on empirical evidence for
justification; and
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only
rules of inference with non-empirical justification.
Unlike (1), (2) does not depend upon contingent facts unrelated to
the argument itself. The argument will be a priori or not regardless
of whom or what is reading it. Moreover, (2) best captures the
spirit of a priori as a feature of justifications, rather than genesis.
(1) seems dependent on the ―context of discovery‖—it asks, ―How,
in practice, did some mathematician come to know the theorem in
question?‖ (2) cares only about how we might, in principle, justify
that theorem. If we can do so independently of sense experience,
our theorem has achieved a priori status. On (2), ―a priori proofs‖
are arguments guaranteed to generate a priori justifications, which
is precisely what proofs ought to do.
Given our assumption that ―normal‖ mathematical
knowledge is a priori, we can derive the following:
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(2*) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if:
(a) all its premises are mathematical axioms or theorems;
and
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only
rules of logic.
Deciding whether computer-assisted proofs are legitimately a
priori requires only determining whether they meet our two
sufficient conditions. Do the computers assisting us employ only
mathematically warranted inferences? We have excellent reason
for believing they do.
Do CAPs Meet Our Definition?
Consider Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4CT, for example.
Exactly what role did computers play? We should remember that
one hundred percent of the conceptual work for the proof was
developed by humans. Stated roughly,7 Appel and Hanken
developed an algorithm—a mechanical procedure for applying a
finite number of mathematical operations to some input,
terminating in some output. The algorithm—like any valid
algorithm—involves only mathematically warranted steps. The
mathematicians proved, using tried-and-true human-generated
methods, that when the algorithm takes a graph as input, a certain
output results if and only if the graph has the property of being

7

The description that follows oversimplifies a complicated and technical
mathematical process, but I believe it accurately portrays the philosophical
elements involved.
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―reducible‖.8 They further proved that if every one of a particular
set of graphs is reducible, the 4CT must necessarily be correct. No
suspect ―computer-proof‖ has been invoked thus far.
Applying the algorithm by hand, however, is simply
impracticable. The procedure requires ―analysis of about ten
thousand neighborhoods of vertices‖ for each of about fifteen
hundred graphs.9 Given the computational nature of an algorithm,
the only reasonable way forward involves outsourcing these
calculations to a machine. To do so, they wrote a machinelanguage program—another series of mechanical instructions that,
in theory, cause the machine to run through the algorithm precisely
as Appel and Hanken described it, storing its data in bits of RAM.
On the hypothesis that the computer functions properly, it executes
the algorithm using only inferences with a priori justification.
Three things in this process are of note. First, the work
done by computer in CAPs remains purely combinatorial—
different in scope, but not kind, from the role that calculators and
even abaci serve in ―normal‖ mathematics. That role comes
nowhere near the creative artificial intelligence Tymoczko
imagines:
Suppose that advances in computer science lead
to the following circumstances. We can program
a computer to initiate a search through various
proof procedures, with subprograms to modify
8
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and combine procedures in appropriate
circumstances, until it finds a proof of statement
A. After a long time, the computer reports a
proof of A, although we can‘t reconstruct the
general shape of the proof beyond the bare
minimum…. [T]he question is whether
mathematicians would have sufficient faith in
the reliability of computers to accept this
result.10
The kind of method Tymoczko describes goes far beyond a
computer-assisted proof—it represents a computer-generated
proof. Specifically, Tymoczko hypothesizes a scenario in which a
computer creates a ―proof‖ of Peano arithmetic‘s inconsistency.
Surely, he says, logicians would find this result ―hard to swallow.‖
I agree; we should be very skeptical of such a hypothetical proof—
but that hesitation does not indicate that mathematicians lack
confidence in the basic calculations computers perform. Again,
CAPs require only this latter kind of combinatorial computation.
Second, we see that computers might introduce error into
proof results in two ways: through flaws in their programming (a
software bug), or malfunctions in the physical processes
underlying their data storage systems (a hardware bug). Both are
real possibilities, but neither differs substantially from the errors
commonly found in flawed attempts at proof by humans. We
misuse notation and make similar syntactical mistakes with
regularity, and our calculations are exponentially more error-prone
than those of machines. If I ask a mathematician for even a
(relatively) simple combinatorial result—say, the rational
10
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reach for a calculator or (even more likely thirty years after
Tymoczko published his paper) a computer. Why? Because
 computers are simply more reliable than humans.
empirically,
Appel, in his philosophical defense of his work, observes:
When proofs are long and highly computational,
it may be argued that even when hand checking
is possible, the probability of human error is
considerably higher than that of machine error;
moreover, if the computations are sufficiently
routine, the validity of programs themselves is
easier to verify than the correctness of hand
computations.11
His last comment raises the final, most important point of how
computer-derivations function in practice: they are subject to easy
and repeated verification. Certainly, it is possible for a single
processor or a single program to malfunction in some way and
thereby produce a false result. But CAPs like that of the 4TC have
been reproduced on hundreds of individual computers, and their
results agreed upon by numerous independently-coded programs.
In fact, new implementations for deriving the 4CT proof continue
to appear even in the 21st century. Granted, these results should not
give us complete, absolute confidence in its validity (as
philosophers, we regard very few things as certain beyond a
doubt). But given the rigor and frequency of their verification, we
can be just about as confident that Appel and Haken‘s algorithm
11
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indeed generates the desired output as we can be about any
empirical fact.
I say ―empirical‖ without concern, though Tymoczko and
his sympathizers would balk at such an admission. They grant that
computers are almost always reliable, but argue that when
assessing their capacity to prove theorems, we are exclusively
concerned with a priori evidence. Tymoczko says as much:
[T]here is a great deal of accumulated evidence
for the reliability of computers in [CAP]
operations, and the work of the original
computers
was
checked
by
other
computers....The reliability of the 4CT,
however, is not of the same degree as that
guaranteed by traditional proofs, for this
reliability rests on the assessment of a complex
set of empirical factors.12
In my estimation, this common argument misses the crucial
distinction between the proof‘s a priori justification for its
conclusion, and our knowledge of that justification. As per our
definition, proof-hood requires that arguments begin from a priori
premises, and proceed along a priori methods; our belief that it
does so needn‘t be similarly a priori. We have overwhelming a
posteriori evidence that the computer‘s methodology follows strict
a priori guidelines, and therefore meets our criteria for an ―a priori
proof.‖

12
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Conclusion
Tymoczko and I start from fundamentally different
conceptions of what ―a priori‖ means in the context of
mathematical results. He roots his entire project in the idea that
that ―mathematical theorems are known a priori.‖13 Are they
always? Remember that knowledge is proprietary to individuals.
One person can have a priori knowledge of a fact another person
knows only empirically, and this principle does not change when
applied to mathematical knowledge. Much (dare I say, most)
mathematical knowledge exists on an a posteriori basis. For
example, I have no graduate training in mathematics, but when a
Fields medalist informs me she has proven an extremely high-level
theorem, I believe her. Is my belief justified? I say yes. This
woman is likely the most knowledgeable expert on the planet. She
has nothing to gain from lying, but everything to lose if caught. If I
cannot trust her opinion, I can trust no one‘s. Is my belief true? If
she really has proven the theorem, it must be. In such a case, my
belief constitutes a posteriori knowledge of a mathematical
theorem. I expect that most undergraduates accept their professors‘
word about theorems prima facie, and thereby create knowledge of
a similar kind. Asserting that theorems are necessarily known a
priori seems simply unrealistic.
We better capture the aprioricity of theorems with reference
not to how particular individuals actually know them, but how
those theorems are justified. For this, we must look to the proofs‘
methods. As per (2*), mathematical arguments follow a priori
methods when neither their premises nor inferences depend upon
13
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sense experience for justification. This certainly seems to be the
case for Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4TC, and for other CAPs
like it.
Tymoczko rightly asserts that mathematicians’ knowledge
of CAPs is necessarily empirical. That fact is difficult to deny.
However, it does not speak to the internal operations of the proof,
which (in my estimation) are the sole determinants of the proof‘s a
priori status. As long the proof offers an a priori justification for its
conclusion, it does not matter whether humans know of that
justification in an a priori way. In essence: we need not know a
priori that the proof’s warrant is a priori. Insofar as we trust our
belief that hundreds of tests run on hundreds of thousands of
combinations of software and hardware platforms cannot all be
completely mistaken, we should trust our belief that CAPs justify
their conclusion without reliance on empirics. Anyone suggesting
that CAPs are not sufficient ―proofs‖ for lack of a priori
justification cannot ignore this result.

197

Bibliography
Appel, Kenneth and Wolfgang Haken. ―The Four Color Problem,‖
in Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology, ed. Dale
Jacquette (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002)
Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press.
Rota, Gian Carlo. 1997. "The Phenomenology of Mathematical
Proof". Synthese. 111 (2): 183-196.
Tymoczko, Thomas. 1979. "The Four-Color Problem and Its
Philosophical Significance". The Journal of Philosophy. 76
(2): 57-83.

198

199

200

MACALESTER
COLLEGE
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME 20
SPRING 2011
The Macalester College Journal of Philosophy is published every
spring. Student submissions in any area of philosophy are
considered. Submissions for future volumes should be submitted to
a member of the Department of Philosophy at Macalester College.
Citation of Articles
Copyright for the articles contained herein has not been
established. However, written permission must be obtained from
the Macalester College Department of Philosophy in order to
reproduce any article (in whole or in part) in a copyrighted
publication.
Contact Information
Department of Philosophy
Macalester College
1600 Grand Avenue
Saint Paul, MN 55105
http://www.macalester.edu/philosophy

201

